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The United Kingdom  
and the European Union:
What would a “Brexit” mean for the EU  
and other States around the World?
Edited by Almut Möller and Tim Oliver
Summary
The possibility of  Britain withdrawing from the European Union – a “Brexit” – has been 
receiving growing attention. Reports have largely focused on what this withdrawal could 
mean for the United Kingdom; however, there has been little analysis of  what it could mean 
for the rest of  the Union, its individual members, wider Europe, and other states around the 
world such as the United States and Japan. This analysis gathers 26 views from think-tanks, 
research institutions, and universities from sixteen EU member states, nine non-EU coun-
tries, and a view from the EU’s institutions in Brussels. Five overall themes emerge from the 
contributions:
1. Developments in the UK have not passed unnoticed, but there are varying levels of  
understanding as to what is driving UK behavior as well as a great deal of  uncertainty 
about the potential impact for the EU and the countries covered. While no country seems 
to be planning actively for a Brexit, many are aware that this step may become necessary 
because of  developments in the UK’s domestic debate.
2. Awareness of  the UK’s position is largely framed by wider concerns facing the EU, 
especially the euro zone. For many states, the UK is important, and the EU would be a 
lesser place without it. Yet while the UK’s reform agenda does appeal to some states, the 
real pressure for reform will remain within the euro zone. Reform agendas might hap-
pen to overlap with London’s, but with the euro zone continuing to move ahead, they 
might increasingly diverge. Countries within the euro zone, the pre-in countries, and 
even Denmark with its opt-out have focused on Germany and France for leadership and 
have tried to secure a place close to euro zone decision-making. London has become a 
bystander.
3. While there is some support for the UK’s positions on EU reform, conceptual clarity and 
language are crucial. States like the Netherlands and Germany seek better enforcement of  
the principle of  subsidiarity, not repatriation. A multispeed EU is considered a possibil-
ity, but not – as the UK might hope – in a pick-and-choose fashion; there is less and less 
appetite in Brussels for “third ways” like Switzerland. And because many EU members 
perceive the UK’s long-term EU agenda as opaque or unpredictable, they are hesitant to 
align with London.
4. Countries both inside and outside the EU are clearly concerned about the economic and, 
to a lesser degree, security consequences of  a British exit. Britain’s economic approach – 
especially its free-market, liberal outlook – would be the most noticeable loss. Yet some 
countries note a growing “mercantilist” attitude in British thinking; its economic con-
nections to some traditionally close countries have been in decline for some time; and 
some states will seek to exploit economically Britain’s marginalization, using this tactic 
to strengthen their appeal to global investors. In European foreign, security, and defense 
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policies, the UK is not easily replaced, and the EU and Europe’s place in the world would lose from 
a British withdrawal: France would face Germany’s “culture of  restraint” on external affairs, while for 
the United States a Brexit would further complicate transatlantic relations by stunting not only its long-
sought improvements to the European arm of  NATO but also a reduction in Europe’s dependence on 
the United States and efforts to make Europe take on a more global role. Furthermore, outside powers 
may seek to play on divisions, choosing between bilateral and multilateral relations when necessary.
5. While these economic and security concerns serve to remind other countries of  the UK’s role in the 
EU, they do not necessarily generate sympathy for it, but rather exasperation at the country’s inability 
to offer leadership other than “negative leadership.” The UK’s debate on limiting immigration is seen 
as a direct attack on the fundamental right of  the free movement of  people and labor in the single 
market. EU countries fear the influence of  British Euroskeptics on their own domestic debate and 
are frustrated with London for not successfully confronting the issue at home. In view of  previous 
episodes of  UK-EU difficulties, the EU today is much larger and in parts much deeper. Some member 
states have little if  any attachment to the UK. The British government’s rapprochement with Germany 
while neglecting, and in some areas abusing, relations with former close partners in central and eastern 
Europe and Scandinavia means it has found itself  on the sidelines of  EU politics. Some of  the UK’s 
criticisms of  the EU and proposals for its reform are seen as legitimate. What is not seen as legitimate 
is advancing these as a purely national interest and using the threat of  a Brexit as leverage. London will 
have to work harder and engage in more effective coalition-building if  it wants to succeed in shaping 
the ongoing debates about EU reform.
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In many ways, Britain is a second home to me. In 
1999, I wrote my doctoral thesis on flexible integra-
tion at the London School of  Economics. My dear 
wife is British, and our family is of  mixed Finnish 
and British heritage. I owe Britain a lot. I am a true 
friend of  Britain, but a worried friend.
Britain’s relationship with the European Union 
is under intense scrutiny and subject to heated 
debate; this publication is proof  of  that. There is 
talk about renegotiation and repatriation. There 
is speculation on a possible “Brexit.” There are 
initiatives for in/out referendums. There is a lot of  
Euroskepticism, reflected also in the EU elections 
this spring.
In other words, there is a lot of  uncertainty. At the 
same time, whatever path Britain chooses, it will 
certainly have implications for its relations not only 
with the EU as a whole, but also with EU member 
states individually and with its partners worldwide. 
Britain’s choice surely has implications for the EU’s 
position, but also for Britain’s own position in the 
world.
This juncture is where this publication steps in. It 
consists of  26 articles mapping out the debate out-
side Britain. We are offered academic analysis of  
debate both within and outside the EU, including 
contributions from Brazil, Japan, Singapore, Swit-
zerland, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, 
Canada, China, and Norway. This range of  non-EU 
contributions I find particularly interesting; after all, 
academic thinking is often about gaining an inde-
pendent perspective from the outside.
In my view, the ideas about renegotiating mem-
bership or repatriating competences rest on the 
assumption that the EU’s treaties would be open 
for renegotiation. This assumption is grounded 
more on the internal British EU debate than on 
reality. I find it unrealistic.
First of  all, with 28 members, treaty change would 
be immensely complicated; once you open the 
treaties, there will be 28 different views on what 
to do. We have been too obsessed with European 
processes and institutional revisions. The EU is 
not about to become a federal superstate. What 
we really need to focus on are European outputs. 
The EU needs to evolve through pragmatic steps, 
improving its practical output in terms of  growth 
and jobs.
Second, there may have been an assumption that 
treaties need revisiting because fixing the euro 
would require new treaty powers. Events have dem-
onstrated that this assumption is not the case – the 
euro and its governance are being strengthened 
within the existing treaties. The real issue with the 
euro zone crisis is to get the European economy 
growing, which involves improving competitiveness, 
developing the Single Market, and promoting free 
trade, regardless of  the institutional setup of  the 
euro area.
And third, the idea that only one member would be 
allowed to pick and choose the policies it wants is 
not a realistic perspective. If  we all could opt out 
at will from the single policies we dislike, no coher-
ent Union would be left. It would be like giving 
the individual citizen the choice of  which taxes to 
pay. Referring to my academic background, I would 
suggest this is not what flexible integration is about. 
At least, it should not be.
Therefore, if  EU membership proves unpopular 
in Britain and renegotiation becomes a reality, the 
logical outcome would be substantially similar to 
the arrangements of  the European Economic Area. 
You participate in the Single Market, but you have 
no say in legislation. You contribute financially, but 
you have less influence. I cannot see this outcome 
being attractive for a country like Britain.
Foreword
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I believe Britain makes a great contribution to EU 
policy. The Single Market, free trade, fiscal restraint, 
enlargement, foreign policy, and competitiveness 
are all areas where Britain has had a decisive impact. 
The EU is essentially all about the internal mar-
ket. If  you are against the internal market, you are 
in essence anti-EU. If  you are pro-internal market, 
you are also pro-European. Britain is definitely pro-
internal market, making it an instinctively pro-EU 
country, as paradoxical as this statement may 
appear.
At the same time, I believe EU membership is of  
great benefit to Britain. Industries and the City 
depend on European markets, and British influ-
ence builds on being a leading member of  a major 
regional entity. The European Union counts among 
the global top; as individual nations, even bigger 
European countries would struggle to obtain a seat 
at the top table.
In conclusion and in the spirit of  this publication 
– as a Finn, as an academic, as an EU policymaker, 
and as a true friend of  Britain – I argue that EU 
membership is the best option for Britain. This 
question, of  course, is for Britain itself  to decide.
I welcome this publication as a contribution to the 
debate, and truly hope you enjoy it.
Alexander Stubb 
Prime Minister of  Finland
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Britain’s relationship with the European Union 
has always attracted considerable comment. More 
recently, the possibility of  Britain withdrawing 
from the EU – branded a “Brexit” – has received 
growing attention in the United Kingdom, the rest 
of  the EU, and beyond. Britain’s ever more strained 
relations with the EU have recently led commenta-
tors in both Britain and the rest of  Europe to ask 
whether some new relationship with the UK on the 
outside might be preferable. In the UK, this devel-
opment has been a result of  the rise in support for 
the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), 
polling showing growing levels of  Euroskepticism, 
the current government’s review of  EU laws and 
powers, and commitments – in differing ways – by 
the Conservative, Labour, and Liberal Democrat 
parties to hold an in/out referendum. The most 
attention was provoked by David Cameron’s 
speech in January 2013, in which he stated that a 
future majority Conservative government would 
seek a renegotiated relationship with the EU that 
would then be put to the British people in an in/
out referendum.
Developments in the EU and beyond have added 
to the speculation. The need for the EU to under-
take further integration to deal with the euro zone 
crisis has raised questions of  whether the UK is 
willing to go along with this integration, especially 
as it could necessitate the type of  treaty change 
that under UK law would trigger an in/out refer-
endum. The emergence of  new markets in Asia 
and the possibility of  a transatlantic free-trade area 
draw the UK’s eyes away from a European Union 
that is often seen as riven by crises, and part of  the 
past rather than the future.
In the UK, this development has led to an ava-
lanche of  reports, most of  which focus almost 
entirely on what an exit from the EU could mean 
for the UK. There is next to no assessment of  the 
further impact of  a post-Brexit EU on the UK, or 
of  how withdrawing from the Union might change 
the UK’s relations with countries such as Germany 
and Australia. The UK also needs to reflect on how 
its current debates are viewed elsewhere in Europe 
and beyond, and on what effect this perception is 
having on these states in their relations with the 
UK and plans for the future. The UK will require 
the other 27 EU member states to agree to any 
renegotiated relationship, so understanding their 
debates on this topic is crucial to assessing the 
likelihood of  David Cameron or any other British 
prime minister securing such a deal.
Commentators outside the UK have been quick 
too in pointing to what leaving the EU could mean 
for the UK. Often such commentary by politicians 
or the media does little more than acknowledge 
that a Brexit would be a bad development for Brit-
ain – and for the EU. But such analysis rarely if  
ever looks at what a Brexit could mean for the rest 
of  the EU, its individual members, wider Europe, 
and other states around the world such as the 
United States and Japan and their relations with the 
EU.
The withdrawal of  any member state is a sensitive 
topic, but it certainly would rock the EU if  its third 
largest member state decided to leave. Undoubtedly, 
if  the UK were to withdraw, this change would 
alter the EU, transform the UK’s relations with 
the EU and its members, and have implications for 
the UK’s and the EU’s respective positions in the 
world. It is a prospect that the EU, its members, 
and third countries should not rule out from hap-
pening. Given the volatile state of  UK-EU rela-
tions, there is a need for improved assessments of  
the overall implications of  the United Kingdom 
leaving the European Union.
This project therefore shifts the perspective of  
the debate. We asked colleagues from think-tanks, 
research institutions, and universities across the 
EU and beyond to set out how the UK’s current 
approach to the EU is being discussed in their 
country, and in particular what are the current 
assessments of  what a Brexit might mean for them.
Contributors were provided with a series of  ques-
tions to guide their thinking. For those states within 
the EU, the questions included the following:
Introduction
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• What debate has there been about the UK’s 
relations with the EU; what role is Britain 
seen as having played in the EU?
• What official government statements and 
other political opinions have been made about 
the possibility of  the UK seeking a renegoti-
ated relationship with the EU?
• What is the attitude of  the general public 
toward the UK and its relations with the EU? 
Are there any opinion polls or other measures 
of  public opinion that provide data on this 
question?
• What opinions exist about British aims to 
reform the EU and about the question of  
how to manage relations between the euro 
zone and the rest of  the EU?
• What impact would a UK withdrawal from 
the EU have on your state and its relations 
with the UK?
• What approach would your state like to see 
the UK take toward the EU?
For states outside the EU, the questions were 
slightly adapted:
• What debate has there been in your country 
about the UK’s relations with the EU; what 
role is Britain seen as having played in the 
EU?
• What opinions exist about British aims to 
reform the EU and about the question of  
how to manage relations between the euro 
zone and the rest of  the EU?
• What impact would a UK withdrawal from 
the EU have on your state’s relations with the 
UK?
• What impact would a UK withdrawal have on 
your state’s relations with the rest of  the EU?
• What approach would your state like to see 
the UK take toward the EU?
Starting in November 2013, the IP Journal of  the 
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) 
released several countries’ views each month until 
July 2014. The papers met with considerable inter-
est in Europe and elsewhere. This compilation 
follows the order in which the respective national 
views were published. Opinions expressed are 
those of  the authors and should not be taken to 
represent the institutions where the authors are 
based, nor the opinions of  the DGAP.
We would like to thank our colleagues from Europe 
and beyond for devoting their time to this project 
and for their incisive and insightful analyses.
We are grateful to Alexander Stubb, Prime Minister 
of  Finland, for supporting this contribution to the 
debate on Britain’s future engagement with the 
European Union and for writing the foreword.
Our thanks go to Rachel Tausendfreund, Hilary 
Brown, and Henning Hoff  at the IP Journal for 
their support and excellent cooperation. Andreas 
Alvarez, Sabine Wolf, and Ginger A. Diekmann 
supported the editing process of  this volume with 
patience and diligence.
Finally, we would like to thank the Alfred Freiherr 
von Oppenheim-Stiftung for the generous support 
of  this publication.
Almut Möller and Tim Oliver 
Berlin and Washington DC, July 2014
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In the late 1950s, the United Kingdom advocated 
creating a free-trade agreement (FTA) in Western 
Europe. It aimed to counter the development 
of  the Common Market, which Britain saw as 
an impediment to doing business with the Com-
mon Market’s six members. France, reluctant to 
commit to a project that threatened to dilute the 
political components of  the Common Market, was 
eventually able to halt negotiations. This episode 
illustrates how, even before the UK joined the 
European Economic Community, the two coun-
tries had long held diverging views on what the 
European project should be. France has cherished 
the ideal of  a political Europe puissance (“a Europe 
of  power”), whereas Britain has favored an eco-
nomic Europe espace (“a Europe of  space”). This 
dichotomy may be hackneyed, but it still holds 
some truth.
Furthermore, current French perceptions of  Brit-
ish European policy cannot overlook a legacy 
of  centuries of  fluctuation between cooperation 
and rivalry between the two. Perhaps now more 
than ever, France and Britain share similari-
ties that should foster a fruitful partnership, but 
the relationship is beset by what former French 
diplomat Geoffroy de Courcel called a “difficult 
complementarity.”1
This “difficult complementarity” is even more 
evident on the EU level. On the one hand, both 
countries share an international outlook and a 
sense of  international responsibility, which spans 
from development aid to military interventions. 
This outlook has been central to the launch of  
certain EU policies, such as the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP). On the other hand, 
France and Britain have profound disagreements 
on EU economic and competition policies, with 
France being favorable to regulation and wary of  
globalization, and Britain a staunch supporter of  
deregulation and at ease with globalization. France 
considers its participation in the EU as belonging 
to a community of  fate and a political project, and 
wants to make the European Union in France’s 
model as much as possible. Britain, in the French 
perspective, sees its participation as a contractual, 
largely economic arrangement, and is only anx-
ious to ensure that its membership fulfills British 
national interests. So how has the Franco-British 
relationship influenced French perceptions of  the 
UK debate on Europe? And what does it indicate 
about France’s position, should the UK’s involve-
ment in the EU change?
French Ambivalence
France has a tradition of  ambivalence vis-à-vis 
Britain and the EU. Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidency 
was perhaps the high point in this respect, in 
no small part thanks to the impetuous char-
acter of  the then president. The bilateral rela-
tionship underwent a dramatic rapprochement 
under Sarkozy, especially on foreign and security 
issues. Pragmatism was the main driver behind 
this approach. French and British strategic out-
looks, foreign policy ambitions, and diplomatic 
and military apparatuses display many points of  
convergence. In a world of  scarce resources, it 
made sense to explore strengthened coopera-
tion.2 The two countries signed a comprehensive 
defense agreement, the Lancaster House treaties, 
in December 2010. Nicolas Sarkozy and David 
Cameron led the coalition that went to war in 
Libya. In March 2011, Sarkozy even said that 
the military intervention showed yet again “that 
there [is] a Franco-English leadership on l’Europe 
de la défense.”3 This perspective runs counterintui-
tive to traditional French positions, as France has 
traditionally stressed the need to link the political 




France has a tradition of ambivalence vis-à-vis Britain’s role in the European Union . There are a number 
of fundamental differences between Paris and London regarding Europe’s direction, yet on other issues 
Britain is an important partner that France would not want to lose . Certainly, though, France will not hesi-
tate to call Britain’s bluff .
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In contrast, Sarkozy was irked at the perceived 
British meddling in the euro zone crisis. During 
a European Council meeting in October 2011, 
he reportedly told Cameron that he had “lost a 
good opportunity to shut up,” after the British 
Prime Minister expressed concerns over the man-
agement of  the euro zone crisis.4 In December 
2011, Sarkozy was equally irritated that his Brit-
ish counterpart had not given him prior notice 
of  demands to secure compromises for the UK 
financial services sector, especially because Ger-
man Chancellor Angela Merkel had been kept in 
the loop.5 On top of  Sarkozy’s resentment over 
British criticism of  the euro zone management, he 
took issue with British demands. The outcome is 
well known: the French leader rejected Cameron’s 
demands at the Council meeting, and the British 
prime minister consequently blocked an EU treaty. 
Sarkozy said afterward that “the [British] demands 
on the financial services were not acceptable. The 
crisis has come from deregulation in the financial 
sector. We could never accept to go backward. 
Europe must adopt further regulation.”6
This two-layered approach of  Franco-British 
cooperation remained in place with the change of  
French leadership in 2012. President François Hol-
lande is not known to engage in the outbursts that 
characterized his predecessor, but disagreements 
with Britain are no less salient. Hollande’s reac-
tions to Cameron’s speech in January 2013 were 
measured. He left it to Foreign Minister Laurent 
Fabius to oppose the UK’s demand for l’Europe à la 
carte, arguing that “they cannot join a football club 
and suddenly say, Let’s play rugby.”7 On a visit to 
London, then Finance Minister Pierre Moscovici 
delivered a similar message, arguing that he saw 
no reason why other countries should be ready to 
accept piecemeal application of  the rules by one 
member state.8
The government’s position reflects French public 
opinion. A poll in 2012 showed that 62 percent of  
the French had a neither good nor bad opinion of  
Britain. This number is considerably higher than 
in previous polls, and shows that the French are 
becoming more neutral – that is to say, less nega-
tive – toward their neighbor across the Channel. 
Yet the French remain somewhat divided over the 
UK’s position within the EU. Polls asking a differ-
ent set of  questions displayed contrasting results: a 
poll for Parisien-Aujourd’hui en France showed 
that 52 percent of  French would favor a UK 
exit;9 in a poll by Ifop for Le Journal du Diman-
che, 58 percent want the UK to remain within the 
EU.10 Among the latter, though, 62 percent favored 
EU integration in which all countries abide by the 
same rules rather than a Europe à la carte. A miss-
ing, but important, question would be whether a 
British exit would make France stronger within the 
EU, and vis-à-vis Germany – an issue yet to be 
explored.
Equivocal on Terms, Not on Principles
The UK’s current renegotiation strategy has so 
far gone largely unnoticed in France, but some 
political positions have surfaced. The Socialist 
Party criticized the British for their vision of  “a 
Europe à la carte and on the cheap [au rabais].”11 
Reactions from the political right have been 
mixed, but overall mild. Some expressed sympa-
thy, and others agreed that Britain was becom-
ing an outlier and needed to figure out what it 
wanted. The greatest sympathy came from the 
far-right Front National. Its leader Marine Le Pen 
welcomed David Cameron’s speech, hoping that 
France might hold a similar referendum.
However, the debate is more nuanced when it 
comes to differentiated integration. The French 
political class would agree that some differenti-
ated integration is indeed inevitable. The concept, 
however, remains vague. What is not acceptable 
for a majority of  the French political establish-
ment is that some countries reap the benefits of  
EU integration while discarding the constraints. 
The conclusions drawn from this consensus 
diverge. For some, the British government is 
pushing an agenda of  cherry-picking that cannot 
be tolerated. Such voices are likely to support a 
common destination for all member states, but 
they would accept that they could go at differ-
ent speeds. For others, the British debate has 
rekindled the idea of  concentric circles, in which 
a core group of  members would be highly inte-
grated, surrounded by a periphery where the UK 
could fit in. In other words, there would not be 
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a single destination for integration within the 
EU. The problem is that concepts such as “dif-
ferentiated integration,” “concentric circles,” or 
“multispeed Europe” are used in French political 
debate with little agreement on what they actually 
mean.
This situation makes it difficult to foresee what 
position the French government would adopt with 
respect to the British strategy of  renegotiating 
powers from the EU. It also depends on what the 
British government will eventually put on the table. 
At this stage, London has adopted a two-pronged 
approach: first, to instill deregulation at the heart 
of  EU reform; second, to renegotiate terms of  
membership, although precise items have not been 
revealed. If  this approach becomes British policy 
vis-à-vis the EU, the French are likely to belong to 
the category of  blunt member states – those who 
would call the UK’s bluff. The vast majority of  
member states could agree to British proposals to 
cut down on regulation, especially for small and 
medium-sized businesses. France may even support 
these proposals, but the crux will be in the over-
arching approach taken, as France rejects deregula-
tion and wants to talk instead about simplification 
of  the rules.12 The recent business report commis-
sioned by Cameron on “cutting EU red tape” has 
already caused concerns in France because some 
recommendations go far beyond lighter regula-
tion for small and medium-sized businesses, for 
instance the proposal not to legislate on shale gas 
at the EU level or to reduce the requirements for 
food labeling by country of  origin. Additionally, 
the French know this strategy is merely a brick in a 
British master plan of  renegotiation.
The likelihood that the French government will 
agree to UK demands on repatriation of  com-
petences is even smaller. This position is one of  
principle. Unless the EU overhauls its architecture 
to offer different treatments for different countries 
– and thus different membership benefits – France 
is unlikely to accept that the UK take part in the 
Single Market and shed responsibilities with regard 
to policies it does not like.
To Go or Not to Go
France certainly has mixed feelings regarding the 
UK staying in or leaving the EU. It senses that 
some initiatives could make headway without the 
UK, notably on social policy and CSDP. On the 
latter, France sees Britain as the main obstacle to 
launching some key initiatives, such as the open-
ing of  a permanent EU operational headquarters 
and beefing up the European Defence Agency’s 
budget. However, the overall potential weight of  
the CSDP could decrease with the UK’s absence. 
France could feel a bit lonely being the last major 
military power in the EU willing to use force. How-
ever, France could see how a British exit might be 
the only way to develop a more common defense 
policy within the EU – France and the UK being 
on the opposing ends of  the ideological spectrum 
on this issue.
Yet Britain is an important partner that France 
would not want to lose. France can rely on the 
UK’s support for nuclear energy. The two countries 
agree on the importance of  the European Council 
in the EU decision-making process, and they do 
not support expanding competences for the Euro-
pean Commission. On foreign policy, they often 
appear together at the forefront, whereas most EU 
countries are wary of  the limelight. Without Britain, 
France would face Germany’s “culture of  restraint” 
on external affairs, which could find support from 
other member states. In that regard, a Franco-
British leadership may be the best recipe to prevent 
a toothless Europe.
France does not want the UK to exit the EU. But 
should Britain go down that road, then France 
would be unlikely to hold Britain back. However, 
detailed discussion in France of  what a British 
withdrawal could mean for France and the EU 
remains limited. For example, there has been little 
analysis of  what it could mean for the Franco-Ger-
man tandem, or whether without the UK the cen-
ter of  the EU would shift eastward. Nevertheless, 
the nature of  the Franco-British relationship pre-
dates the existence of  the EU and has arguably not 
been redefined by the European Union. Whether 
the UK is inside or outside the EU, France’s views 
of  Britain will remain ambivalent.
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The United States has been a long-standing sup-
porter of  both European integration and a British 
role in the European project. The US-designed 
Marshall Plan for assisting the reconstruction of  
Europe required European unity and cooperation 
as a means of  facilitating reconstruction and secu-
rity. When in 1962 retired US Secretary of  State 
Dean Acheson said, “Great Britain has lost an 
empire and has not yet found a role,” he immedi-
ately followed it with another clear statement: “The 
attempt to play a separate power role apart from 
Europe, a role based on a ‘special relationship’ with 
the United States and on being the head of  a ‘com-
monwealth’ which has no political structure, unity, 
or strength – this role is about played out.” The 
part about playing “a separate power role apart 
from Europe” is often overlooked, not least by the 
British. Acheson’s speech reflected growing opin-
ion in Washington that has led US administrations 
from Kennedy onward to push for UK participa-
tion in European integration.
US support for a strong British role in Europe 
helped create fear that Britain was an “American 
Trojan horse” set to sabotage European unity on 
behalf  of  Washington. No one personified these 
fears more than French President Charles de 
Gaulle, who twice vetoed UK entry into the Com-
mon Market. Yet these fears overlooked the United 
States’ close relations with other major continental 
European powers, especially Germany. And they 
misunderstood the fundamental interest that the 
United States had in European unity on economic 
and security grounds, concerns born from its 
involvement in two World Wars centered around 
Europe.
Fears of  the UK serving as a Trojan horse for 
America resurfaced during the bitter European dis-
putes over the Iraq War. And indeed, throughout 
the 1990s and 2000s – and particularly under the 
Bush administration – the United States would 
on occasion cherry-pick the diplomatic support 
of  individual member states to advance broader 
diplomatic goals. Yet in backing the United States 
on the 2003 Iraq War, the UK was not alone in the 
EU, with the then governments (if  not necessar-
ily the citizens) of  16 of  the current 28 member 
states supporting the war in some way. Moreover, 
just two years after the Iraq war, President Bush 
made very clear in his 2005 trip to Brussels that the 
United States had an enduring interest in a strong, 
successful European Union.
The American Interest
The Obama administration has continued the Bush 
administration’s support for a strong and united 
EU, with the UK as an engaged member. US poli-
cymakers increasingly appreciate that US power is 
reduced from just a decade ago, if  only in relative 
terms. Unilateralist impulses have been replaced by 
a search for like-minded and reliable allies capable 
of  helping advance common Atlantic values. As 
President Obama made clear in his state visit to the 
UK in 2011, Europe remains the cornerstone for 
US global engagement and the greatest catalyst for 
global action in the world today.
From the US perspective, the UK and the EU are 
increasingly bound together, and must remain so 
if  the transatlantic relationship is to remain healthy 
and relevant in a world marked by the profound 
shift of  power and economic influence toward 
the East and the South. In the medium term, the 
United States will seek to work through NATO 
or through coalitions of  the willing on key issues. 
But in the longer term, the United States will likely 
need a strong and coherent EU to advance com-
mon interests and values in a globally competitive 
world. And as Obama’s then Assistant Secretary 
of  State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Phil 
United States of America
Jeff Lightfoot and Tim Oliver
Britain is one of the United States’ most important relationships, but Britain’s position within the European 
Union is central to its importance . Were the United Kingdom to exit from the EU, it would weaken the 
geopolitical position of Britain and change the EU and Europe in ways that could be detrimental to US 
interests .
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Gordon, declared in a visit to London in January 
2013: “We welcome an outward-looking European 
Union with Britain in it. We benefit when the EU 
is unified, speaking with a single voice, and focused 
on our shared interests around the world and in 
Europe … We want to see a strong British voice 
in that European Union. That is in the American 
interest.”
The United States has expressed frustrations at 
Europe’s inability to act coherently in the world 
either through the European Union or NATO. The 
EU’s own problems, especially those in the euro 
zone, leave the United States concerned about the 
damage that a euro zone collapse could cause for 
both Europe and the United States. Though the 
United States realizes that a phase of  navel-gazing 
is inevitable while the EU deals with its euro zone 
challenges, it nonetheless finds it frustrating. This 
current phase adds to fears that the EU is too 
inward-looking in general.
From Washington’s perspective, British member-
ship in the EU enhances the prospects for coop-
eration between the EU and the United States. 
American and British alignment on a range of  
issues – such as economic liberalization, free trade, 
and security outlooks – makes UK membership 
in the EU in the direct interest of  the United 
States. Efforts to reform the EU, to make it more 
responsive and dynamic, are therefore welcomed 
by the United States. However, the United States 
is also alert to concerns from other member states 
that British efforts are more about British domestic 
politics and national interests, and less about the 
interests of  either the EU or stable transatlantic 
relations.
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partner-
ship (TTIP) has emerged as a crucial focus of  
US–EU relations. For the United States, this deal is 
not simply about trade. If  successfully negotiated, 
it could shift the center of  gravity of  transatlantic 
relations from NATO toward a US–EU relation-
ship. Britain has been central to efforts to move 
this relationship forward, thanks in no small part 
to its position as one of  the United States’ larg-
est trading and investment partners. But Britain’s 
strained relations with the EU haunt negotiations.
Although a TTIP without the UK (in the case of  
its secession from the EU) would not be impos-
sible – indeed, the United States and other EU 
members have warned that this alliance could hap-
pen – it would be a more difficult deal to secure, 
especially in Washington, where it would be a 
more difficult sell to Congress. Talk of  Britain 
joining NAFTA, or securing some other deal with 
the United States, overlooks how for the United 
States, any such relationship would take place in the 
shadow of  the TTIP.
Despite talk of  an Asian pivot, the Unites States 
remains committed to Europe. An improved geo-
political relationship is the prize that the United 
States seeks through the TTIP. For the United 
States, the TTIP could be less effective if  Britain 
was not to play a leading part in the European side 
of  the relationship.
NATO remains an important part of  the United 
States’ relations with Europe, but in part thanks to 
failures in Europe to organize better on defense 
or act coherently on security matters, the United 
States is growing weary of  the security alliance. 
Operations in Libya, where the US role proved 
essential, along with the behavior of  states such as 
Germany with respect to Syria, and the UK after 
the House of  Commons vote, have reinforced con-
cerns. As a result, US concerns that EU defense 
cooperation could undermine NATO have given 
way to a desire to see any progress on defense, 
regardless of  the facilitator. The United States sees 
the lack of  European capability – be it through 
NATO or the EU – as the primary risk to NATO 
and the future of  transatlantic security cooperation.
Beyond concerns about trade and security, the gen-
eral political debate in the United States about the 
UK and the EU can seem lackluster. Relations with 
the UK are still seen very much through talk about 
Churchill or Thatcher. Although some Republicans 
lament US relations with the EU, the potential for 
this position to extend into executive policy, should 
the Republicans win the White House, is, at best, 
remote. Moreover, no one in the United States any 
longer sees the European Union – with its many 
crises – as a threat to American power, as some did 
in the late 1990s. Instead, a lazy but popular view 
DGAPanalyse 16 | September 2014
17
of  Europe, the UK included (especially among 
conservatives), sees it as a place alien to US values 
and in decline, thanks to issues such as socialized 
medical care and Islamization.
A European Union without Britain: 
Implications for the United States
For the United States, the UK’s geopolitical rel-
evance would be much reduced by withdrawal 
from the EU. Britain would remain an important 
ally, with strong economic, social, and cultural links. 
The practical core of  any “special relationship” 
would more than likely remain in nuclear weapons, 
intelligence sharing, and Special Forces. The UK’s 
involvement in US intelligence activities monitor-
ing other EU member states points to how strong 
this link is. British prime ministers would likely 
continue the long-standing approach of  offering 
British military contributions to US military opera-
tions as a way of  securing influence in Washington, 
and in turn a continued US defense commitment 
to the UK. But declining UK military capabilities 
will make this strategy increasingly difficult. Other 
options would need to be considered. The United 
States does not see EU membership as limiting the 
UK to only engaging in European matters. It wel-
comes London’s global engagement, but this role 
is built in part on a foundation of  European and 
transatlantic links. Any efforts by Britain from the 
outside to play a bridging role between the United 
States and the EU would not likely be welcome in 
either party. Britain therefore risks finding itself  
sidelined in US–EU relations.
Britain must avoid a situation in which a US admin-
istration is forced to choose between a deep and 
special bilateral relationship with the UK, and a 
more brittle, but much larger and important rela-
tionship with the rest of  the EU. From the US 
perspective, Britain and the EU should remain 
together for the health and relevance of  the trans-
atlantic relationship. Nor would the United States 
appreciate – if  anything it would deeply resent – 
being drawn in to play the part of  a counselor to 
limit the damage, not least to its own relations with 
its European allies, from a UK–EU divorce.
The United States, like powers such as Russia 
and China, would not assess Britain’s withdrawal 
simply in terms of  what it means for its own 
relations with the UK, but in terms of  what it 
means for its more important and larger relation-
ship with the European Union. The implications 
of  a UK withdrawal for the EU are generally 
under-researched, but it could make the EU more 
inward-looking, unwilling to enlarge further, less 
focused on the Atlantic, and even less able to mar-
shal the full potential for military and diplomatic 
power. It would remain dependent on a US security 
guarantee.
Alternatively, freed of  an awkward member, the EU 
could become a more coherent actor. Whichever 
way the EU moves, the UK should not expect the 
United States to disengage from the EU because 
Britain has withdrawn. If  anything, Britain’s 
absence would mean that the United States would 
have to increase its relations with the remaining 
members of  the EU, to the detriment of  rela-
tions with the UK. There would be no shortage of  
applicants to fill the position of  claiming to be the 
United States’ closest ally within the EU, and the 
United States would be keen to build closer rela-
tions with, for example, France, the Netherlands, or 
Poland. Although such applicants might struggle 
to offer a relationship that could claim to be as 
“special” as British–American ties, for Washington 
they would be of  increased importance thanks to 
Europe and the EU, as an area of  the world in 
which it would retain considerable interests.
DGAPanalyse 16 | September 2014
18
DGAPanalyse 16 | September 2014
19
It is no surprise that the prospect of  the United 
Kingdom leaving the European Union has barely 
registered in Canadian political circles. A federal 
election is scheduled for 2015, and major domestic 
matters loom, including energy, climate change, 
aboriginals’ rights, and the Arctic. In foreign policy, 
relations with China, Brazil, Russia, and, as always, 
the United States tend to attract more intense pub-
lic scrutiny than those with the EU. Even NATO, 
through which Canada’s security and defense rela-
tions with Europe have largely been conducted, 
may slip into relative obscurity as the Afghanistan 
mission winds down.
Moreover, a Brexit seems, to many outsiders, hard 
to take seriously. British Prime Minister David 
Cameron’s strategy consists of  a series of  tight pas-
sages to be navigated, each obscured by a fog of  
political contingencies. The first is a UK election in 
2015. If  won by the Conservatives, it would trigger 
a UK–EU renegotiation of  uncertain scope and 
prospects; if  by Labour, possibly a similar, if  less 
defined, scenario. The second troublesome stage 
would concern when and how to declare victory 
(or indeed any outcome) in this campaign. The 
third decision point, assuming some clarity on the 
second, would be a clear and simple in/out British 
referendum, probably in 2017. A national election, 
negotiations between a member state determined 
to bargain and EU partners reluctant to sit at the 
table, and finally, a roll of  the democratic dice in 
which anything can happen – such a vague, uncer-
tain, and distant scenario seems to defy rational 
analysis. Such a mix of  uncertainty and improb-
ability makes it difficult at the moment to start a 
conversation about Britain’s future in the EU with 
any well-informed or influential Canadian.
Transatlantic Free-Trade Agreements
The modest company of  Canadians interested in 
Europe has tended, in recent years, to be preoc-
cupied with two big issues that seem weightier than 
the UK government’s emergent European strategy: 
the negotiation of  a Canada–EU Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), to which 
the final legal touches are currently being applied 
before formal signature and ratification; and the 
extended agony of  the EU’s euro zone crisis, which 
has tested the economic stability of  some of  Can-
ada’s main trade partners and weakened the global 
economy upon which Canada is so reliant. These 
two issues can serve as lenses through which to 
examine how Canada might respond to the pros-
pect of  a British exit from the EU.
CETA, whose main features and selling points 
have been announced, exemplifies the new genera-
tion of  economic agreements that go far beyond 
tariff-cutting on traded goods to the liberalization 
of  markets in services, investment, public pro-
curement, agriculture, and other aspects of  each 
party’s domestic economy. As with earlier agree-
ments signed in 1959 and 1976 with the then EEC, 
Canada is the first EU trading partner to sign this 
new form of  treaty, even as the United States has 
launched similar, potentially more consequential, 
negotiations with the EU for a Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP).
If  the risk of  a British breach with the EU gains 
prominence in the next few years, it will be natu-
ral for Canadians to ask what this change would 
mean for CETA and, by extension, for Canada’s 
economy and its relations with the UK and the rest 
of  Europe. At the moment the UK accounts for 
about 30 percent of  Canada’s merchandise trade 
with the EU – 50 percent more than Germany, 
Canada’s second-largest market in Europe. Trade in 
services and two-way investment give the UK even 
Canada
Charles Pentland
As the finishing touches are placed on a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between 
Canada and the European Union, fear of the United Kingdom eventually leaving the EU mars celebration 
of this significant step forward in transatlantic relations .
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greater prominence among Canada’s EU partners. 
The question is whether this well-established pat-
tern would be affected if  the UK walked out of  
the EU, presumably leaving CETA behind.
Indeed, most divorce scenarios would mean that 
international agreements such as CETA would 
cease to apply to the UK. At a stroke, then, Can-
ada’s chief  economic partner in the EU and argu-
ably one of  its principal incentives for pursuing 
CETA would be lost to the agreement. Some might 
claim, of  course, that a bilateral pact very similar to 
it – indeed even more liberal, given the economic 
views of  the Conservatives currently in power on 
both sides of  the Atlantic – could be negotiated 
forthwith, although this solution may underesti-
mate the transaction costs to both sides and the 
negative political climate engendered in Ottawa by 
the UK’s exit. A second possibility is that Britain 
seeks to attach itself  to the US–EU negotiations 
over the TTIP. But these negotiations are likely 
to be well advanced by that time, and neither a 
recently rejected EU nor a United States that had 
made clear its preference for a strong Britain in a 
strong Europe would be terribly receptive to such 
a brash initiative. A third possibility, mooted among 
some British Conservatives, is a more radical turn 
away from Europe toward the Commonwealth 
(for which successive British governments have 
in fact shown decreasing regard) or the “Anglo-
sphere” (a nostalgia-laden construct largely bereft 
of  economic content). For Canadians, the Com-
monwealth as such holds little appeal as a vehicle 
for trade liberalization agreements with emergent 
markets. On the one hand, they prefer bilateral 
or regional approaches to such countries. On the 
other, the travails of  the World Trade Organiza-
tion’s Doha Round suggest that, for the UK and 
Canada alike, emergent markets may be a seductive 
but illusory escape from hard but potentially more 
rewarding bargaining with the EU.
These unlikely prospects aside, a pending British 
exit from the EU would confront Canada with the 
failure of  a strategic vision of  Europe that it has 
shared with the United States since the 1960s: that 
of  a wealthy, stable single market strengthened 
and liberalized by the inclusion of  Britain and 
like-minded northern members; and thus a strong 
European pillar for the North Atlantic security 
community centered on NATO. On these grounds 
the Americans pushed hard for Britain’s member-
ship in the EEC from the Macmillan government’s 
first initiative in 1961 through two French rejec-
tions, the accession in 1973, and the referendum 
two years later. Canada came to share that enthu-
siasm, after some hesitation over trade diversion 
and the implications of  a US–Europe two-pillared 
model of  transatlantic relations that would consign 
Canada to the shadow of  the United States.
Prospects for Relations between Canada 
and a Post-UK European Union
If  a divorce would raise questions for Canada 
about how to deal with a free-floating UK, it would 
also challenge some established nostrums about 
the EU, already shaken by the five-year euro crisis. 
Even with CETA still in place, would a post-UK 
European Union remain as attractive to Canadian 
traders, investors, and governments? Insofar as one 
of  the benefits of  British membership is its lead-
ing role as a platform for Canadians selling to and 
investing in the broader European market – not to 
mention the allure of  London as Europe’s financial 
center – the answer could well be no. That might 
not be so if  Britain managed to escape the EU pol-
icies it most dislikes while remaining in the Single 
Market. Such an outcome could reduce the threat, 
for example, of  the wholesale migration of  finan-
cial services from London to Frankfurt or Paris.
Absent the UK, the EU would remain an economy 
comparable in size – if  not in dynamism – to the 
United States and China. Its major members, espe-
cially Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, 
would retain their importance for Canada. To the 
extent that its troubled southern members pass the 
remaining tests of  economic recovery and, along 
with others such as France, adopt growth-friendly 
structural reforms, the EU should deliver the 
results promised for CETA in both Ottawa and 
Brussels.
On the other hand, although the UK is not a mem-
ber of  the euro zone, its trade performance does 
not yet seem to be benefiting from the depreciation 
of  sterling that has accompanied its own version 
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of  Europe’s economic crisis. Combined with the 
weakness of  its recovery in general, this develop-
ment suggests that, even as the UK government’s 
European strategy unfolds in the next few years, its 
allure as Canada’s main EU partner may start to 
diminish. Would a Britain – however open to the 
world – that has largely failed to arrest the decline 
of  manufacturing but built new strengths in ser-
vices (now 80 percent of  its economy) become 
more or less attractive to Canadian traders and 
investors?
Important to Canadian policymakers, although less 
so than CETA and the euro crisis, is a third area 
of  concern: the future of  the EU and the UK as 
global actors, particularly with respect to peace and 
security. Britain has brought to the EU the global 
perspective of  a great power along with impres-
sive military and diplomatic capabilities. Despite 
its reluctance to commit meaningfully to the EU’s 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), it 
has provided key diplomatic assets to the nascent 
External Action Service. While giving priority to 
NATO, Canada has expressed interest in working 
with CSDP missions and, more generally, values 
the EU as a regional and global “security provider.” 
A British departure, although not directly harmful 
to NATO, would surely be seen in Ottawa as the 
diminution of  a promising European capacity.
It is unlikely that any of  the above concerns will 
surface as matters of  debate in Canada until and 
unless renegotiations take place and a referendum 
looms. Canada’s own experience with referendums 
in 1980 and 1995 shows that, in the public and the 
political class alike, concern arises late but surges 
quickly and often irrationally. Unlikely as this sce-
nario may seem at the time of  writing, most Cana-
dians would find themselves hoping that the British 
will opt to stay inside the European Union and 
work for a better Europe.
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If  and when a UK in/out referendum happens, 
and whether it will result in Britain leaving the 
European Union, is considered a subject of  specu-
lation. There is a feeling in Berlin that London 
might need to face a fundamental choice about its 
EU membership – and that a move that leads to 
Britain either staying in or getting out might turn 
out to be cathartic. Germany believes that its lever-
age on British public opinion and stakeholders’ 
opinions is limited, as is its desire to offer tailor-
made solutions to London to help it win its domes-
tic campaign for Europe. Nonetheless, Germany’s 
vision of  the EU is not one of  a “Britainless 
Europe.” This situation presents the new coalition 
government in Berlin with a dilemma.
In the coming months, Germany will have to con-
tinue devoting a great deal of  its energy to euro 
zone reform. The agreement founding the Ger-
man coalition government suggests that the grand 
coalition of  Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU), its Bavarian sister party the Chris-
tian Social Union (CSU), and the Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) is likely to take a cautious approach 
toward further integration of  the Economic and 
Monetary Union. But even with a limited approach, 
the German government will contribute to widen-
ing the gaps between the “ins” and “outs” of  the 
euro zone. It is therefore heading toward a choice 
that it would rather not make: between a more 
integrated euro zone, and a wider European Union 
in which all member states can find their place – a 
predicament that German policymakers are increas-
ingly aware of. To avoid such a choice, Germany 
and Britain need to find common ground in the 
discussion on how the euro zone and the wider EU 
can be reconciled with one another.
Britain as a European, Germany as an  
EU Power
Germany has an interest in strong cooperation 
with Britain, in particular with regard to London’s 
global ambitions. London is seen as a powerful 
ally in shaping Europe’s opportunities in a global-
izing world. Angela Merkel’s vision of  the EU is 
not inward-looking, but instead focuses on a future 
global role for Europe, with Germany a central fig-
ure. Trade, innovation, competitiveness, and a will-
ingness to embrace the promises of  globalization 
are often cited as strong bridges between Britain 
and Germany in Europe. While it is often over-
looked in Britain that Germany, even under a con-
servative chancellor, remains committed to a social 
market economy, there is still room for cooperation 
on an outward- looking economic agenda. With 
regard to European security, there is little doubt in 
Berlin that the British contribution is vital; other-
wise Germany would be under even more pressure 
to contribute more to EU defense and security.
An argument often heard in Germany is that an 
EU without Britain would result in a shift of  power 
within the EU toward France and the southern 
countries, a development detrimental to Berlin’s 
interests. Yet Britain’s role as a spoiler within the 
EU is something that also worries Germany. In 
particular, there are concerns that a renegotiated 
UK–EU relationship would lead to other mem-
ber states adopting a cherry-picking approach to 
membership. If  Germany was faced with a British 
“no” vote, it would have to find new ways to work 
with Britain as a European power, but it would 
do so while remaining committed to EU interests. 




Berlin would rather not have a British in/out question added to its already packed EU agenda . Although 
David Cameron’s speech in January 2013 did resonate with some in the German political arena, the atti-
tude so far has been one of “let’s cross that bridge when we come to it .”
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Competing Visions of the Notion of  
EU Membership
Even with an increasingly global outlook and grow-
ing confidence in shaping the euro zone accord-
ing to its own preferences, Germany continues to 
focus on the economic health of  all members of  
the euro zone. This approach is seen as a necessity 
for the German economic model with its strong 
focus on exports. Germany must consider its fel-
low euro zone members, both in terms of  the 
substance of  its policies and in terms of  the style 
it adopts in negotiations. Arguably, the 2009–2013 
coalition government of  Chancellor Merkel did 
not always get intra–euro zone communication 
right. The vital euro zone interests lead Germany 
to weigh its priorities carefully, and make it espe-
cially perceptive to intended or unintended spoilers. 
For now, the so far opaque British claim for “less 
Europe” is being largely ignored as Angela Merkel 
and her new coalition continue to shape their ideas 
for “more Europe” within the euro zone. But if  
London’s claims infringe on Germany’s vital inter-
ests, Berlin is likely to side with the euro zone. As 
much as Berlin might wish for German and British 
agendas to be reconcilable under the EU umbrella, 
this task might be too difficult. Saving the euro 
zone through further integration may come at the 
price of  losing Britain and weakening the wider EU.
Britain as a Spoiler or as a Partner?
German policymakers are well aware of  the often 
fierce debates in Britain about the EU. Berlin 
acknowledges that the nature of  EU membership 
is again changing with the need to further integrate 
the euro zone, and understands that these devel-
opments run counter to British preferences. The 
German government itself  faces domestic chal-
lenges with respect to Europe, and understands 
the challenges of  navigating public opinion. For 
the time being, however, this process seems peace-
ful; in the September 2013 elections, a majority 
of  Germans showed that they place their trust in 
Angela Merkel’s abilities to manage the euro crisis. 
However, it is questionable whether the German 
public is aware of  the fundamental choices about 
economic and social policies that are currently 
being discussed as part of  efforts to save the euro, 
because the previous government and most of  the 
opposition parties largely shied away from public 
debate on these choices.
What is noted with surprise in Germany is that 
while it has become more pragmatic toward EU 
affairs and more outward-looking, the British 
debate appears to have become more ideological, 
less pragmatic, and inward-looking. German policy-
makers are having trouble reading London’s signals 
and wonder where Britain is headed. A wave of  
visits by officials and politicians from London, not 
all of  them proving successful, have not added 
clarity. Despite some problems and remaining hesi-
tancy, Berlin has gained confidence in leading EU 
debates, and as a result expects to be challenged 
over its European policies. However, there is a 
limited appetite for conversations with the Brit-
ish, who seem to suffer from a fundamental lack 
of  understanding of  the German position and the 
wider debate elsewhere in the EU.
London has to work harder to establish itself  as 
a credible voice in the debate over EU reform, 
and demonstrate that it is not acting purely out 
of  national self-interest, particularly with respect 
to the British government’s ongoing Balance of  
Competences Review and the wider reform agenda 
that David Cameron outlined in his January 2013 
speech on Europe. Germany has a tradition of  dis-
cussing subsidiarity, and therefore could potentially 
contribute a great deal to a competence debate 
(especially given its powerful federal states), but the 
timing of  the British initiative was met with indig-
nation in Berlin. It was seen as a rather divisive 
exercise at a time when Germany was investing a 
lot of  energy into fighting centrifugal forces within 
the EU. To German ears it sounds rather strange 
to hear from Britain that the EU needs to reform. 
Germany has spent four years heavily engaged in 
EU reform, or, more precisely, euro zone reform. 
From a German point of  view, ideas on how to 
bridge the widening gaps between the “ins” and 
the “outs” of  the euro zone would be more useful 
than stirring up the sensitive question of  com-
petences as the British Balance of  Competences 
Review does.
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The euro zone/non–euro zone division will 
increasingly shape British–German relations in 
the EU. Britain and Germany will have to find a 
joint agenda that allows them to bridge the widen-
ing gaps. This effort could form part of  a positive 
agenda for the British government to succeed in 
any British in/out referendum.
Britainless Europe – What Would It Mean  
for Germany?
An EU without Britain is not in Germany’s interest. 
Even the process would be messy. The negotiations 
for withdrawal not only would be legally challeng-
ing; they would absorb a good deal of  political 
energy, especially from Germany, which would 
likely play a central role in negotiations. A British 
withdrawal would have spillover effects not only on 
a number of  EU policies, but also on fundamental 
debates over the future path of  the EU. Having 
invested a great deal of  energy and resources into 
saving the euro zone from collapse, Germany 
would find itself  confronted with yet another 
period of  EU change and reform – and one that, 
unlike euro zone reform, would be largely beyond 
its control.
A British exit would also mean the loss of  one of  
the EU’s most ambitious international and military 
players. If  the EU continues to build its own for-
eign and security policies, then Germany would be 
increasingly pressed by Paris, Warsaw, and others to 
do much more to compensate for Britain leaving 
these structures.
Finally, Germany would have to continue to engage 
with Britain as a non-EU member. A major Euro-
pean country would find itself  outside the EU’s 
institutions, procedures, and many if  not all of  
its legal arrangements. Ironically, in continuing to 
engage with London, Berlin risks weakening the 
institutions and structures of  the European Union 
on which it places such great emphasis.
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Poland’s perspective on the EU is still conditioned 
by its fierce battle to secure membership and a 
historical awareness that its economic and political 
standing could be snatched away. The UK, hav-
ing enjoyed a millennium of  more or less linear 
economic and political development, has a differ-
ent sense of  its own worth and the purpose of  
EU membership. The difference in perspectives 
between catch-up country and “incumbent” West-
ern power makes close cooperation difficult.
This difference matters for two reasons. First, and 
unusually for today’s fragmented European Union, 
the two countries are actually in broad agreement 
about the EU’s future. Both talk about a liberal 
area, aligned with the United States but not depen-
dent on it, a bloc prepared to enlarge for geostra-
tegic reasons and to behave pragmatically on vital 
issues such as renewable energy. Thus, any failure 
to overcome their differences of  interpretation and 
capitalize on this overlap of  interests increases the 
chances that a rather different vision of  the EU 
will win out.
Second, the bilateral issues that bind the two coun-
tries in the EU are becoming almost existential in 
their dimensions, be this the challenge of  large-
scale migration flows from Poland to the UK under 
the EU’s free movement laws or the emergence of  
a euro zone core with the capacity to define both 
countries politically. The UK and Poland would 
greatly increase their chances of  solving these 
problems if  they worked together, whereas any fail-
ure to do so will turn European integration from a 
solution into a serious problem for them.
This tight symmetry in an otherwise unequal EU 
relationship means not only that one side’s actions 
can disproportionately affect the other, but that 
each often assumes that the other shares its basic 
approach to European affairs. This assumption is 
proving a recipe for tension and misunderstanding, 
currently played out in three perceptions of  the UK 
in Poland – as spoiler, talker, and mirror.
Britain the Spoiler
The British frequently express their surprise about 
the way in which Warsaw is conducting its Europe 
policy. They are confused by what they see as 
Poland rebalancing away from the UK in a way 
potentially inimical to Poland’s own interests. They 
question the wisdom of  Warsaw building bridges 
with France (the country most opposed to Polish 
EU accession), hugging Germany tight (history 
cautions against a Polish–German tandem), and lin-
ing up to join a euro zone wracked by crisis.
Because these efforts are the principal contours of  
Poland’s current European policy, the critique can 
be rather irksome (the Poles can be credited with 
at least a basic awareness of  the potential pitfalls 
of  their approach). But what exasperates officials 
in Warsaw most is not the implicit accusation of  
political naivety. It is what they see as London’s lack 
of  self-awareness. After all, the UK has had a sig-
nificant role in cutting down the options available 
to Poland and pushing Warsaw to rebalance.
Take the British role in Poland’s changed relation-
ship to France. In 2011, David Cameron tried 
to block EU treaty change. When the euro zone 
member states pushed ahead without him and 
agreed on a fiscal compact, it was by recourse to 
an intergovernmental treaty outside the EU frame-
work. This move created a parallel legal architec-
ture beyond the EU and without the safeguards 
provided by Union decision-making rules. It gave 
euro zone members a formal channel to cooperate 
among themselves if  they again wanted to move 
Poland
Roderick Parkes
When Poland secured EU membership in 2004, in a move strongly backed by the United Kingdom, the 
two countries were acutely aware of the potential of their cooperation, viewing it as a means to construc-
tively shape the European bloc . Now, a decade later, the British–Polish relationship is indeed emerging as 
one of the key relationships of the new Europe . And yet, it is not the closeness of their relationship that 
makes it so important, but the tensions in it .
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ahead without nonmembers. From the perspective 
of  Poland, and following years of  hostility from 
Chirac and Sarkozy, the French now had them over 
a barrel: Agree to our policy line, or we will exclude 
you.
As for Poland’s relationship to Germany, one rea-
son why Warsaw hugs Berlin so close is because 
London is hugging Berlin so close. The UK for-
merly acted as a kind of  “consensual spoiler” in 
the EU. It stood up for a broad range of  mem-
bers – including Poland – nervous about ideas 
emanating from Brussels, Paris, and Berlin. Today, 
London is more focused on itself, and perceives 
that it can gain concessions directly from Berlin. 
In particular, the UK seems convinced that its 
agenda to reform the EU, either through a general 
decentralization of  power or a set of  UK-only 
arrangements, can be best achieved through Ger-
many. To prevent a diktat of  these two govern-
ments, or a free-for-all where large countries take 
back the powers they want, Warsaw feels that it 
too must talk with Berlin.
Nowhere, though, are the effects of  the changed 
British approach to Europe clearer than in the area 
of  euro zone governance. From Warsaw’s perspec-
tive, the UK’s self-centered focus of  late has fun-
damentally weakened the position of  Poland and 
the other non–euro members. Since the onset of  
the euro zone crisis, the UK has singularly failed to 
build alliances with any other euro-out except Swe-
den, let alone push for euro zone decision-making 
to remain open and transparent to nonmembers. 
In the absence of  support from the most powerful 
non–euro member, the only way that Warsaw can 
now ensure that its interests are taken into account 
by the euro zone core is by articulating its firm 
commitment to join the common currency.
Of  course, it would be wrong to believe that 
Poland has deepened its relations with France, 
Germany, and the euro zone only because of  Brit-
ain’s self-elimination as a partner. Even before the 
French presidential elections, for example, Warsaw 
appeared to be looking for a means of  engaging 
with François Hollande, and has actively used the 
change of  political direction in Paris to deepen ties. 
As for the partnership with Berlin, the government 
of  Donald Tusk made a priority of  that from the 
very first. The point is simply: Warsaw cannot share 
the analysis that its bond with other governments 
is an example of  political naivety or evidence of  
continental caucusing, or just some kind of  inex-
plicable given. While it may be true that Warsaw 
bases its relations with euro zone governments 
on a rather exaggerated fear of  its potential exclu-
sion from the core, the UK’s attitude that the euro 
zone should integrate politically without the rest is 
almost designed to exacerbate such perceptions.
Britain the Talker
The British are of  course aware of  the tense state 
of  relations, and London has made some serious 
efforts to engage with Warsaw, not least in the 
form of  a recent joint initiative on EU deregulation. 
But this effort is the exception rather than the rule. 
Instead of  seeking out consensus positions, espe-
cially on matters like intra-EU migration and cross-
border crime, where EU-wide reform depends 
largely on the two capitals, London has more usu-
ally focused on clarifying British motives to Warsaw.
The assumption seems to be that if  Warsaw only 
understood the reasons behind the British position, 
it would fall in line with it. The British explain, for 
instance, that David Cameron is often speaking 
as leader of  the Tory Party when he is at his most 
Euroskeptic. When listening to his speeches about 
the reform of  the EU, Poles should not fret that he 
is defining government policy – London remains 
pragmatic, not ideological, and the two countries 
can work together.
Yet London’s emphasis on explaining rather than 
listening is problematic, for Warsaw has a strong 
sense that the UK is not being honest with itself. 
Much Polish scorn is reserved, for instance, for the 
Commonwealth policy promoted by former For-
eign Secretary William Hague. Polish commentators 
deem it wishful thinking that the Commonwealth 
states, neglected by London since the 1970s, will 
offer a serious alternative to EU membership. Like 
the UK, Poland is aware of  the growing relevance 
of  non-European powers and their challenge to the 
competitiveness of  the EU. Unlike the UK, how-
ever, Poland will have to build its relations to them 
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from a standing start: it does not have a global his-
tory. Warsaw is thus sensitive to any indication that 
the UK is squandering its advantages and treating 
its relations to, say, Canada, Australia, or India as 
nothing more than an expedient means of  reducing 
its exposure to Europe.
Poland recognizes that if  the UK really wants to 
boost its international standing, it will first have to 
face up to its close dependence on other EU mem-
bers. And, of  course, this important step also holds 
true for Britain’s chances to realize its European 
agenda: without investing in relations with other gov-
ernments, Poles believe, British-style intergovernmen-
talism will only leave London marginalized by other 
capitals and reliant on the supranational European 
Commission, Court, and Parliament to stand up for 
it. Developments in the summer of  2013, when Spain 
introduced tight border controls on people crossing 
into Gibraltar, were seen to confirm this trend. After 
a round of  gunboat diplomacy with its old rival Spain 
over the British Overseas Territory, London was 
forced to recognize that the problem could be solved 
only within an EU context and – worse – that it now 
lacked the web of  governmental relations to achieve 
this end. In an embarrassing climbdown, it called in 
the European Commission. After a year spent trying 
to water down the European Commission’s powers 
to scrutinize border controls, the UK was the first to 
activate them.
All of  these examples show that a decade of  
increased exchange between Poland and the UK 
has done little to increase mutual trust. The cur-
rent situation flies in the face of  the UK’s foreign 
policy elite, which back in 2004 stressed the idea 
that opening the British labor market to Polish 
nationals would secure good relations. Instead, the 
large-scale migration seems to have cemented Brit-
ish prejudices about Poland and confirmed Polish 
fears about Britain.
The reason may be that the UK’s foreign policy 
elites were displaying thinking typical of  a receiv-
ing country: immigration may be a burden, but the 
payoff  will come in the form of  the gratitude of  
the sending state. This attitude meant that the Poles 
who migrated often found themselves funneled 
into jobs far below their skill levels. For the govern-
ment in Warsaw, there was the added frustration 
of  seeing a generation of  ambitious and relatively 
affluent Poles leave.
In contrast to Ireland – traditionally a country of  
emigration, and one that is said to have made bet-
ter use of  the qualifications brought by Poles – the 
UK thus failed to capitalize on the brave move to 
open its labor market in 2004. And while a large 
tranche of  the Polish elite is familiar with Brit-
ish motivations and thinking, having worked and 
trained there, this familiarity has not bred sympathy 
so much as contempt.
Britain the Mirror
The UK’s efforts to boost understanding of  its 
policies have been problematic for one last rea-
son: they hold up a mirror to Warsaw and its own 
problems. When explaining the difficulties of  deal-
ing with a Euroskeptic public or government, for 
instance, British officials cannot help but point to 
equivalent tendencies in Poland. Indeed, across a 
whole range of  issues – defense, the budget, free 
movement – the British cannot explain their weak-
nesses without forcing Poles to face up to theirs.
This habit is made more difficult by the com-
plex “seesaw” nature of  their current relationship. 
Poland is currently hovering between two states 
– not yet a leading member of  the EU, no longer 
a junior member. Britain’s decline may thus boost 
Poland’s status in the EU, but it could also push it 
into a role that it is not equal to. For that reason, 
Warsaw does not know whether to rejoice in the 
UK’s predicaments and play down its own, or to 
mourn the loss of  Britain as a close partner with 
similar predicaments.
On the one hand, therefore, Warsaw is embracing 
its reputation as a member state on the rise – it 
has used this narrative to bolster its influence in 
Brussels and to sell difficult choices at home. Any 
indication that British politicians are stuck in the 
mind-set of  the last decade is treated severely, and 
Poland dislikes being taken for granted as “our 
transatlantic partner in the east,” or viewed as a 
country reliant on British protection, influence, or 
money.
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On the other hand, Poland is acutely aware of  how 
far it still needs to go if  it is to play at the top table 
in Brussels. For this reason, Poland still belongs to 
a band of  British “orphans” in the EU – member 
states that once viewed the UK as their principal 
partner, but now have to fend for themselves. This 
group includes the Czechs, the Dutch, the Swedes, 
and the Commonwealth countries Cyprus and 
Malta. For its part, Britain is struggling with its 
own in-between status in the EU – part leading 
member, part exposed and marginalized state. Its 
efforts to navigate this precarious situation throw 
up dilemmas for Poland. Both are unsure whether 
to break away from the protective structures of  
the EU and embrace subregionalism (e.g., the 2010 
Anglo-French defense entente) or differentiated 
integration (e.g., the fiscal compact), or closer ties 
with Berlin rather than Brussels.
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Owing to Ireland’s overwhelming economic depen-
dence on the UK in 1973, the country’s accession 
to the EEC was contingent upon the accession 
of  its larger neighbor. Once inside the club, how-
ever, Ireland almost immediately distinguished 
itself  from the UK by becoming a firm supporter 
of  European integration. As early as 1975, when 
London decided to hold a referendum on EEC 
membership, the Irish government concluded that 
Ireland would not follow were Britain to leave the 
EEC. This decision was remarkable given that Irish 
foreign policy up to this point had mainly focused 
on managing relations with the UK. The effect of  
EEC membership was liberating for Ireland, as it 
enabled the country to diversify its trade links and 
become less dependent on the UK while simulta-
neously raising the state’s international profile and 
self-confidence.
The divergence between the UK and Ireland in 
their attitudes toward EU membership has per-
sisted and deepened ever since. The distinct pos-
sibility that the UK will leave the European Union 
is problematic for Ireland, which remains as com-
mitted as ever to full and active membership. This 
deepening divergence stands in marked contrast to 
the improvement in recent years in their bilateral 
relationship, which is now stronger than it ever has 
been. The positive change in relations was due in 
no small part to EU membership, as this setting 
enabled personal contacts to develop between Irish 
and British politicians and officials in a way that 
had not previously been possible. Following the 
1998 Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, 
London and Dublin have been able to turn their 
attention to the wider interests at stake in their 
relationship.
Deep Ties
Although the Irish economy is now much less 
dependent on the UK than in the past, the bilateral 
economic relationship – a trade flow of  one bil-
lion euros per week – remains very important. The 
UK is Ireland’s largest export recipient; Ireland is 
the fifth-largest destination of  UK exports, which 
exceeds by far the relative size of  its population 
and economy. This strong economic relationship 
is based on a complex web of  commercial, insti-
tutional, and transport connections. Social, cul-
tural, sporting, and familial ties, combined with a 
common language, also bring the two states close 
together and contribute to mutual understanding.
The ties that bind the two states are further 
strengthened by the imperative of  maintaining 
peace and stability in Northern Ireland, which 
requires the continued engagement and coopera-
tion of  London and Dublin. After months of  
talks led by US diplomats, the failure in December 
2013 of  Northern Irish political parties to reach 
agreement on a number of  residual issues demon-
strates the challenges still to be overcome in this 
respect.13 Northern Ireland has benefited greatly 
from EU membership, not only through direct 
funding, such as through the Common and Agri-
cultural Policy (300 million euros annually), peace 
and reconciliation programs such as PEACE 
(with PEACE IV securing 150 million euros for 
the period 2014–2020), and regional funds, but 
also through the symbolic and practical implica-
tions of  common membership with the Republic 
of  Ireland, which has diminished the physical 
presence of  the border. Former Irish Prime Min-
ister John Bruton has warned that the Northern 
Ireland peace process is “reversible,”14 though this 




Ireland’s accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) helped it move away from economic 
dependence on the United Kingdom, enhancing its international profile and self-confidence . The two 
countries still have very close economic and political relations and cooperate on issues relating to the 
Northern Ireland peace process . But the prospect of the UK obtaining special concessions on EU regula-
tions, giving it a competitive advantage over other member states, is almost as unwelcome as an outright 
UK exit .
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Northern Ireland’s political leaders, not yet fully 
engaged in the EU debate, have a role to play 
in setting out the possible consequences of  an 
EU exit for the region.15 Any barriers to the free 
movement of  goods and people could have a 
destabilizing effect on Northern Ireland’s fragile 
economy, not to mention the relations between 
nationalist and unionist communities. Even if  the 
Common Travel Area between the UK and Ireland 
remained in place, UK withdrawal could impede 
the strengthening of  economic and social relations 
between the Republic and Northern Ireland. For 
instance, many existing areas of  north–south coop-
eration, such as trade promotion, agriculture and 
rural development, environmental issues, health, 
and transport, take place within an EU framework. 
Add to this uncertainty the possibility of  Scottish 
independence following the referendum in Septem-
ber 2014 (also related to the UK’s EU debate), and 
the future shape of  relations across these islands 
– and Europe’s western borders – becomes even 
more unpredictable.16
Irish Reaction
It is not surprising then that Irish government rep-
resentatives have expressed deep concern over the 
prospect of  a UK withdrawal, and particularly over 
its implications for continued British–Irish bilateral 
cooperation.17 One cabinet member has referred to 
UK withdrawal as a “doomsday scenario” for Ire-
land.18 The potential difficulty is that safeguarding 
the Common Travel Area and bilateral relations with 
the UK could reduce Ireland’s capacity for indepen-
dent participation at the EU level, thereby forcing on 
Ireland an uncomfortable choice between its near-
est neighbor and its continental partners. However, 
the message from the government is clear: “Ireland 
is an integrated and committed member of  the EU 
community. And will remain so. On such a vital topic 
of  national interest, we will not be caught in the slip-
stream of  decisions that others make.”19 This stance 
is very much supported by public opinion. The most 
recent Eurobarometer poll shows that 70 percent of  
the Irish population supports European economic 
and monetary union, compared to just 19 percent in 
the UK.20
Viewed from outside, Ireland’s high level of  pub-
lic support for EU membership and the euro 
may seem surprising after five years of  economic 
turmoil, austerity, and a bailout program perceived 
by many as being imposed by the European Com-
mission, the European Central Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund. However, Ireland’s 
support for EU membership runs deep. This 
strong support is not only an outcome of  EU 
membership reducing Ireland’s economic depen-
dence on the UK, nor indeed the infrastructural, 
social, and socio-economic progress that followed 
EEC accession in 1973. Ireland’s enthusiastic 
membership in the EU and the euro zone con-
tinues to pay off  in economic terms. Ireland has 
become an important link in the value chain of  
US firms, for which its access to the Single Mar-
ket is key. Even before the crisis began, Ireland 
prospered as an investment gateway to Europe. 
In 2013, Ireland became the number one export 
platform in the world for US multinationals.21 
Between 2009 and 2012, US firms invested 97.7 
billion dollars in Ireland (8.5 percent of  the global 
total). While US foreign direct investment (FDI) 
to the UK over the same period amounted to 
141.7 billion dollars (12.4 percent of  the global 
total), it is worth bearing in mind that the GDP 
of  the UK is about twelve times that of  Ireland.
Foreign investment therefore plays a central role 
in the Irish economy, and one of  Ireland’s key 
assets as an investment base is its membership in 
the Single Market and in the euro zone. Recent 
trade missions by government representatives 
to countries like China, Japan, and Saudi Arabia 
will have emphasized Ireland’s access to a market 
of  500 million people. This advantage helps to 
explain the general consensus that the national 
interest lies in the European Union. In a poll car-
ried out in January 2013, 83 percent of  respon-
dents agreed that Ireland has, on balance, ben-
efited from membership in the EU.22 In the same 
survey, two-thirds of  respondents held the view 
that Ireland should remain in the EU even if  the 
UK leaves.
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Preparing for an EU without Britain
Given the solid core of  support for Ireland’s mem-
bership in the EU and the countervailing trend in 
Britain, the two partners appear to be heading in 
opposite directions. UK withdrawal is, therefore, 
a situation for which Ireland – north and south – 
must be fully prepared. In the case of  withdrawal, 
Ireland could be a potential beneficiary in attract-
ing FDI away from an isolated UK. A number of  
multinational companies and financial institutions 
have already suggested that their investment in the 
UK would have to be reviewed following an EU 
exit. As an English-speaking, euro-trading, amena-
ble location for mobile global investment, Ireland 
could become a larger gateway to the EU. How-
ever, the risks for Ireland are great. Aside from 
the potential for barriers to trade and free move-
ment between Ireland and its primary economic 
partner, the loss of  a crucial liberal ally on issues 
ranging from taxation to free trade could make 
Ireland’s position within the EU considerably less 
comfortable.
A key question that then arises: How far would 
Ireland be willing to go to keep the UK in the 
EU? It is important to remember in this regard 
that, as well as being Ireland’s closest partner, the 
UK competes with Ireland for investment from 
outside the EU. It is not yet clear what specific 
demands Prime Minister Cameron will make of  
his European partners. However, if  the UK were 
to succeed in exempting itself  from certain EU 
regulations while retaining full access to the Single 
Market, this arrangement could see a rule-con-
strained Ireland being outcompeted by its neighbor, 
a prospect almost as unwelcome as an outright UK 
withdrawal. This concern was reflected in a state-
ment by Eamon Gilmore, Ireland’s minister of  for-
eign affairs and trade, in January 2013: “The Euro-
pean Union is not an à la carte menu. We’re either 
a union or we’re not. This is not going to work if  
we have 27 or 28 categories of  membership.”23 Ire-
land might support EU-wide reform on issues like 
subsidiarity, proportionality, and overregulation if  
this reform will keep the UK in the EU. However, 
the unilateral repatriation of  competences or opt-
outs of  EU legislation would be far more difficult 
to accept.
The decision of  the UK to opt out of  over 130 
measures in EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
cooperation and attempt to rejoin 35 individual 
measures is therefore being closely watched in Ire-
land. The process could provide a rehearsal of  the 
negotiations that would follow a later UK decision 
to withdraw from the EU. The JHA opt-outs could 
have a significant impact on British–Irish police 
cooperation dealing with terrorism and organized 
crime across the Irish border. This possibility was 
acknowledged in a House of  Lords EU Commit-
tee Report on the opt-outs in October 2013, which 
stated that “insufficient attention has been paid to 
the possible negative impact on Anglo-Irish coop-
eration in policing and criminal justice matters.”24 
Aside from the practical implications flagged by 
the House of  Lords, UK withdrawal from the EU 
would also leave Ireland isolated as the only com-
mon law jurisdiction in the EU.
Ireland’s national interests would be best served 
by a UK at the heart of  the European project. 
Because this scenario is increasingly unlikely, Irish 
European and foreign policy could face consider-
able strategic challenges over the coming years, as 
Ireland attempts to balance its close bilateral rela-
tionship with the UK with its equally strong com-
mitment to European integration.
All views and opinions expressed are solely those of  the 
author.
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China’s vision of  a multipolar world shapes its 
views of  both the EU and the UK’s place in the 
EU. A united, strong, and open Europe that is a 
credible global actor suits China’s interests. How-
ever, in pursuing this vision, China’s interests in the 
EU and the UK alternate between being primarily 
economic and geopolitical, albeit with consider-
able overlap between the two. China’s geopolitical 
thinking concentrates largely on its neighboring 
states and superpowers such as the United States. 
Uncertainties over European integration and coop-
eration, especially since the euro zone crisis, have 
temporarily marginalized the position of  the EU in 
China’s geopolitical thinking and have led China to 
focus instead on bilateral relations with individual 
EU member states. However, despite the euro zone 
crisis, the EU remains of  central importance in 
China’s economic thinking. Similarly, China’s views 
of  the UK’s position in the EU alternate between 
support for the UK’s strong free-trade approach to 
EU–Chinese trade, and concerns about UK sup-
port for a more value-oriented diplomacy toward 
China. Despite these tensions, British marginal-
ization within or withdrawal from the European 
Union would change China’s relations with both 
the EU and the UK, possibly in ways damaging to 
all concerned.
Chinese Views of the EU
China looks at the EU through the lens of  four 
underlying factors: the global strategic balance of  
power, the way in which European integration 
has developed over time, the development of  the 
EU’s China policy, and China’s changing role in the 
world.25 Based on this framing, China’s current EU 
policy is characterized as follows.
First, economic and trade cooperation has long 
been, and remains, the basis of  Chinese–EU rela-
tions. As a result, China’s policy toward the EU 
concentrates on cooperation on economic, cultural, 
and technological matters. Despite the euro zone 
and European debt crisis, Chinese analysts and 
businesses are optimistic about Europe’s economic 
prospects.
Second, China considers the EU to have a limited role 
as a global actor, judging from the internal coordina-
tion problems seen in the repeated failure to develop 
a credible common foreign and security policy. Even 
when the EU does act, for example in crisis manage-
ment, it does so almost exclusively in areas surround-
ing the EU or in its traditional spheres of  influence 
such as Africa. As far as East Asian security is con-
cerned – one example is the tensions surrounding the 
Diaoyu Islands – the EU and its member states have 
so far played no active role. Despite some policy dif-
ferences and transatlantic spats over NSA spying, the 
EU and its members clearly remain close allies of  the 
United States on most international issues. In China’s 
view, the EU embraces the role of  a “civilian power,” 
while its members continue to relegate hard security 
issues to NATO.
Third, EU–China relations have been disturbed by 
the many debates about human rights and democ-
racy.26 China and the EU have had a series of  long-
running disagreements on human rights issues such as 
Tibet, China’s policy toward Africa, and environmen-
tal issues. For example, between 2006 and 2008 the 
European Parliament adopted a series of  resolutions 
and drafted reports on China that provoked negative 
responses from Beijing. As a way of  countering a col-
lective EU values-based approach, China has attached 
more importance to bilateral relations with individual 
EU member states. China’s experience has been that 
member states, in particular Germany, are more open 
to pragmatic relations in isolation.
Fourth, the global financial crisis caused distur-
bances in trilateral relations between the EU, China, 
China
Lirong Liu
With the Chinese snubbing London for Brussels, Paris, and Berlin on President Xi Jinping’s spring 
European visit and arguing that “Britain is easily replaceable in China’s European foreign policy,” it is clear 
that the United Kingdom’s influence on China – including its desirability as a Single Market location for 
East Asian investment – is far greater within the European Union than without .
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and the United States, and although there are many 
unsolved problems in the transatlantic relationship, 
the close relationship between the United States 
and Europe should not be underestimated. China 
has doubts about the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP), currently under 
negotiation between the United States and the EU. 
Beijing worries that the TTIP could come to shape 
new trade rules and dominate the governance of  
global trade at the expense of  China and other 
emerging economies. These fears have been height-
ened by Japanese efforts to connect the free-trade 
negotiations it started with the EU in 2013 to TTIP 
negotiations. China sees this development as an 
attempt to balance its rising economic power. Such 
free-trade agreements have the potential to become 
an important factor influencing the way Chinese–
EU trade relations develop in the next decade.
Finally, the primary focus of  China’s EU policy has 
oscillated between relations at the supranational 
and relations at the intergovernmental levels. Since 
the failure of  the EU constitution in 2005, the Chi-
nese government has focused on developing bilat-
eral relations with individual EU member states. 
This approach has been embraced even more in 
the face of  the euro zone and European debt crisis, 
a topic of  much concern among participants at the 
November 2013 annual meeting of  the Chinese 
Association for European Studies held in Shanghai.
Chinese Views of the UK  
and of the UK in the EU
David Cameron’s 2013 visit to China provided a 
number of  opportunities to learn about Chinese 
views of  the role of  the UK in the world. Accord-
ing to an article published in the Global Times, 
a newspaper owned by the official Communist 
Party People’s Daily newspaper, the UK is no lon-
ger considered a great power and “is easily replace-
able in China’s European foreign policy.”27 This 
evaluation was not so much an accurate estimate of  
Britain’s position in the world, as an expression of  
the Chinese government’s dissatisfaction with Brit-
ain’s value-oriented foreign policy vis-à-vis China.
China is well aware of  the UK’s difficult relation-
ship with the EU. The UK has hindered European 
political integration on account of  several factors, 
the most notable of  which, from China’s perspec-
tive, is its special position between the United 
States and Europe. The UK’s position in a chang-
ing EU has not passed unnoticed in China. The 
euro zone crisis has created a situation in which 
the UK appears increasingly isolated, both through 
developments within the rest of  the EU and 
through growing skepticism in the UK. Thanks to 
efforts principally led by France and Germany to 
reform the euro zone, a “Union within the Union” 
is emerging, meaning the UK can be excluded 
from decisions within this new core. This possibil-
ity has heightened tensions between the EU’s “big 
three.” From Beijing’s perspective, the British gov-
ernment needs to focus on a renewal of  its Euro-
pean policy as well as improved diplomacy.28
Yet, as explained above, China’s relationship with 
the EU is mostly of  an economic nature, and Lon-
don plays a strong role in this area. The EU is Chi-
na’s biggest market, and the UK has played and can 
continue to play a positive role in the development 
of  economic relations between the two. Among 
the EU’s big three, the UK has always been a lead-
ing advocate of  free trade and open markets.29 This 
position contrasts with France’s preference for 
protectionism, and Germany’s alternation between 
the two. During the EU–China Summit in 2012, 
the former Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao 
proposed a bilateral free-trade deal similar to the 
TTIP negotiations. This proposal was welcomed by 
Cameron during his 2013 visit. He also promised 
Britain’s support to facilitate trade and investment 
relations between China and the EU. His state-
ment was criticized by the European Commission, 
which argued that it was too early to start such 
negotiations.
The UK has also played a prominent role in the 
EU’s approach on matters of  human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. These issues are key ele-
ments of  the EU’s overall foreign policy.30 How-
ever, the EU’s human rights dialogue with China 
has not been consistent, with some member states 
emphasizing human rights and others prioritizing 
economic cooperation. The UK has taken an active 
role in the EU–China human rights dialogue while 
also pursuing its own dialogue bilaterally. Germany, 
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despite also having its own human rights dialogue 
with China, has tended more toward economic 
cooperation.31 As a clear example of  the British 
emphasis, British prime ministers have met the 
Dalai Lama more often than their French or Ger-
man counterparts have.
Concerns over security issues in East Asia do not 
play as prominent a role in the EU’s China policy. 
The EU has expressed concern about stability in 
East Asia, and also has stressed that the US military 
presence is an important factor in maintaining sta-
bility in the region. At the same time, proposals to 
lift the EU’s arms embargo against China, in place 
since 2004, have met with opposition from the 
UK. The proposal, pushed by France and Germany, 
was initially welcomed by the UK, but thanks to 
US pressure, especially on the UK, the embargo 
remains in place.
What a Change in UK–EU Relations  
would mean for China
Chinese scholars view the discussion of  a UK with-
drawal from the EU as reflecting two factors: Cam-
eron’s need to appease the Euroskeptic elements of  
his party and maintain its unity; and, at the same 
time, in facing the aforementioned changes to the 
EU that have come about because of  the euro 
zone crisis, Cameron’s push for more favorable 
conditions for the UK to remain inside a reformed 
EU.32 His success will depend on the rest of  the 
EU agreeing to give the UK a new position within 
the EU, in particular granting it continued access 
to the Single Market. This effort will in part be 
shaped by Britain’s place in EU foreign and security 
cooperation, where neither France nor Germany 
want Britain to leave the EU, as it would damage 
EU efforts in these areas.
The Chinese government has not made any clear 
statements about the possibility of  the UK rene-
gotiating its relationship with the EU. It has, how-
ever, paid close attention to the euro zone crisis 
and Britain’s role in the European Union’s China 
policy. When Wen Jiabao visited the UK in June 
2011, Yang Jiechi, the former Chinese foreign min-
ister, reiterated a long-standing view that a healthy 
and stable development of  Sino-British relations 
was useful in promoting China–EU relations.33 
Overall, it can be argued that Beijing would prefer 
to see the UK stay in the EU and play an active 
role in European integration. In January 2011, 
former Chinese Vice–Prime Minister Li Keqiang 
met British Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg in 
London. Li reaffirmed that Beijing attaches great 
importance to China–EU relations and that China 
is ready to help European countries overcome the 
euro zone crisis. According to Li, a further deepen-
ing of  China–EU relations is not only beneficial for 
both sides, but also helpful in creating a stable mul-
tipolar world.34 He hoped the UK would play an 
active role in the EU’s China policy by continuing 
to oppose protectionism, pushing for the EU to 
recognize China’s full market economy status, and 
urging the EU to relax restrictions on high-tech 
exports to China.
China would face some serious problems should 
the UK withdraw from the EU. First, a British 
withdrawal could change the regional integration 
of  Europe and the EU’s trade policy toward China. 
Since the outbreak of  the debt crisis, China’s 
exports to the euro area have experienced ups and 
downs, whereas according to the International 
Monetary Fund’s 2014 Direction of  Trade Statistics, 
China’s exports to the UK increased from 31.3 bil-
lion US dollars in 2009 to 46.3 billion US dollars in 
2012, a growth of  47.9 percent. If  the euro zone 
does not recover, then China’s trade with the EU 
could be confronted with stronger support for 
protectionism – and Britain would be lost as a free-
market advocate.
Second, Sino-British trade could be affected. The 
UK is China’s third-largest trade partner in the 
EU, and Britain’s EU membership is crucial to the 
future development of  Sino-British trade relations. 
The view in Beijing is that the UK will only be able 
to access the world’s largest single market by being 
an EU member.
Third, Chinese investment in the UK would be 
affected too. In recent years Chinese investments 
in the UK have increased rapidly, especially since 
the financial crisis; the UK’s independent monetary 
system and stable regulatory market mechanisms 
make it an appealing destination within the larger 
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European market. After a UK withdrawal, Chinese 
industry investors would have to pay customs as 
they export products to the EU. However, com-
pared to Japanese investments in the UK, the 
impact on China would be relatively limited, as 
Hong Kong investments focus mainly on util-
ity assets and mainland Chinese on real estate 
investment.
In its relations with China, Britain has both an EU 
and a bilateral identity, which creates particular 
challenges for China. On the one hand, the view 
of  the UK in the EU focuses on the UK’s sup-
port for free trade, its central role in maintaining 
the EU’s international power and influence, and 
its role in shaping the EU’s approach to matters 
such as human rights in China. At the same time, 
the UK’s often half-hearted approach to the EU 
means that Beijing has increasingly looked to other 
EU member states to build and manage China–EU 
relations. China has also adjusted its focus toward 
individual EU member states in managing the euro 
zone crisis and handling matters related to human 
rights. Especially notable here are relations with 
Germany. The importance of  Germany, and the 
lesser position accorded to the UK, was shown in 
May 2013 during the first overseas trip of  the new 
Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang: the only EU 
country he visited was Germany. This trend has 
begun to change, with the March 2014 European 
visit of  Chinese President Xi Jinping including a 
visit to the EU institutions, emphasizing once again 
the importance of  EU–China relations at a supra-
national level.
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After the fall of  the Berlin Wall, the United King-
dom supported EU enlargement with eastern and 
southeastern Europe. It saw the possibility of  
divergences in a larger Europe as an opportunity 
for a more variable and market-driven structure to 
European integration. The foreign policy declara-
tion adopted by the Slovenian Parliament in 1999 
identified the UK as one of  the most important 
EU member states. In accordance with the text, 
relations with neighboring countries, the United 
States, and the main EU member states – namely, 
Germany, France, and the UK – “carry specific 
weight from a political and economic point of  
view.” However, the UK did not capitalize on 
what could have become a special relationship. In 
practice, relations with Germany and France have 
become far more important. Since 1999, Slove-
nia has managed to enter the EU and NATO, as 
well as join the euro zone in 2007. Ljubljana has 
become accustomed to the fact that the main 
decisions are being made in Berlin and Paris, in 
particular with regard to euro zone matters. As a 
result, Britain’s position in Slovenian thinking has 
continued to decline. Although the 2008 state visit 
to Slovenia by Queen Elizabeth II proved popular, 
political links have been anything but. London has 
become infamous for warning against the mas-
sive migration of  “Polish plumbers,” interpreted 
in Slovenia as an attack on all immigrants from 
eastern and southeastern Europe – in spite of  the 
fact that in the group of  new member states, labor 
migration from Slovenia has been the smallest, 
with remittances playing an insignificant role in 
Slovenian GDP. Economic ties between Slovenia 
and the UK are marginal. Slovenian imports from 
and exports to the UK account for no more than 
0.1 percent of  its total trade.
Reactions to David Cameron’s  
Europe Speech
David Cameron’s January 2013 announcement that 
a future Conservative-run government would try 
to renegotiate the UK’s position in the EU did not 
go unnoticed in Ljubljana. However, because Paris 
and Berlin decided to not give too much attention 
to Cameron’s speech, the Slovenian government 
decided to wait too. In any case, Slovenia has 
more pressing matters at home. It is under pres-
sure because of  a high budget deficit and growing 
public debt. The cleaning of  the balance sheets of  
the state-owned banks is being closely monitored 
by the EU. Because the country depends on new 
credit and investments, it prefers to keep a low pro-
file on other issues.
One of  the few “formal” political views on the 
UK’s new strategy was voiced by Slovenian MEP 
Tanja Fajon, who blogged that the UK’s position 
was an “act of  populism,” as “even the biggest EU 
member states are not big enough to prosper on 
their own.” The fact that Fajon did not distinguish 
between Cameron’s position and that of  the UK 
is symptomatic of  how Cameron’s announcement 
was perceived in Slovenia, and perhaps in much 
of  continental Europe. Fajon’s view echoed state-
ments made by Gunther Krichbaum, president of  
the committee for European affairs in the Ger-
man Bundestag and an ally of  Chancellor Angela 
Merkel, who led a high-powered delegation from 
the German Bundestag on a two-day visit to 
Britain in January 2013.35 In a direct response to 
Cameron’s speech, Krichbaum said that the UK 
was attempting to blackmail the rest of  the EU, 
which “is not the way to create a political future.” 
In his opinion, a renegotiation of  the EU treaties 
would trigger other EU member states to make 
Slovenia
Marko Lovec
The British attempt to renegotiate EU policies with distributional implications is tempting from a Slovenian 
perspective . Slovenia faces problems of its own, and London raising the stakes could, at least in the short 
term, improve Ljubljana’s position . However, the two do not really share a vision of the future design of the 
European Union, and as a member of the euro zone, Slovenia’s focus is on Berlin and Paris .
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yet other demands. In Slovenia, this statement 
was interpreted as a warning against disintegrative 
forces and had a strong negative connotation in 
the political discourse. The so-called Balkanization 
process – the events that led to the disintegration 
of  Yugoslavia and that resulted in a “lost decade” 
dominated by political conflicts in the region – is 
still remembered vividly.
Slovenian media, referring to various analyses 
of  a potential British exit, such as the one made 
by The Economist, argued that an exit from the 
EU could save the UK around six billion euros in 
contributions to the common budget, that food 
prices might decrease, and that London would 
be able to avoid financial regulations.36 To the 
Slovenian public, this analysis sounded as if  the 
UK no longer wanted to pay the costs of  mem-
bership. However, with half  of  its exports going 
to the EU, the UK would have to renegotiate its 
trade agreements from a position of  dependency 
and risk a substantial share of  investments and 
finance relocating to continental Europe. The 
media also quoted Olli Rehn, the commissioner 
for economic and monetary affairs and the euro 
and the vice president of  the European Com-
mission: “If  I were a Briton in the EU, I would 
prefer to be in the midfield as a playmaker, rather 
than sitting on the sidelines as a substitute … 
You never score goals from the bench.”37 The 
Slovenian public understood the Obama admin-
istration’s response – that the UK is much more 
valuable to the United States inside than outside 
the EU – as a sign that the UK is overestimating 
its strategic opportunities outside the European 
Union.38 The Slovenian economist Jože Damijan 
compared the relationship between the UK and 
the rest of  the EU to a married couple that has 
long been sleeping in separate bedrooms; in his 
opinion, not much would change – at least in 
economic terms – if  one of  the partners finally 
decided to move out.
Divergent Visions for the Future
As a consequence of  the global financial and 
economic crisis and the euro zone crisis, the UK 
– along with most EU member states – is facing 
increased economic pressure. The decision of  the 
euro zone to enforce strict fiscal rules created a 
divide between the euro area, including Slovenia, 
and the rest of  the EU, with the latter also having 
to pay the price for the forced rescue of  the euro. 
London decided to contribute only selectively to 
the bailout programs. In addition, Cameron’s prom-
ise of  a referendum on EU membership is seen as 
contributing to a democratization of  decision-mak-
ing on fundamental EU issues and to a rebalancing 
of  the positions of  the various categories of  EU 
member states. As such, this path is appealing to 
Ljubljana.
However, national referendums on EU-related mat-
ters have a bad history of  turning into referendums 
on the popularity of  national governments, which 
makes Slovenia cautious.
Slovenia also faces economic problems. The adop-
tion of  the euro in 2007 supported a credit boom, 
which created fictional growth and covered up the 
need for economic restructuring. With the begin-
ning of  the financial crisis, debt began to accumu-
late, and Slovenia found itself  under pressure from 
financial markets. It had to cut public spending and 
undertake painful restructuring. In Slovenia, there 
is a growing sentiment that smaller and less-devel-
oped countries are paying an asymmetrical price 
for the euro zone crisis. Thus, the British attempt 
to negotiate issues that have distributional implica-
tions is far from unimportant from the Slovenian 
perspective.
Overall, there is a clear limit to what the UK’s 
claims could bring to Slovenia, as they are based on 
ideas that probably would leave Slovenia worse off  
in the longer term. What London appears to want 
is a Europe led by free markets and cooperation 
between member states on a pick-and-choose basis. 
In Slovenia, many believe that such an arrangement 
would expose smaller and less-developed mem-
ber states to the daily politics of  bigger countries. 
Cameron himself  gave an example of  this tendency, 
when in the spring of  2013 he said that the UK 
should not be paying child benefits to the family 
of  a Polish worker back in Poland, thus suggesting 
that immigration would be one of  the points in 
the UK’s renegotiation of  its position in the EU.39 
Unsurprisingly, this comment triggered a negative 
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reaction from the Hungarian EU commissioner for 
employment, social affairs, and inclusion, László 
Andor, as well as from several Slovenian members 
of  the European Parliament. Although the number 
of  Slovenian labor migrants in the UK is insignifi-
cant, the issue has taken on more than symbolic 
importance, as it demonstrated that the UK was 
ready to take advantage of  cheap labor from the 
new member states while dumping social costs on 
their home countries. The UK’s approach was seen 
as a threat to free movement as one of  the pillars 
and key mechanisms for achieving economic con-
vergence in the EU.
The immigration issue as voiced by Cameron 
reflects broader contradictions in Slovenia’s and 
the UK’s strategic EU outlooks. Slovenia supports 
the German and French vision of  a proper eco-
nomic and monetary union as a next step in the 
integration process. Slovenia is also in favor of  the 
establishment of  growth mechanisms in return for 
stricter fiscal and banking regulation, thus prevent-
ing future asymmetrical crises in the euro zone. In 
the Slovenian vision, the EU is more of  a super-
state, enhancing the position of  individual member 
states in developing their political voice. For a 
country of  little more than two million inhabitants, 
this support is a strong asset in a fast-changing 
world of  emerging powers. Such a vision is directly 
opposed by Cameron: “I’ve said we want to get 
Britain out of  the idea that there’s an ever-closer 
union in the European Union – we don’t want an 
ever-closer union, we want to have trade and coop-
eration, not an ever-closer union.” While Ljubljana 
might be tempted by a short-term alleviation of  its 
economic situation, its longer-term needs have it 
lined up firmly with the drivers of  the euro zone.
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The British–Norwegian political relationship has 
deep roots. Before and immediately after World 
War II, security was at the center of  the bilateral 
relationship. As the 1950s began, the Norwegian 
government increasingly looked to Britain for 
political guidance as well. Politically and culturally, 
Norway’s then foreign minister observed, Norway 
felt closer to Britain than to the countries on the 
European continent.
Accordingly, as the process of  European integra-
tion began to emerge in the early 1950s, Norway 
aligned itself  closely with British positions. Norway 
shared British skepticism about federalist think-
ing on European integration, and it too preferred 
European cooperation as an integrated part of  
the transatlantic security framework rather than 
some other alternative. Reportedly, the bilateral 
ties between the two countries were so strong at 
the time that the possibility of  Norway joining the 
British Commonwealth was subject to serious inter-
nal discussion.
When the European Economic Community (EEC) 
was established in 1957, both countries remained 
outside. Instead, in the 1960s they formed the 
less politically ambitious European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA), which also comprised Aus-
tria, Denmark, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden, and 
Switzerland. Such was the strength of  Norway’s 
relationship with Britain that when Britain soon 
afterward decided to apply for EEC membership, 
Norway followed suit. The Norwegian government 
observed that this step was natural given the close 
ties to Britain in foreign, security, and economic 
policy. That said, during this period frictions also 
emerged between the two countries – within EFTA, 
in their membership negotiations with the EC, and 
bilaterally over fishing rights. As the 1960s came to 
an end, Britain’s role as a lodestar for Norwegian 
foreign policy had waned in Norwegian politics. 
In 1973 the two countries’ shared path as outsid-
ers came to an end. Whereas Britain became a full 
member of  the EEC, Norway remained outside 
after a small majority (53.5 percent) of  Norwegians 
voted against membership in a referendum.
Being an Outsider
Norwegians once again voted against EU member-
ship in a second referendum in 1994, this time, too, 
with a small majority (52.3 percent). Since then 
membership has not been on the political agenda 
of  any Norwegian government. In fact, coalition 
governments with internally divergent positions 
on EU membership have often had an internal 
agreement, sometimes referred to as a “suicide 
paragraph,” stating that the government will resign 
should one of  the parties wish to put the issue 
of  EU membership on the political agenda. As 
Norwegian public opposition to membership has 
been steadily increasing in recent years, it could be 
argued that there are also few incentives for the 
pro-EU parties to put the issue of  membership 
back onto the political agenda. Recent polls sug-
gest that as many as 71 percent of  the Norwegian 
people now oppose EU membership, with only 
19 percent in favor.40 
To outside observers, the steady Norwegian oppo-
sition to membership may come across as some-
what puzzling. Not least because Norway in many 
areas is as closely integrated in the EU as many 
member states. In 2012 a report from a govern-
ment-appointed review committee assessing Nor-
way’s agreements with the EU concluded that while 
Norway formally remains a nonmember of  the EU, 
it “is far more closely associated with the EU than 
most people realize.”41 Beyond the EEA agreement, 
which gives Norway access to the EU’s internal 
market, Norway also has bilateral agreements with 
the EU on a wide range of  other policy areas, 
including issues under justice and home affairs, 
and foreign, security, and defense policy.42 The 
Norway
Kristin Haugevik
A British exit from the European Union could revitalize the bilateral relationship between Britain and 
Norway and add a powerful voice to the group of EU outsiders . But as an adaptive external player with-
out a seat at the table in Brussels, Norway prefers to have like-minded allies like Britain on the inside .
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present Norwegian government, elected in 2013, 
has declared – like the previous one – that it will 
pursue an active policy toward Europe, ensuring an 
active presence in Brussels and making use of  “the 
opportunities and available options provided by the 
EEA agreement to safeguard Norway’s interests.”43 
For the first time, Norway now has a minister 
responsible for EEA and EU affairs.
For Norway, there have been practical conse-
quences from being “neither completely outside 
nor fully inside” the EU, as the aforementioned 
review put it. On the one hand, Norway adopts 
a large majority of  EU law and often aligns itself  
closely with the EU on issues that are not covered 
by formal agreements, including EU positions and 
declarations on foreign policy.44 On the other hand, 
Norway does not have a seat at the EU table when 
decisions are made, and often has to rely on “back 
channels” in order to make its views known in 
Brussels. Bilateral dialogue with states within the 
EU is a key means of  achieving this aim. On many 
issues, the Nordic EU members Denmark, Finland, 
and Sweden are natural allies. However, Britain is 
also commonly portrayed as a country with which 
Norway often has coinciding interests, not least 
on external affairs and on the development of  a 
European security and defense policy, with respect 
to which both countries have been supporters of  
preserving NATO’s role as the primary security 
organization in Europe. On such issues, Britain is 
often an important ally for Norway within the EU 
system.
Implications for Norway
David Cameron’s speech in January 2013 on the 
future of  Britain’s relationship with the EU, in 
which he outlined the plan for a future Conserva-
tive government to seek a renegotiation between 
Britain and the EU to be followed by a national 
referendum, received broad public attention in 
Norway.45 In particular, Norwegian media reports 
emphasized that Cameron’s speech stated that he 
did not consider the Norwegian association with 
the EU a good model for Britain – both because 
of  the two countries’ very different points of  
departure in terms of  resources and because 
of  Norway’s lack of  a say in Brussels. As Cam-
eron argued, “Norway sits on the biggest energy 
reserves in Europe, and has a sovereign wealth 
fund of  over 500 billion euros. And while Norway 
is part of  the Single Market – and pays for the 
principle – it has no say at all in setting its rules. It 
just has to implement its directives.”46
The Norwegian government at the time did not 
give an official response to Cameron’s speech. 
Before the speech, however, then Foreign Minister 
Espen Barth Eide warned Britain against follow-
ing Norway’s example, pointing out that Norway 
in practice was closely integrated in the EU, but 
absent “when decisions are made.”47 The new 
Norwegian government has taken a similar stance. 
When Prime Minister Erna Solberg met with Cam-
eron early in 2014, she made it clear that she did 
not consider the EEA agreement a good alterna-
tive to full membership, especially not for a country 
like Britain.48 As she argued, “I do not believe that 
Great Britain, with its old empire mind-set, should 
consider becoming a member of  an organization 
[the EEA] which basically means that laws and 
rules which are made in other countries are imple-
mented directly.”
There is little doubt that a British withdrawal from 
the EU, either partially or fully, would influence 
Norway. But what the exact practical implications 
would be remains more uncertain. On the one 
hand, one might argue that a British exit could 
add to Norway’s political room for maneuver vis-
à-vis the EU, adding a strong voice to the group 
of  EU outsiders and smoothing out the differ-
ences between those on the inside and those on 
the outside. A British exit might also revitalize and 
strengthen British–Norwegian bilateral cooperation 
further. Today, trade, energy, and defense are at 
the center of  the bilateral relationship, and the two 
countries have coinciding views on a wide range 
of  international issues. The working relationship 
is commonly described as close and good, even if  
it does not, as former British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair once observed, attract the most newspaper 
headlines and political attention.
On the other hand, should Britain decide to leave 
the EU, it seems quite likely that it would steal 
much of  the attention from the EU’s institutions 
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and the remaining EU member states, perhaps at 
the cost of  the visibility of  smaller nonmembers 
such as Norway. On issues where Britain and Nor-
way do not have coinciding interests, one could 
imagine that it would become more difficult for 
Norway to make itself  heard in Brussels. From this 
perspective, a British exit and a more fragmented 
EU could complicate matters for Norway. It also 
remains to be seen how Norway would react if  
Britain secured a deal with the EU that is perceived 
as “better” than the one Norway has.
More importantly, perhaps, as Britain is often 
portrayed as one of  Norway’s closest and most 
like-minded bilateral partners in Europe, it could 
be argued that Norway needs Britain’s continued 
presence around the EU decision-making table – 
where it does not itself  have a seat. Prime Minister 
Solberg communicated this message in January, 
when she observed, “[Norway is] better served if  
there are countries in the EU [like Britain] that are 
concerned that [it] should not be a fast train … but 
instead want to ensure that the cooperation we 
already have today works better.”49 
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“No kangaroos in Austria” reads a popular T-shirt 
for tourists. It is a sentence that summarizes how 
little known the central European country of  Aus-
tria is to the rest of  the world. Not surprising, you 
might say, for a small country of  eight million peo-
ple on a continent of  half  a billion. But it is not 
only its size that allows Austria to go fairly unno-
ticed in world politics; a combination of  factors 
has resulted in a country that is on the one hand 
economically open and on the other politically 
introverted. The dismembering of  the Austro-Hun-
garian Empire in the aftermath of  World War I, the 
country’s disastrous involvement in World War II, 
and the gaining of  independence in 1955 under 
the condition of  neutrality made Austria cautious, 
if  not timid, in the exercise of  foreign policy. This 
situation was intensified by the shadow cast over 
the country by the Iron Curtain until 1991.
Despite being a member of  the European Union 
since 1995 and a member of  the euro zone, Austria 
has not completely abandoned the notion of  neu-
trality. It may send peacekeeping troops to former 
Yugoslavia or Africa, but Austria is not a member 
of  NATO.50 Similarly, Austria may side with the 
West with respect to the promotion of  human rights 
and the fight against discrimination, but it will not 
jeopardize its relationship with Russia. This ambiva-
lent stance has its benefits. First of  all, it allows the 
country to keep all of  its options open and to build 
its international relations on the principle of  coopera-
tion instead of  confrontation or conflict. Second, the 
international image of  a stable, democratic, prosper-
ous, yet neutral country helps Austria present itself  as 
a bridge between West and East. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that a number of  international organiza-
tions, such as the United Nations, the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and 
the Organization of  the Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC), among others, have a seat in Vienna. As 
long as (selective) neutrality pays off, it is unlikely that 
Austria’s foreign policy will hit the headlines, except 
perhaps for the wrong reasons.51
Neutrality does not necessarily amount to sitting 
on the fence. After all, Austria was forthright in its 
support for enlarging the European Union east-
ward and bringing its neighboring countries into it. 
However, when it comes to the prospect of  Britain 
leaving the EU, Austria has chosen, for the time 
being, to remain silent. When I asked about the 
possibility of  a “Brexit,” the issue was dismissed by 
officials as a hypothetical scenario. It is not unusual 
for diplomats to refuse to comment on actions or 
events that have not yet taken place and may never 
materialize, but I am left wondering whether the 
potential shrinkage of  the EU preoccupies the 
Austrian government at all. If  we are to judge from 
the few and infrequent Austrian media reports on 
the possibility of  a Brexit and its implications, it is 
clear that the issue does not feature highly on the 
public agenda. Thus, a casual observer may be left 
with the impression that Austria has little to lose 
if  Britain decides to leave the EU. In comparison 
to other European countries, this impression is 
probably correct. But it would be wrong to assume 
that Austria has nothing to worry about. Quite the 
opposite is true, for Austria would prefer Britain in 
the EU for both economic and political reasons.
Austria’s main trading partner is, of  course, Ger-
many, not Britain. According to Eurostat figures, in 
2010, 44 percent of  the value of  Austria’s exports 
in the EU-27 area went to the country’s biggest 
neighbor.52 The second-most important market for 
Austria’s exports is Italy (10.8 percent), followed 
by France (5.8 percent) and Hungary (4.5 percent). 
Britain comes in fifth, taking in 4.3 percent of  its 
exports in terms of  value. In 2001 this figure was 
6.4 percent. Consequently, Britain may not be the 
most important trading partner of  Austria, but it is 
not negligible either. A slightly different look at the 
data confirms this. OECD data, illustrated below, 
reveal that the trade imbalance between Austria and 
Britain has been growing over the years in favor of  
Austria.53 For this reason, Austria would not wel-
come any developments that disturb its trade flows 
Austria
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Austria has so far remained silent on the issue of Britain leaving the European Union . However, a British 
withdrawal entails the risk of strengthening populist arguments in Austria .
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with the United Kingdom, and yet the latter leaving 
the EU might do just that.
Nevertheless, the greatest threat for Austria is not 
economic but political, and it is not direct but indi-
rect. A decision by the UK to end its EU member-
ship would change not only the UK, but the other 
EU member states as well. It would take the EU 
into uncharted territory with potentially formidable 
challenges for the future of  supranational institu-
tions and European integration in general. To start 
with, Britain’s departure from the EU would prob-
ably result in the need for greater contributions to 
the EU budget from the remaining member states, 
because Britain is a net payer. Austria, too, is a net 
payer, and the demand for more EU-bound money 
from taxpayers would almost inevitably lead to 
popular dissatisfaction and political controversy.
The Impact on Austrian Euroskepticism
Austrians may not be the most Euroskeptic nation 
in the EU, but they are no Euro-enthusiasts either. 
A recent Eurobarometer survey revealed that only 
25 percent of  Austrians have a positive image of  
the EU, compared to the EU-28 average of  31 per-
cent.54 Furthermore, the influence of  the popu-
list Freedom Party (FPÖ) among the electorate, 
which employs xenophobic and anti-EU rhetoric, 
has been growing. In comparison to the previ-
ous general elections, the FPÖ increased its vote 
share in the elections in 2013 by nearly 3 percent 
to 20.5 percent, whereas the two mainstream par-
ties currently in a coalition government, the Social 
Democrats (SPÖ) and the People’s Party (ÖVP), 
lost about 2 percent each, earning 26.8 percent 
and 24 percent, respectively. In the European Par-
liament elections in May 2014, the FPÖ received 
almost 20 percent of  the vote, securing third place 
after the ÖVP and the SPÖ, and four seats in the 
European Parliament compared to just one in 2009.
Given these results, it may not be long until the 
FPÖ ranks second in the national parliament elec-
tions, making it the obvious partner in a coalition 
government, unless a broader alternative coalition 
of  at least three parties were able to form. For the 
time being, it is not possible to assess the probabil-
ity of  different coalition combinations, but it is easy 
















Trade between Austria and the UK, 1995–2011
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do without a xenophobic and populist party in 
power. The last time the FPÖ was in government 
it provoked an international outcry that resulted in 
Austria’s isolation, not to mention domestic reper-
cussions (e.g., social tensions, financial mismanage-
ment, and scandals). Against this background, any 
significant development facilitating the electoral 
strengthening of  the FPÖ ought to concern Aus-
tria, even if  it originates in another country. Brit-
ain’s potential exit from the EU is such an alarming 
prospect. It would become an example used by 
Euroskeptic parties and forces across Europe. It 
would prove that EU membership is not necessarily 
a one-way street, and that a pick-and-mix approach 
is feasible and even commendable. The FPÖ would 
probably seek to capitalize on such a development, 
as it did recently with the Swiss referendum on 
EU immigration in February 2014, when the FPÖ 
party leader Heinz-Christian Strache argued that he 
could imagine a similar referendum taking place in 
Austria.
Drawing on the precedent of  the third-largest 
member state and a long-time participant turning 
its back on the EU, the FPÖ would appear more 
convincing to voters who have started wondering 
whether the euro is a good idea, whether Austria 
should be bailing out other member states, and 
whether Austria would not be better off  outside 
the EU. In other words, Britain leaving the EU 
would strengthen the FPÖ’s political arsenal by 
making its populist claims seem more credible. This 
development, in turn, would help the FPÖ boost 
its popularity further, and perhaps help it climb to 
second position in the next national elections, to be 
held in December 2018. With the prospect of  los-
ing power, the political forces that support the idea 
of  an open, cosmopolitan, and pro-EU Austria 
would have to adjust their agenda to that of  their 
Euroskeptic, xenophobic, and nationalist challeng-
ers. With the prospect of  this bleak scenario, even 
if  the other political parties succeed in excluding 
the FPÖ from a future coalition government, Aus-
tria’s position toward the EU and European inte-
gration is likely to become more critical.
If  we assume that the turn of  events will be com-
parable in other countries where Euroskeptic par-
ties are strong, the outlook for the EU appears 
uncertain. British withdrawal would not cause 
Austria to follow suit, and it is doubtful whether it 
would trigger similar moves in other member states 
in the short term. However, it would release two 
competing forces that would shape the future EU. 
On the one hand, the powerful image of  a victori-
ous British Euroskepticism would serve as a role 
model for Euroskeptic parties and movements in 
other countries. On the other hand, the promise 
of  improved efficiency in EU decision-making 
might translate into more benefits for the remain-
ing member states and greater output legitimacy for 
the EU.
Neither Austria nor any other EU country can 
prevent Britain from leaving should its people vote 
for an exit in an in/out referendum. Nevertheless, 
there is more at stake than meets the eye. It is not 
simply a question of  economic gains and losses, 
but also of  domestic and international politics 
deeply intertwined and cutting across borders. Seen 
in this light, there is enough for Austria to lose 
from a British withdrawal from the EU that the 
Austrian government should, instead of  dismissing 
the idea as a hypothetical scenario, start preparing 
for all eventualities.
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Bilateral relations between Bucharest and London 
have, given the number and relevance of  shared 
interests, until recently been characterized by con-
structive collaboration. The UK has acted since 
the 1990s as a strong supporter of  Romanian 
membership in European–Atlantic institutions. 
A strategic partnership was launched between 
Bucharest and London in 2003, and strengthened 
in 2011. This commitment has translated into 
cooperation on a number of  relevant dossiers in 
European and international politics to date. Within 
the EU, Bucharest and London cooperated on the 
Single Market, energy security, education, and labor. 
Within NATO, the strategic partnership translated 
into cooperation in Afghanistan. Fundamentally, 
both countries consider the Single Market and its 
untapped potential to be highly important. How-
ever, the current political discourse in London is 
seen as drifting away from discussions in Brussels, 
with the free movement debate in particular touch-
ing a raw nerve in Romania.
Differing Visions of Constructing Europe
The UK’s vision of  the EU’s raison d’être diverges 
from the Romanian one in that London does not 
consider deeper European integration key to the 
future success of  its country. For Romanians, the 
deepening of  the integration process is indeed 
essential to bring their country closer to the Euro-
pean goals of  shared security and prosperity. Over 
the last few years, Britain’s leadership seems to have 
come to see these objectives as achievable not nec-
essarily in the framework of  the European Union, 
whereas for Romania these goals are not possible 
outside the EU. The need for Romania to over-
come its status as a catch-up country is the main 
driver of  this view, and the crisis has strengthened 
rather than weakened this argument.
Romanian decision-makers and analysts acknowl-
edge that the UK’s EU narrative is equally deter-
mined by London’s interests and vision of  the 
world. But compared to Romania, the UK is draw-
ing the opposite conclusion from the crisis, that is, 
“less Europe.”
The last few years have also seen the development 
of  an overall different UK discourse in its rela-
tionship with the EU, which has not escaped the 
attention of  Romanian politicians, media, and civil 
society. David Cameron’s intention to hold a ref-
erendum on Britain’s exit from the EU has raised 
Romanian concerns about how such a possibility 
might affect bilateral economic ties as well as work 
and study opportunities for Romanian nationals. 
Particularly worrying was his call for the removal 
of  the phrase making reference to an “ever closer 
union” from the preamble of  the EU treaty. Roma-
nian politicians and civil society, considering deeper 
integration an indispensable condition, do not sup-
port such a narrative change. The negotiations on 
the current multiannual financial framework have 
been a case in point. In this particular field, there 
is growing concern in Bucharest that London will 
most likely block any future attempt to further 
consolidate supranational governance, something 
particularly welcomed by Romania in the field of  
budgetary and fiscal affairs.
Recently, Bucharest and London have taken up 
different, even opposing perspectives on a num-
ber of  important issues: the size of  the European 
budget, the political and financial implications of  
euro zone membership, and, more recently, the 
right of  free movement. In Bucharest’s interpreta-
tion, the persisting differences – particularly on the 
latter topic – are likely to have an impact also on 
the way in which the UK, once one of  the stron-
Romania
Agnes Nicolescu
Romania has watched as the United Kingdom has turned from an outspoken supporter of EU enlarge-
ment in the 1990s into a more inward-looking actor . While Bucharest may understand London’s argu-
ments about the size of its contribution to the EU budget, Romanians are less enthusiastic about restric-
tions on the right of free movement for EU citizens . From a Romanian point of view, such poisonous 
debate could undermine bilateral relations and the credibility and potential of the UK’s wider EU reform 
agenda .
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gest supporters of  European enlargement, views 
further enlargements of  the bloc. The geopolitical 
and geo-economic motivations that guided British 
pro-enlargement thinking over the last two decades 
seem to be fading away, bringing to the fore a more 
pragmatic cost–benefit approach among leading 
UK political figures.
For many Romanians, the line adopted by the Con-
servative Party on some of  the most important 
European issues leaves little choice to the average 
British citizen, as it has become increasingly dif-
ficult to differentiate between the various shades of  
dark gray to black promoted by the Tories and the 
United Kingdom Independence Party. It is also true 
that Labour and the Liberal Democrats are open to 
the idea of  holding some form of  in/out referen-
dum – in either case following any future transfers 
of  power from London to Brussels – and they also 
call for EU reform. At the same time, both parties 
clearly acknowledge the benefits of  EU member-
ship. However, it remains to be seen whether they 
will stick to their current discourse on the EU 
should they come to power after the next election.
Poisonous Debate on Free Movement  
of Labor
The heated domestic debate in the UK has also had 
a direct effect on Romanians. They are concerned 
that the issue of  the labor-related mobility of  Roma-
nian and Bulgarian workers will be used as an elec-
toral topic, including in the forthcoming European 
elections. The “invasion” by Romanian nationals, 
announced in tabloids across the UK, has not, in fact, 
taken place, as later acknowledged by British authori-
ties, with Cameron himself  admitting that immigra-
tion from Romania and Bulgaria was “reasonable” 
and that nothing more could be done within the set 
rules to keep workers from coming over from these 
countries.55 Furthermore, according to a 2011 Euro-
pean Commission report on labor mobility within the 
EU, the removal of  work restrictions for new member 
states did not lead to a “mass phenomenon.”56 
The way in which the issue was covered by much 
of  the UK media has sparked strong reactions 
from Romania’s political class and civil society. 
They protested against a massive bias that failed to 
discuss the benefits to the British economy, includ-
ing Romanians working in positions otherwise dif-
ficult to fill with British nationals. Currently, around 
100,000 Romanians live, work, and/or study in the 
UK. As shown by several studies and reports, most 
of  these Romanians arrived before Romania joined 
the EU in 2007, and most are regulated through 
various forms of  work permits, ensuring their 
inclusion in the official tax system.
Sending large numbers of  workers abroad also 
reduces the output of  Romania’s labor force. The 
effect of  this trend – set to decline over the next few 
years – is greater on Romania as a sender country 
than on the UK as a receiving state. Furthermore, 
workers from countries such as Romania and Bulgaria 
exert relatively little pressure on the UK healthcare 
system because most such workers are young peo-
ple, often taking jobs below their educational level that 
have gone unfilled by native workers.57 After the UK 
lifted transitional employment restrictions for Roma-
nia and Bulgaria in January 2014, numerous Romanian 
commentators noted with bitterness that the British 
authorities’ acknowledgment that the actual number 
of  Romanians going to the UK was actually lower 
than in previous years – and in any case nothing close 
to the numbers predicted – did little to ease the con-
cerns of  the average British citizen.
This debate continues to be particularly harmful for 
Romanian and Bulgarian nationals, as discriminatory 
measures have followed, including the suspension 
of  maintenance loans that British universities usually 
grant to students. This action has negatively affected 
the community of  Romanian students and junior pro-
fessionals studying or working in the UK, one of  the 
best-educated Romanian communities abroad. Most 
worryingly, this measure may have set a precedent for 
Romanians to be subject to further restrictions on 
the grounds of  nationality; such restrictions have not 
been set in other EU member states.
Implications for Romania
Some Romanians may fancy the idea that a UK 
exit from the EU might free eastern Europeans – 
Romanians included – from being thought of  as 
mere beneficiaries of  European cooperation rather 
than providers too. But in reality such a scenario 
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would have largely negative consequences for 
Romania’s economy and society overall, especially 
for British interests and investments in Romania. 
For all of  the hurdles in recent UK–EU relations, a 
British exit from the EU would have serious conse-
quences for both London and Bucharest. Bilateral 
trade between the two totaled to about 1.86 billion 
euros in the first two quarters of  2012. Romanian 
exports to the UK grew by 7.5 percent in the same 
year, contributing to the maintenance of  a positive 
trade balance for Bucharest. A UK exit would be 
severely detrimental to Romania’s major economic 
and political interests, from the Single Market to 
trade ties, investments, and work mobility. The 
renegotiation of  the UK’s relations with the Single 
Market would be particularly relevant to Romania. 
Complaints already voiced by the British business 
sector in relation to working hours, fiscal issues, the 
protection of  personal data, and access to health 
care will perhaps intensify as the UK fundamen-
tally rethinks its relations with the EU. London’s 
maneuvering for ever more exceptions in compari-
son with its European partners is set to become 
the rule. Once this avenue is opened – such is the 
assessment in Bucharest – it will be very difficult 
for EU member states to keep their initial standing 
in their relationship with the UK, including unre-
stricted access to its labor market.
Although, according to the latest polls, the Tories 
are unlikely to win the next election, the discourse 
and measures adopted so far have already set a 
more mercantilist tone in UK–EU relations. They 
also pose questions about the direction of  Euro-
pean integration in the longer term, which Brit-
ish political debate increasingly challenges. This 
approach, though unsurprising in light of  Britain’s 
historical quest for exceptionalism within Europe, 
is likely to harm both the EU’s overall tenure as a 
global actor and London’s image as a link between 
the European Union and the rest of  the world.
An EU without the UK would raise further chal-
lenges for Romania and other countries in central 
and eastern Europe, primarily regarding the eco-
nomic and banking integration to which they com-
mitted themselves. Whereas in British politics no 
change of  course on this topic is to be expected, 
the stability of  the euro zone is clearly vital also for 
London’s interests. Britain leaving the EU would 
make things more difficult, for instance, in nego-
tiating the transatlantic free-trade agreement TTIP 
and in consolidating the EU’s backbone, the Single 
Market. In order to succeed, the EU requires the 
strengthening of  trade relations, mutual invest-
ments, education exchanges, and unrestricted access 
to the labor market for Romanian citizens between 
Romania and all of  its partners, including the UK.
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Attitudes toward the EU in Britain and Bulgaria 
could not be more different. According to a 
2013 Eurobarometer poll, 50 percent of  Britons 
believe that their country could better face the 
future outside the EU, whereas 67 percent of  Bul-
garians do not hold this belief  about Bulgaria.58 
The two countries are also very different with 
regard to what their governments stand for or 
against in the EU. With regard to managing the 
euro crisis, Bulgaria’s center-right government 
(2009–2013) firmly sided with Germany.59 As a 
euro outsider, Bulgaria did not have much of  a say, 
but being keen to join the euro meant it was eager 
to position itself  as a reliable prospective insider. 
This position contrasts sharply with David Camer-
on’s 2011 veto and his willingness to isolate the UK. 
Bulgaria’s incumbent center-left government, on 
the other hand, has not pursued such a clear course. 
Whereas the bigger coalition partner (the Socialists) 
went into the 2014 European elections campaign 
with domestic rhetoric stressing a new beginning 
for the EU, the government itself  does not seem 
to have positioned itself  in any particular EU camp. 
Nevertheless, what the two successive Bulgarian 
governments have in common are their aspirations 
to join Schengen and their opposition to tax har-
monization and an EU-wide financial transaction 
tax. However, this opposition is related to concerns 
about losing competitive advantages rather than to 
general objections to deeper integration.
How Bulgaria is positioning (or rather failing to 
position) itself  in the EU has been experienced 
on the ground in Sofia and captured by British 
Ambassador Jonathan Allen, who has spoken out 
against the Bulgarian authorities’ downbeat attitude 
of  being at the periphery of  the EU: “Saying ‘We 
are a small country’ permits the attitude to take 
root that things happen to Bulgaria and that Bul-
garia shouldn’t expect to get what it wants or to 
win in a negotiation.”60
It should not then come as a surprise that the 
Bulgarian authorities have been silent on British 
demands for EU reform. It may be that this silence 
will have to be broken, with the Bulgarian govern-
ment forced to face the possible consequences 
should Cameron be able to fulfill his promise to 
hold an in/out referendum by the end of  2017. In 
2017–2018, the EU presidency troika will comprise 
the UK, Estonia, and Bulgaria. A debate on EU 
reform and a referendum on a British exit before 
Bulgaria’s EU presidency would therefore pose a 
serious challenge for Sofia. Nonetheless, the pos-
sibility of  Britain leaving is not on the Bulgarian 
government’s radar in this early stage of  prepara-
tion for Bulgaria’s 2018 EU presidency. In late 2013 
the Diplomatic Institute of  the Bulgarian Ministry 
of  Foreign Affairs organized a roundtable on the 
2018 EU copresidency of  Bulgaria and the UK, 
entitled “BG–GB: Changing Images in the Mir-
ror.” The titles of  two panels (“Pride and Prejudice” 
and “Great Expectations”) and the concluding ses-
sion (“The Show Must Go On”) suggested light-
ness; there was no debate about “Britain outside 
Europe,” even less so about implications for Bul-
garia, and nothing on any possible renegotiation.
In contrast, a key issue was Bulgaria’s image in the 
UK and vice versa. During the Cold War, Bulgaria 
and Britain were in opposing Eastern and West-
ern European camps; today they are allies in both 
NATO and the EU. Moreover, Britain has been 
one of  the major supporters of  Bulgaria’s inte-
gration into a “free world,” in which “we are all 
Brits.”61 Back in May 1999, it was Tony Blair who 
first raised the question of  making the Eastern 
Bulgaria
Antoinette Primatarova
A European Union without the United Kingdom is not considered a realistic scenario in Bulgaria . Britain’s 
cherished opt-outs from Schengen, the euro zone, and some justice and home affairs matters, its bud-
getary rebate, and an appetite for more sit in stark contrast with Bulgarian fears of any changes to the 
functioning of the EU that might delay Bulgaria’s prospects of becoming part of Schengen and the euro 
zone, and that might consolidate a multispeed Europe, thus increasing the chances that poor countries 
will fail to catch up .
DGAPanalyse 16 | September 2014
56
enlargement an inclusive one and opening negotia-
tions not only with Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia, 
but also with Bulgaria and Romania.
There is a mismatch between the image of  Bul-
garia as a NATO and EU member and the image 
of  Bulgaria in the British mass media. In 2013, 
Bulgaria and Romania were subjected to repeated 
negative reporting on a potential influx of  immi-
grants and a potential drain on the British welfare 
state following the end of  free-movement restric-
tions on January 1, 2014. The United Kingdom 
Independence Party, in particular, poured oil on 
the fire. The negative portrayal of  Bulgaria in Brit-
ish mass media throughout 2013 was mirrored by 
angry media reporting in Bulgaria on British efforts 
to curb both the rights of  Bulgarian students in the 
UK and the free movement of  potential Bulgar-
ians workers. However, this reporting never con-
nected to Cameron’s aims of  EU-wide reform, a 
renegotiation of  UK membership, and an in/out 
referendum.
This failure to connect the two debates, along with 
Bulgaria’s uncertain approach to the EU in general, 
stems in part from how few Bulgarian newspapers 
and Internet media commit time and effort to 
in-depth analysis of  EU issues. The weekly Capi-
tal and the online euinside are two of  the few 
exceptions.
Since 2010, Capital has organized regular, three-
stage online votes on topical issues. On the 
eve of  Cameron’s speech on the EU in January 
2013,62 Capital launched a vote on the question, 
“Should Britain stay in the EU?”63 On March 8, 
2014, close to the announcement of  Cameron’s 
seven points for EU reform,64 Capital launched a 
vote on “‘For’ or ‘against’ two-speed Europe?”65 
These votes cannot be considered public opinion 
polls either in terms of  numbers or representa-
tiveness, but they offer a rare insight into these 
issues. In the 2013 vote, the supporters of  Britain 
staying in the EU prevailed in all three stages, 
with the final result being 60 percent to 40 per-
cent. The arguments of  those who presented 
the cases for or against focused mainly on the 
consequences for Britain. Possible consequences 
for Bulgaria and the EU touched on political 
implications, such as how Britain’s membership 
means less EU navel-gazing, a greater openness 
to modernization, more global thinking, and the 
possibility of  further enlargement. In the first 
round of  the 2014 vote on a multispeed Europe, 
there was a strong trend against a two-speed 
Europe (71 percent). This opposition did shrink 
in the second round to 64 percent and to 52 per-
cent in the third. The final, almost balanced result 
was clearly due to the arguments of  the propo-
nent that only a two-speed Europe would allow 
Bulgaria to catch up on the basis of  improving 
its competitiveness outside the straitjacket of  a 
one-size-fits-all model. The volatility of  this vote 
also demonstrated a lack of  firm opinions about 
the positive and negative implications of  deeper 
integration. This result is not surprising, given 
the lack of  political debate about a multispeed 
Europe and British demands for EU reform.
The unwillingness to discuss openly the future of  
the EU can be seen in how incumbent decision-
makers ignore or turn down media requests for 
interviews on Bulgaria’s position on EU reform. 
Analysts and opinionated politicians from previ-
ous governments demonstrate a much more open 
attitude to discussing the problem (the most 
recent example appeared on euinside in early 
March 2014).66 Reform-related questions were 
answered by Meglena Kuneva (European minister 
2002–2006, commissioner 2007–2010, and leader 
of  the list of  a newly established coalition of  
center-right parties for the May European Parlia-
ment elections), Ivailo Kalfin (minister of  foreign 
affairs 2005–2009, MEP from the S&D Group 
since 2009, and leader of  the list of  a newly 
established coalition of  center-left parties for the 
May European Parliament elections), and Dimitar 
Bechev (head of  the Sofia office of  the Euro-
pean Council on Foreign Relations). All three 
shared the concern that EU reform is a challenge 
that the incumbent government is not prepared 
to tackle – a circumstance that might cement a 
kind of  second-class membership for Bulgaria. 
They fear a situation in which the euro zone and 
some members of  the EU begin to act in ways 
detrimental to both Bulgaria and the idea of  
European unity. If  the euro zone consolidates its 
position as the heart of  the EU, it could neglect 
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the interests of  outsiders who would like to be 
inside, such as Bulgaria. At the same time, some 
members, such as the UK, could try to isolate 
themselves by adopting national as opposed to 
EU policies on border controls, migration poli-
cies, and social rights. These policies would limit 
the opportunities that the EU offers to Bulgaria.
A UK departure from the EU would of  course 
also affect British–Bulgarian economic relations. 
At present, 15,000 British citizens have houses 
in Bulgaria, and 300,000 visit the country annu-
ally. According to statistics from the Ministry of  
Industry and Energy, in 2013, 2.1 percent of  Bul-
garian exports went to Britain.67 In 2007, the UK 
ranked ninth on the list of  export destinations, but 
was down to twelfth in 2013. For the last fifteen 
years, 2.5 billion euros of  British investment have 
flowed into Bulgaria, although a check against the 
list of  major foreign direct investors includes only 
one British company on the list, in 107th position 
(Imperial Tobacco Group PLC).
To refer once again to Ambassador Allen and his 
attempt to encourage Bulgarian authorities to speak 
out: “You can either see Bulgaria as being at the 
periphery of  everywhere or at the centre of  every-
thing: the difference is as much a state of  mind as 
geographical reality.”68 Bulgarians are clearly not yet 
ready to consider their country the center of  the 
EU, yet remain afraid of  remaining at the periphery 
forever. Despite the British media’s negative por-
trayal of  Bulgaria, on many occasions the British 
government has demonstrated that it can imagine 
Bulgaria as quite central (e.g., in the process of  
shaping enlargement, in discussing regional security 
issues, and, more recently, through encouraging 
cooperation on energy issues). Bulgarians should 
consider this potential when hoping that Britain 
will not opt out of  the EU.
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Despite their differences and the difficulties in the 
EU–UK relationship, the UK has played a signifi-
cant role in many areas of  EU integration for more 
than forty years. Although determining the exact 
impact of  a British withdrawal from the EU is dif-
ficult, one can list a number of  areas in which such 
a development would undoubtedly have a pro-
foundly negative impact on the EU, and an even 
greater negative impact on the UK itself. It would 
also radically change the way in which the EU 
functions by changing its main institutions, creating 
a series of  alterations that would, in the end, not 
necessarily be wholly detrimental to the European 
Union.
The Value of the UK in EU Policymaking
One of  the reasons virtually no one in the Brussels 
policymaking community, including the institutions, 
would like to see the UK leave is because of  how 
the UK’s civil service engages with the EU and 
what priorities it advances at the EU level. While 
defending national interests, the UK has generally 
been pragmatic, willing to compromise, and diligent 
in its implementation of  agreed legislation. The UK 
focus on hard economic benefits – for example, in 
advancing the Single Market, reducing bureaucratic 
burdens, or pushing for trade liberalization – was 
also seen by many countries, from Germany to 
Scandinavia, and by many in the Commission, 
as a healthy balance against too much focus on 
political integration or on Southern-style state 
interventionism.
Recently, many have seen this positive role of  the 
UK diminish, with the UK placing a much greater 
focus on its domestic policy agenda, and British 
policymakers and, increasingly, the British pub-
lic, displaying a high distrust of  the EU. Even in 
areas where in the past the UK would have been 
a champion of  European solutions, for instance 
in enlargement policy or the digital Single Market, 
there is a trend toward disengagement. In addi-
tion, the UK government’s current approach to 
EU negotiations is seen to be less in the spirit of  
constructive give-and-take, and more in the vein of  
an increasingly inflexible approach based on unilat-
eral demands and backed by a threat of  exit. This 
change in both substance and style has led many to 
question whether the approach chosen by the UK 
is constructive, both for the UK and for the rest of  
the EU, or whether it will simply increase the dis-
tance between Brussels and London.
Shifting Alliances and Voting Blockages
However, the fact that London does the job of  
challenging further integration is also convenient 
for some countries, depending on the issue in ques-
tion. It allows countries to hide behind the UK on 
a range of  often fundamental issues, such as the 
EU budget, the reduction in burdens on business, 
the further integration of  the euro zone, and the 
desirability of  a more federal European Union. 
With the UK outside, countries would have to be 
more open about policy preferences on these issues.
There would also be a shift in power within the 
EU system. While the average population size of  
the remaining EU member states would fall, the 
individual power of  the larger member states, par-
ticularly France and Germany, would increase. The 
qualified-majority voting procedure illustrates this 
point: currently, France and Germany together 
The View from Brussels
Fabian Zuleeg
Given the United Kingdom’s willingness to promote certain issues, its pragmatism and diligence in imple-
mentation, and its budgetary contributions, the EU institutions and other member states are likely to regret 
a UK exit . But a UK unable to influence both the Single Market, upon which it would still be dependent, 
and the international political stage to the degree it could as an EU member may find itself regretting an 
exit from the European Union even more .
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hold around 16.5 percent of  the votes, with just 
under 29 percent of  the population. After a UK 
exit, France and Germany would hold 17 per-
cent of  the votes (if  votes per country remained 
unchanged), with almost 33 percent of  the popula-
tion. The overall center of  political balance within 
the EU would also shift, moving both further 
south and further east. At face value, Germany 
would become an even stronger power if  one of  
the four large member states left the EU. How-
ever, it is not quite that simple: Germany has often 
formed coalitions with the UK to advance certain 
issues, for example issues related to trade and the 
EU budget. Not having the UK in the EU might 
deprive Germany of  an important ally on these 
issues.
The European Parliament would also change. Brit-
ain’s departure would weaken the Socialists and 
Democrats Group, as the Labour Party is one of  
the larger constituents of  this group, whereas the 
Conservatives have chosen, for the moment, to be 
outside the European People’s Party. It can also be 
expected that the Parliament would generally be 
less favorable to British exceptionalism if  the UK 
were outside the EU, making it difficult to find the 
necessary compromises to facilitate post-Brexit UK 
access to the Single Market.
A UK exit would also affect those policy areas 
where there is still unanimity. Enlargement is often 
cited and could be a case in point. However, it is 
unlikely that a UK exit would have a major impact 
on future accessions, given that the UK has gener-
ally been supportive, although recent concerns over 
the freedom of  movement might result in a change 
in stance for further enlargement.
An area where a UK exit would have a major 
impact is the EU budget. On the one hand, it 
would open the door for reform, particularly on 
issues related to the revenue side, including budget 
rebates. On the other hand, there might be less 
pressure to increase efficiency or reform the tra-
ditional areas of  spending such as regional funds 
and agriculture, because the net payers would lose 
an important ally. Although the UK has not been 
particularly successful in achieving reform so far, 
London succeeded with the support of  the other 
net payers to limit the overall spending in the cur-
rent round. In addition, the UK is still a net payer, 
and the loss of  additional revenue would have to 
be compensated by the net payers and/or by a 
reduction in expenditure (unless the UK would still 
pay into the EU budget under post-exit arrange-
ments, as Norway does). There is no agreed way 
of  calculating net contributions, but the UK pays 
in more than it receives. In 2012 the UK Treasury 
estimated the UK’s net contribution for that year at 
around £7 billion.69
In the past, the UK has also threatened to block 
major further integration steps and/or treaty 
changes, most recently with London walking out 
of  the negotiations on the fiscal compact. However, 
this behavior has only made member states think 
more creatively about treaty reform, so as not to 
allow London to delay or hold up much-needed 
reforms. However, it is questionable whether 
achieving major steps in integration would be 
easier without the UK, given the diversity of  views 
among the other member states.
Future Policy Priorities
With a UK exit, overall policy priorities would 
also shift, with less focus on issues such as free 
trade, the Single Market, and business conditions, 
as the UK has always been one of  the strongest 
proponents of  opening markets. The focus on the 
financial sector would become weaker, although 
clearly there are still significant financial centers 
in Frankfurt and Paris, which might even benefit 
from a UK exit. There would be a tendency to be 
more interventionist in this area, be it in limitations 
on bankers’ bonuses or in the financial transaction 
tax. But, again, it is clearly not the case that there is 
unanimity among the remaining member states.
Future cooperation on defense and security under 
the EU framework would also be less likely and 
certainly even less effective than today. In Euro-
pean terms, the UK is clearly one of  the heavy-
weights in this area, and it is hard to envisage effec-
tive EU coordination without it. However, there 
has not been much progress in this field anyway, so 
the most likely outcome would be that this policy 
area would remain beyond the EU’s ambit.
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Weight in the World
Of  course, there would also be a much broader 
impact on the foreign policy field, going beyond 
the limited institutional impact on the EU’s Exter-
nal Action Service. The UK is an important actor 
in the world, with a seat on the UN Security Coun-
cil. It is also a large member state, with around 
12 percent of  the EU’s population, a high GDP 
(around 14.5 percent of  the EU total), and an 
important role in the Single Market. So overall, the 
weight and importance of  the EU as an interna-
tional actor would be diminished. However, a UK 
exit would not only reduce the importance of  the 
EU in global affairs but also reduce the impact that 
the UK can have in the future. It is questionable 
whether a country like the UK would continue to 
be a major global actor without European coopera-
tion, although more limited cooperation on a bilat-
eral basis or through NATO would still be possible.
Internal Effects with External Impact
There is a high degree of  uncertainty about the 
impact that withdrawal would have on the UK 
itself, in part because of  the policy choices that 
would then be open to the UK. For example, 
whether the UK remains an attractive location for 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and to what extent 
there would be continued labor mobility would 
depend on how closely the UK economy remains 
integrated in the Single Market. A UK outside the 
Single Market would suffer economically as well as 
reduce the overall size of  the market, although the 
UK’s absence might also benefit some countries: 
for example, a reduction in FDI might well be 
compensated by an increase in other parts of  the 
EU, such as Ireland. Although the UK would want 
to remain part of  the Single Market, it is unlikely 
that the rest of  the EU would be particularly will-
ing to offer wide-ranging concessions if  these 
concern the basic rules of  the Single Market, in 
particular the four freedoms. Crucially, access to 
the Single Market would depend on the willingness 
of  the UK government to accept rules made else-
where without a UK political voice. A recent perti-
nent example is the row over Swiss participation in 
the Single Market, following the Swiss referendum 
to potentially limit the free movement of  people.
There is also the question of  the political stability 
of  the UK. For forty years, the EU and the wider 
European integration process have provided a 
framework of  checks and balances, for example in 
limiting the severity of  anti-terrorism laws, espe-
cially important in a country without a codified 
constitution. There is a probability that a much 
more strident nationalism could develop in the 
UK and have a negative impact on inter-European 
cooperation in areas such as energy and justice.
Greater Coherence Equals  
Greater Integration?
One immediate impact of  a UK exit would be 
more coherence in euro zone membership. Cur-
rently, one in three EU citizens lives in a country 
that has not introduced the euro. After a UK exit, 
that figure would be only one in four, with none of  
the large countries outside. The most likely impact 
would be a further concentration on the euro zone, 
with less differential integration and with countries 
outside the euro zone being more marginalized in 
decision-making and receiving less policy attention, 
including less attention from the institutions. But a 
UK exit would also mean that the EU would have 
to come up with ways to manage relations with 
an outer circle of  countries that are unlikely to 
become full member states.
The marginalization of  non–euro zone countries, 
together with the example of  a country leaving, 
might strengthen anti-EU voices in some countries. 
However, this scenario seems unlikely because the 
remaining EU member states would be more aware 
of  the costs of  an exit, especially for small coun-
tries. The fundamental economic dilemma would 
be clearer: to be closely integrated in the Single 
Market means accepting EU rules, regardless of  
whether a country is politically integrated in the 
decision-making process or outside of  it.
In the longer term, a UK withdrawal might also 
enable further integration, especially within the 
euro zone. But this possibility is far from certain: Is 
there a shared desire among the remaining member 
states to have “more Europe”? Even if  that is the 
case, is there a shared vision of  the direction of  
further integration? Although some might think 
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that the UK leaving would bring the EU closer to 
the “ever closer union,” the reality is different: the 
appetite for further integration is limited, with most 
countries willing to accept only what is perceived 
as the minimal integration necessary to stabilize the 
system. 
Clearly, many issues need to be resolved, with or 
without a UK exit. There would also be a major 
issue around timing, with an exit likely to be a pro-
tracted and politically and economically costly pro-
cess. But at the very least, it would force some of  
this discussion into the open. In the end, it would 
be detrimental to the EU and even more so to the 
UK. But if  it does happen, it will have to form part 
of  a broader debate about the direction of  EU 
integration.
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There is a certain irony in the fact that Winston 
Churchill delivered his famous 1946 appeal to cre-
ate a “United States of  Europe” in Switzerland, 
in the auditorium of  the University of  Zurich. 
Churchill’s Zurich speech is widely regarded as the 
starting point for European integration after World 
War II – despite the fact that both the United 
Kingdom and Switzerland still have difficulties 
dealing with European integration. An aversion 
to deeper European political integration remains 
widespread in both countries. As a latecomer to 
the European Economic Community (EEC), Brit-
ain’s struggle with European integration has seen it 
negotiate a special place with opt-outs and rebates. 
Switzerland, though geographically located in the 
heart of  the continent, like Britain has a strong 
insular mentality. Despite not being in the Euro-
pean Union, Switzerland has negotiated a special 
bilateral relationship with Brussels, allowing it to 
participate in the EU on special terms.
It is therefore no wonder that in British Euro-
skeptic circles, the discussion of  a possible UK 
withdrawal has included the idea of  an alliance 
between the two insular-minded states. This hypo-
thetical quasi-paradise has been dubbed “Britzer-
land.” There are indeed striking parallels between 
the United Kingdom and Switzerland, for example 
with regard to domestic debates about the eco-
nomic impact of  voluntary nonparticipation in 
the euro zone and the Single Market or about the 
perceived disadvantages of  intra-European labor 
migration. The British debates are thus followed 
with special interest in Switzerland, with some 
hope, but also with concern.
Two Islands in Europe
As an island, the UK is naturally at arm’s length 
from the continent of  Europe and claims a spe-
cial position within the EU. Switzerland was also 
considered an “island in the middle of  a stormy 
sea,” in the nineteenth century the only democratic 
republic among Europe’s monarchies and in the 
twentieth century as an “island of  peace,” spared 
from both world wars. During the Cold War, Swit-
zerland was part of  the West. Because of  neutrality 
and sovereignty concerns, however, it refused to 
join the United Nations or NATO. With the excep-
tion of  economic and technical cooperation within 
the framework of  the Marshall Plan and the then 
OEEC (Organisation for European Economic 
Co-operation), Switzerland in 1947 chose a strictly 
independent foreign policy.70 It was quick to real-
ize, however, that it had to deal with Europe on a 
bilateral basis in order to avoid being completely 
isolated. By 1956, Bern concluded a consultation 
agreement with the “European Six” – Switzerland’s 
bilateralism with the EU thus had a long history 
before 1992.71
Switzerland and the UK hewed to the same line 
on European matters, especially in the mid-1950s, 
when they were forced to come up with a coun-
terstrategy to the EEC in order to minimize the 
economic disadvantages of  being outside the 
developing European bloc. The planned customs 
union between West Germany, France, Italy, and 
the Benelux countries posed a dilemma for Swit-
zerland, because at that time around 40 percent of  
its exports went to these six countries – to West 
Germany in particular. High external EEC tariffs 
would have hampered trade and hurt Swiss com-
panies. Ideas for a greater free-trade zone in the 
OEEC framework were rejected in Paris, on the 
grounds that the EEC would “dissolve like a sugar 
cube in a cup of  English tea.” In response, in 1960 
the UK, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, 
Austria, and Portugal created the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) as a community of  
seven states to compete with the EEC.
Switzerland
Christian Nünlist
British Euroskeptics often portray Switzerland as an attractive alternative model to EU membership . But 
the “Swiss model” with its bilateral special solutions has recently come under severe pressure . There are 
clear links, especially evident to the Swiss, between how Brussels is behaving toward Switzerland and 
the idea of a British exit . Switzerland could become an example of the limitations on what some British 
Euroskeptics think the UK can achieve .
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The common European policy of  Switzerland and 
the UK in the EFTA framework was threatened 
as early as 1961 by the “betrayal” of  the British, 
who surprisingly submitted an EEC membership 
application. In 1963, French President Charles de 
Gaulle’s rejection of  the British application was 
celebrated by the Swiss as the “liberator of  Switzer-
land,” because association plans with Switzerland 
had also already been drafted in Brussels.72 In 1972 
the EFTA countries succeeded in concluding a 
free-trade agreement with the EEC for industrial 
goods. The citizens of  Switzerland accepted the 
deal with an impressive 72.5 percent of  the vote.
To date the European political philosophies of  the 
British and the Swiss have remained very similar, 
even though the UK left EFTA in 1973 and joined 
the EEC, whereas Swiss voters rejected accession 
to the European Economic Area (EEA) in Decem-
ber 1992 with a slight majority of  50.3 percent, 
thus cementing Switzerland’s “special path” in 
Europe. The main goal of  both British and Swiss 
European policy has always been economic coop-
eration. Over the years both countries have publicly 
distanced themselves from some of  the high policy 
areas such as a common foreign and security policy 
as well as from the goal of  an “ever closer union.”
Britzerland outside Europe
Euroskeptics in the UK like to refer to the model 
of  Switzerland as an example of  how relations 
with Europe could be successfully shaped from 
outside the EU. In late 2008, the Conservative 
MEP Daniel Hannan wrote a paean to Switzer-
land’s alternative model of  relations with Europe, 
“Why Can’t Britain Be More Like Switzerland?”73 In 
the journal article, he wondered why Switzerland, 
as a nonmember of  the EU, had suffered the least 
in the European economic crisis and still produced 
growth rates of  over 3 percent. He pointed out 
that Switzerland’s per capita exports to the EU 
market were more than twice as high as those of  
the EU member Britain. As the scenario of  a Brit-
ish EU referendum has grown more likely, the 
Swiss model has become more popular in the UK. 
The British press has spoken of  Britain outside 
Europe as a “Greater Switzerland”74 or a “Swit-
zerland with nuclear weapons.”75 The comparisons 
with Switzerland were even more in vogue after 
David Cameron’s speech in January 2013, although 
he admitted that while he admired Switzerland, the 
UK could achieve a better deal. In April 2014 a 
young British diplomat even won a 100,000 euro 
“Brexit prize,” awarded by the Institute of  Eco-
nomic Affairs, for an essay suggesting that a post-
EU UK should negotiate a special outsider position 
somewhere between the positions of  Switzerland 
and Turkey.76
Switzerland follows the Brexit debate with great 
interest. Media analysis has noted the “dangerous 
kinship” between the two countries, drawing atten-
tion to the similarities in rejecting political integra-
tion by pointedly asking, “Will we be brothers in 
decline?” The UK Independence Party (UKIP) was 
presented as a “turbocharged SVP” (the right-wing, 
Euroskeptic Swiss People’s Party [SVP] became 
the strongest political party in Switzerland after 
its successful 1992 campaign against Switzerland 
joining the EEA), with UKIP leader Nigel Farage 
described as a fanatic.77 In other articles and op-eds, 
the Swiss and British were jointly characterized as 
“recalcitrant Europeans” and “problem children of  
the EU.”78
In a late 2012 interview with the Swiss weekly Die 
Weltwoche, London Mayor Boris Johnson cam-
paigned for a new political alliance outside the EU – 
a “Britzerland”79 – with Switzerland and the UK at 
its core, whose members, later to include Norway 
and Sweden, would be allowed to trade freely with 
EU members, but would not be obliged to partici-
pate in all of  the other EU activities.80
However, the question remains: Is the bilateral 
way still the silver bullet, not only for Switzerland 
but also for the UK? The “Swiss model,” though 
adored by Euroskeptics in the UK and elsewhere, 
no longer corresponds to the reality of  Switzer-
land’s actual relations with the EU. In spite of  
unilateralism, Switzerland today is de facto semi-
integrated into the EU. The bilateral way did not 
send Switzerland into isolation, but led to rap-
prochement with the EU through ten treaties. In 
the area of  domestic security, Switzerland directly 
participates in the EU’s Schengen regime, even 
if  the Swiss do not have a direct say in its opera-
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tion. Switzerland and the EU profit from free 
trade and are closely intertwined economically. In 
2013, 55 percent of  Swiss exports went to the EU; 
73 percent of  Swiss imports had their origin in 
the EU (where 57 percent of  Switzerland’s exter-
nal trade is with neighboring countries Germany, 
France, Italy, and Austria). Because of  its strong 
economic dependence on the EU, Switzerland 
unilaterally adopts most EU legislation by way of  
what is called “autonomous enactment.” Switzer-
land also contributes financially to EU programs; in 
2012 the sum came to 664 million euros.81
Thus, Switzerland’s independence from the EU is 
largely illusory and greatly exaggerated in political 
rhetoric. Nevertheless, the bilateral track remains 
very popular among Swiss citizens. Until 2014, all 
bilateral treaties with the EU had been approved 
by the Swiss voters, with 67.2 percent in 2000 
(“Bilaterals I”), 54.6 percent in 2005 (Schengen/
Dublin), 56 percent in 2005 (extension of  freedom 
of  movement to the ten new member states that 
had joined the EU in 2004), 53.4 percent in 2006 
(cooperation with central and eastern Europe), and 
59.6 percent in 2009 (expansion of  free movement 
to Bulgaria and Romania).
2014: The Swiss Model Revisited
The surprising outcome of  a popular vote in Swit-
zerland has, however, changed the Swiss perception 
of  the British EU debate rather dramatically: on 
February 9, 2014, Swiss voters narrowly accepted 
the so-called mass immigration initiative of  the 
SVP with 50.3 percent, thus challenging free move-
ment between the EU and Switzerland that had 
come into effect in 2002. Switzerland had commit-
ted itself  in 1999 to respect free movement, one 
of  the EU’s core principles and a fundamental 
right of  EU citizens. On the basis of  the “guillo-
tine clause,”82 the EU is now free to terminate all 
ten bilateral treaties with Switzerland if  the latter 
decides to uphold the vote and violate the treaty 
guaranteeing free movement.
Euroskeptics in the UK and elsewhere were quick to 
praise the courage of  the Swiss to limit immigration 
from the EU and to fight the negative consequences 
of  the free movement of  persons within Europe.83 
Ahead of  the vote, Swiss Euroskeptics had, for their 
part, pointed to recent efforts by David Cameron to 
make the free movement of  persons less free and to 
restrict both immigrants’ access to social assistance 
and the influx of  Bulgarians and Romanians through 
quotas. The British countermeasures against alleged 
“welfare tourism” from eastern Europe were taken 
up by the SVP in their election campaign for the 
immigration initiative. With great satisfaction, national 
Councilor Christoph Blocher (SVP) registered that 
Cameron was now voicing the same demands that the 
SVP had pursued for many years in Switzerland. At 
that time, there appeared to be a real likelihood that 
Switzerland and the UK would be able to fight jointly 
for exceptions in the free movement regime and that 
Switzerland could profit from the internal EU debate 
on immigration. In general, the debate in the UK is, 
from a Swiss perspective, an interesting indicator of  
the EU’s readiness to engage in reform discussions 
that go to the core of  long-standing Swiss–EU con-
troversies, such as those regarding the distribution of  
jurisdictions between Brussels and European capitals. 
If  these reform discussions were to satisfy British 
concerns, they would probably also satisfy Swiss inter-
ests. In addition, representatives of  British banks and 
car manufacturers have recently begun to speak out 
and warn of  the negative impact that EU withdrawal 
would have on the British economy; this debate could 
also influence Switzerland’s debate on its future rela-
tions with the EU.
But the harsh reactions of  the European Com-
mission in Brussels, regarding both Cameron’s 
announcement to restrict the movement of  per-
sons in the UK and the narrow yes-vote on the 
mass immigration initiative in Switzerland, may be 
interpreted rather differently. Precisely because of  
the exit scenario, the EU could be tempted in the 
coming months and years to adopt a hard line and 
make an example of  Switzerland, with a view to 
applying pressure on the UK. To be fair, in this 
regard, the EU’s approach to Switzerland is not 
entirely new. In recent years, Brussels has become 
increasingly dissatisfied with the sectoral bilateral-
ism and has long demanded an institutional agree-
ment with Switzerland. In principle, Brussels is 
aiming to establish a relationship with Switzerland 
that is similar to its relationship with EEA coun-
tries such as Norway.84
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Against this backdrop, Brussels could be particu-
larly adamant vis-à-vis Switzerland, in particular 
with respect to Swiss restrictions on the fundamen-
tal freedom of  movement.85 The EU’s initial reac-
tions seem to support such an interpretation:86 the 
European Commission blocked negotiations with 
Switzerland on electricity, and suspended Swiss 
participation in the EU student exchange program 
(Erasmus) and in an EU research program (Hori-
zon 2020). In 2013, Swiss universities received 
1.8 billion euros from EU research funds; the UK 
received 2 billion euros – British elite universities 
thus view the recent punitive strike by the EU 
against Switzerland with great concern.87
The EU could therefore deliberately put a damper 
on the Swiss model by showing that there can be 
no access to the Single Market without freedom 
of  movement and by demonstrating that Swit-
zerland is more dependent on the EU than vice 
versa. The idea that bilateralism can serve as a 
panacea for a prosperous economic future outside 
the EU would quickly lose ground, which would 
also affect British EU debates. The signal would 
be clear: the time of  cherry-picking and à la carte 
access to the Single Market has its limits, even for 
Switzerland.
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Before Denmark’s EU membership beginning in 
1973, the Danish relationship with the then EEC 
was closely tied to the political choices of  Britain. 
In the 1950s the UK was the biggest market for 
Danish exports, the largest part of  which were agri-
cultural products; in the early 1970s, 20 percent of  
Danish exports went to the UK. Danish govern-
ments at the time saw it as imperative to follow the 
UK’s institutional affiliations in its market policy. 
Denmark, therefore, opted for membership in the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) with the 
UK and followed the UK’s rapprochement with 
the EEC in the 1960s, leading eventually to mem-
bership in the EEC in 1973 alongside the UK and 
Ireland.
Within the EU, Denmark and Britain have often 
been described as awkward partners for the other 
member states. In both countries, the EU has been 
a subject of  vehement debate from a very early 
stage; the EU’s institutional dynamics after 1984 
have been controversial; and policy responses have 
often been outside the EU mainstream. This stance 
and setting originate from a fundamentally instru-
mental understanding of  the EU in both Denmark 
and the UK, which differs from the understanding, 
dominant in France and Germany, of  a common 
European cultural base.
Since the Cold War, the majority of  the political 
parties and the political elite in Denmark more 
generally consider the EU an essential form of  
cooperation for Denmark for instrumental reasons. 
Danish governments have acted on this basis in 
spite of  the opt-outs introduced as a consequence 
of  a second referendum in 1993, following the 
rejection of  the Maastricht Treaty in a 1992 ref-
erendum. According to the discourse on essential 
cooperation, Denmark has to be as close as pos-
sible to the EU core countries, given its four EU 
opt-outs. For example, Denmark shadows the euro, 
takes part in the euro-plus pact, and is also con-
sidering taking part in the banking union currently 
being negotiated in Brussels. The parties adher-
ing to the essential cooperation discourse want to 
abolish the Danish opt-outs as soon as possible, 
although a less positive stance toward participation 
in the euro has emerged in recent years. However, 
this abolishing can happen only through a new ref-
erendum on some or all of  the opt-outs, and the 
common understanding among these parties is that 
the European political environment at the moment 
is not conducive to obtaining a positive outcome in 
such a referendum.
It is important to note that the radical left and 
right as well as significant parts of  the public do 
not agree with the discourse on the EU as essential 
cooperation; they instead take the view that the EU 
should take the form of  normal interstate coopera-
tion, where few if  any substantial concessions are 
made. This strong position means that the govern-
ment and the mainstream political parties can never 
be sure of  a yes in a referendum, and it was this 
position that was behind the introduction of  the 
four opt-outs in 1993. At the same time, the logic 
of  the interstate cooperation discourse has a lim-
ited effect on Danish EU policy in areas other than 
the four opt-outs and in daily policy with respect to 
the EU. The government and the other mainstream 
parties want to be as close as possible to the EU 
core, given the opt-outs, on the basis of  the essen-
tial cooperation discourse. The left-wing Unity List, 
the ultraliberal New Alliance, and the right-wing 
Danish People’s Party cannot influence this general 
policy line. The important exception is when, in 
accordance with the constitution, specific EU leg-
islation deemed to give away Danish sovereignty 
requires a five-sixths majority to be passed in the 
Folketing. This exception was the case in relation to 
the European Patent Court, which both the Unity 
List and the Danish People’s Party have opposed. 
Denmark
Henrik Larsen
Since the Cold War, the United Kingdom and Denmark have been moving in very different directions in 
their EU policies . Denmark’s EU discourse now revolves around the idea of essential cooperation, with the 
country positioned close to the core of the European Union . Both politically and economically, Denmark’s 
interests lie more closely with Brussels and its EU partners than with its historical allies in London .
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The resulting lack of  a five-sixths majority means 
that Denmark could only give its consent through a 
positive referendum vote (which took place along-
side the EU elections in May).
Strong Reactions to Cameron’s Speech
The Danish government did not welcome David 
Cameron’s speech on renegotiating the British 
relationship with the EU. Danish Prime Minister 
and Social Democrat Helle Thorning-Schmidt said 
in an interview that she preferred strong cohesion 
between all member states and that the UK and 
Denmark had chosen “different EU paths in rela-
tion to European cooperation.” While stressing that 
the two countries were “friends and alliance part-
ners,” that Denmark would like to see the UK stay 
in the EU, and that there should be respect for dif-
ferences between EU countries, she also said, “We 
already have a flexible Europe. A good example is 
the opt-outs we have in Denmark.” Prime Minister 
Thorning-Schmidt emphasized, “We also need a 
strong, common core amongst the [then] 27 mem-
ber states … So in that way Europe is not a buffet 
… Now it is up to the UK to work out what kind 
of  position it wants in the EU. But I don’t think 
the EU will be stronger if  every member state 
can tailor their membership to fit, thereby losing 
the core which ought to be common in our EU.” 
According to the prime minister, the approach put 
forward by Cameron was neither of  interest to nor 
suitable for Denmark: “We think it serves the Dan-
ish interest best to be close to the core in Europe 
and to make a difference every day in a construc-
tive way – and in that way make our voice heard in 
Europe.”88
Deputy Prime Minister Margrethe Vestager also 
stressed the differences between the Danish and 
British positions (in spite of  both countries having 
opt-outs): “We are very close to the core in the EU 
and in a very different situation from the UK.”89 
The Liberal Party, Denmark’s largest party, which 
held power from 2001 to 2011 and is poised to 
regain power in the next general elections, took a 
stance similar to the current government, stating 
that Cameron was on the “wrong track.”90
As much as these responses were directed at EU 
partners, they were also directed at the internal 
Danish political scene, with the aim of  legitimizing 
and defending the Danish policy of  being close 
to the core and not fighting for a more flexible 
EU. And yet the message in Cameron’s speech 
struck a chord with Danish parties skeptical of  the 
continued deepening of  EU integration. The UK 
government’s attempt to renegotiate the relation-
ship with the EU lent legitimacy to right-wing and 
ultraliberal voices in Danish politics that want less 
EU integration, such as parts of  the Conservative 
Party, the New Alliance, and the Danish People’s 
Party. Ideas about renegotiating Danish EU mem-
bership and only participating in the internal 
market resonate in all three parties. It is only the 
radical left Unity List that wants Denmark to leave 
the EU altogether.
A poll from January 2013 showed that 52 percent 
of  Danish voters would not want Denmark to 
leave the EU if  the UK decided to withdraw its 
membership.91 However, 47 percent would like the 
Danish government to renegotiate the conditions 
of  Danish membership, although roughly the same 
number was against a referendum on member-
ship in the EU following a renegotiation. The poll 
suggests that the UK’s importance as a reference 
point for the Danish population in EU politics 
should not be underestimated. This circumstance 
may be linked to the relatively Anglophile attitude 
of  the Danish population since at least World 
War II, skepticism about EU integration, or a com-
bination of  both factors. The poll also suggests 
that there was a difference between the negative 
reactions of  the Danish government to Cameron’s 
speech and the wishes of  the population concern-
ing the consequences for Denmark. Minister for 
Europe Nicolai Wammen’s comment that the elec-
torate was behind the government’s policy of  “not 
jumping on the English ferry” was surprising in 
the light of  the poll’s results.92
Overall, however, the picture is not so clear.
According to the same poll, a majority also sup-
ported Denmark’s participation in the euro-plus 
pact and the banking union, although there has 
also been a consistent majority against joining the 
euro since the onset of  the economic crisis.93 On 
DGAPanalyse 16 | September 2014
69
this political issue, there was more of  an over-
lap with Danish government policy and no clear 
alignment with British policy. This outcome may 
have to do with the shape of  the debate in Den-
mark in relation to economic EU issues such as 
the euro: there is widespread fear of  serious con-
sequences for Denmark should it be left out of  
something. In this respect, the essential coopera-
tion discourse often has been powerful in shaping 
the debate.
Impact of UK Withdrawal on Denmark
Wammen commented in March 2013 on the pros-
pect of  the UK leaving the EU, saying that he 
did not “expect the UK to leave the EU. And no 
matter how Britain is linked to the EU after a ref-
erendum, Britain will remain an ally, we will remain 
good friends.”94 The comment may be read as a 
commonsense, diplomatic response to an issue that 
Denmark can do little to influence.
Denmark has had substantial military coopera-
tion with the UK outside the EU for the last ten 
to fifteen years, so there would be a solid base to 
build on were Britain to leave the European Union. 
However, it is interesting that, forty years after 
Denmark joined the EEC primarily because of  the 
UK’s entry, the reverse prospect of  the UK leaving 
the EU has not evoked stronger terms to charac-
terize the value of  UK membership in the EU for 
Denmark. But then things have changed over the 
past forty years. Denmark’s basic intergovernmen-
tal and Atlanticist approach is, to a large extent, 
still shared with the UK, as is a general support 
for free trade. Denmark and the UK both have 
EU opt-outs. However, as the statements above 
illustrate, Copenhagen at present considers itself  
as “very close to the core,” which is clearly differ-
ent from the present tenor of  London’s EU policy. 
Also, the UK’s role as a market for Danish exports 
has diminished, as the UK has now fallen into third 
position after Germany and Sweden. Arguably, 
the relative importance of  the UK as a partner or 
leader for Denmark in the EU has declined – not 
least due to the UK’s marginalization vis-à-vis eco-
nomic and monetary union. Of  course, political 
cycles in the two countries also affect this decline: 
the Blair government’s emphasis on the need for 
the UK to play a “full and leading role in Europe” 
was closer to Danish ways of  thinking than the 
present Conservative-dominated British govern-
ment. Moreover, from around the end of  the Cold 
War, Danish governments and mainstream political 
parties (but not the Danish population) have con-
tinuously understood the EU in terms of  essential 
cooperation, whereas views in London have oscil-
lated significantly in this respect. In the past, Dan-
ish policy in Europe often followed London, but 
more recently the relative importance of  other 
European countries has increased.
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Australia and New Zealand are about as far from 
Europe as you can get while still remaining on this 
planet. Nevertheless, both countries’ histories have 
been closely bound with Britain’s and therefore 
Europe’s. With regard to their relations with the 
United Kingdom and the European Union, Austra-
lians and New Zealanders might best be described 
as Euroskeptics of  the heart but Europhiles of  
the head. These attitudes stem from the history of  
Britain’s accession to the European Community, as 
well as recognition of  the importance of  contem-
porary Europe as a trading partner and a potentially 
like-minded political actor. Opinion in both of  
these independent nations ultimately wishes to see 
the UK remain in the EU. But this wish is primar-
ily a means to see the continuing reforms, which 
both nations feel are necessary as outside powers 
seeking access and influence in Brussels, even if  
expectations about the likelihood of  reform remain 
low. Furthermore, these low expectations come at 
a moment of  noticeable reengagement in bilateral 
relations with the UK and even growth of  political 
support for the so-called Anglosphere.
Demographic Links
Australia is a country with a population of  23 mil-
lion people on a continent large enough to com-
fortably fit Europe; New Zealand’s population of  
4 million inhabits two main islands about 2,000 
kilometers from Sydney. Despite the geographical 
distance and dominant perceptions of  immigration 
from Asia, people-to-people ties between Australia, 
New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Europe 
remain strong. The Australian Bureau of  Statis-
tics found in 2011 that 24.6 percent of  Australia’s 
population was born overseas and that 5.3 percent 
(over one million people) of  the current Australian 
population was born in the UK.95 Thus, the United 
Kingdom still provides the largest single migrant 
group, although the proportion declined margin-
ally from 5.8 percent in 2001. Furthermore, it was 
the leading country of  birth for the overseas-born 
population in Australia (20.8 percent), followed 
by New Zealand (9.1 percent), China (6.0 percent), 
and India (5.6 percent).96 The situation is similar 
in New Zealand, with a quarter of  the population 
born overseas. However, the New Zealand statistics 
agency found from the 2013 census that migrants 
from the aggregated region of  “Asia” (31.6 per-
cent) had overtaken the UK (26.5 percent) as the 
largest point of  origin for the overseas-born.97 It 
should be noted that EU-born citizens are also 
well represented among Australia’s population. The 
2011 Australian census found that more than one-
third of  the 5.3 million Australian residents born 
overseas were born in the European Union – some 
1.9 million people. Furthermore, an EU passport 
remains a prized item, with the promise of  interna-
tional mobility for young and professional Austra-
lians. It is estimated that around half  of  the nearly 
one million Australians living and working abroad 
are in Europe,98 with approximately 100,000 of  
these living in the United Kingdom.99
Despite the cultural proximity, the ties between the 
UK and Australia and New Zealand are not the 
same as they were a hundred or even fifty years ago. 
Australia and New Zealand are two English-speak-
ing countries sharing close historical, economic, 
political, and cultural ties, but both are independent 
sovereign states. They shared military service dur-
ing World War I and established comprehensive 
economic cooperation under closer economic rela-
tions (akin to the EU’s Single Market) in 1983.
The date of  this economic initiative – whose nego-
tiations began in the late 1970s – is not innocent. 
Closer economic integration between Australia 
and New Zealand was linked to the loss of  mar-
kets suffered when Britain joined the European 
Community (EC). Thus, debate in Australia and 
Australia and New Zealand
Ben Wellings and Annmarie Elijah
Australia and New Zealand were forced to reorient their spheres of interest and their economies when the 
United Kingdom joined the EEC . Following the UK’s exit from the European Union, these three countries 
could cooperate again on the global stage, especially in Asia . Yet Aussies and Kiwis might have more to 
gain from having a liberal partner at the European (and transatlantic) trade negotiating table .
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New Zealand about Britain’s involvement in the 
European Union has been fundamentally shaped 
by both these countries’ relationship with the 
United Kingdom and the long process of  British 
accession to the EC. When Britain’s EC applica-
tion was first announced in 1961, the shock was 
profound given the heavy – in New Zealand’s case 
near total – dependence on the UK as a market for 
primary products such as minerals, meat, and dairy. 
When British accession came in 1973, it had a sig-
nificant impact on exports to the UK from both 
countries, even noting some transitional arrange-
ments made for New Zealand by Britain and the 
members of  the EC. The loss of  markets was most 
keenly felt in agricultural sectors. British plans to 
join the EEC were widely seen as a betrayal, and 
one with potentially disastrous consequences. “We 
are facing the greatest economic crisis of  our his-
tory,” the president of  New Zealand’s Labour Party 
told The Times in 1962, “wars and depressions not 
excepted.”
Economic Links
Australia and New Zealand – as part of  the Cairns 
Group established in 1986 – were integral to a 
push within the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
for the liberalization of  European markets and 
reform of  the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
in particular. The politics of  this initiative and the 
existence of  the EC’s external tariff  walls defined 
Australia’s and New Zealand’s relationships with 
Brussels for decades. Accordingly, both countries 
have been supportive of  British efforts to speak 
out against the direction and pace of  European 
integration at certain moments in the history of  
the EU.
The historic loss of  UK markets was somewhat 
offset by the geopolitical realignment of  Australia 
and New Zealand as regional powers in the Asia-
Pacific (or what is now referred to in Canberra 
as the Indo-Pacific Rim) and as advocates of  free 
trade. Both Australia and New Zealand were early 
adopters of  neoliberalism and implemented poli-
cies of  so-called economic rationalism with gusto. 
Like Australia, New Zealand is increasingly focus-
ing its attention northward. New Zealand signed 
a free-trade agreement with China in 2008, and 
the following year China, having already overtaken 
the UK in 2003, replaced the United States as 
New Zealand’s second-largest trading partner after 
Australia.
Despite this considerable strategic and economic 
reorientation in what is now portrayed as “the 
Asian century,”100 the EU remains an important 
economic and strategic partner for Australia and 
New Zealand. According to the European Com-
mission,101 in 2012 the EU was Australia’s second-
largest trading partner in goods and services (after 
China) and third in merchandise (after China and 
Japan).
Antipodean Perceptions of the  
European Union
Australia boasts strong bilateral diplomatic ties 
with most EU member states, although public and 
media awareness of  the EU remains low.102 Until 
the change of  government in 2013, Australian 
espousal of  “middle power” diplomacy (specifically 
by means of  the G20, the UN Security Council, 
and the Asia-Europe Meeting) sat well with the 
EU’s own emphasis on multilateralism. The formal 
relationship with the EU itself  is long-standing 
(since 1962) and durable despite tensions. In par-
ticular, the attempt to sign a treaty-level agreement 
has been delayed by what one might call furious 
agreement over common values. The delay arose 
over Australian objections to the standard human 
rights clause attached by the European Parlia-
ment to all treaties. The Australians felt (perhaps 
erroneously) that their human rights record spoke 
for itself, a view that gained some sympathy in 
New Zealand. Despite this incident, attention has 
shifted back to the trade relationship. Following the 
announcement in 2014 that the EU would upgrade 
its diplomatic mission to New Zealand, it also said 
it would consider a trade agreement with Welling-
ton. Likewise, the possibility of  an EU–Australia 
trade deal is under scrutiny in Canberra.
Thus, we should not assume, however important 
relations with the UK are for the Aussies and 
Kiwis, that everything is determined by history. 
Some opinion in New Zealand advocates find-
ing small partners and allies within the EU that 
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might understand the perspective of  a small nation 
negotiating with large neighbors, rather than seeing 
the United Kingdom as a natural ally. In Australia, 
awareness exists of  the need to understand the EU 
from a perspective that is not mediated through the 
British perspective. An Australian trade delegation 
to Europe in 2013 visited France, Germany, Slova-
kia, and Austria – all euro zone countries – and did 
not visit the UK.
Admittedly, revising a UK-centric perspective is 
not always easy. UK–Australia ties run strong and 
deep. Much reporting on European matters is fil-
tered via UK press and media: Rupert Murdoch is 
Australian, after all. Recent arrivals from Brussels 
sometimes complain that public debate about the 
EU in Sydney or Melbourne could easily be taking 
place in London. Furthermore, the UK remains 
a major point of  access to the EU. According 
to the Australian Department of  Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, the UK was Australia’s largest two-way 
goods and services trading partner within the EU 
in 2012, accounting for 22.3 billion Australian dol-
lars and ahead of  Germany in second place, which 
accounted for 15.7 billion Australian dollars.103 
It was also Australia’s largest export market in 
Europe (ahead of  the Netherlands, Germany, and 
France) and the second-largest import market after 
Germany. Although no direct comparison is pos-
sible, by contrast these figures compare with total 
two-way merchandise trade with the euro zone 
countries of  40.5 billion Australian dollars in 2012. 
Given the importance of  the UK relationship, it is 
sometimes possible to hear complaints that the UK 
feels it “owns” the relationship with Australia.
“More Jakarta, Less Geneva”
Moreover, the UK–Australia relationship has been 
intensifying in the past decade and particularly 
since the establishment of  the UK’s Conserva-
tive–Liberal Democrats coalition in 2010. From the 
mid-1970s there was a somewhat taken-for-granted 
nature to political relationships between London 
and Canberra. Although it is true that Australia has 
become significantly engaged in Asia, UK–Austra-
lia bilateral ties have been revived. AUKMIN meet-
ings (an Australia–United Kingdom engagement at 
the ministerial level) were established in 2006 after 
Tony Blair’s visit to Australia at the opening of  the 
Melbourne Commonwealth Games. The meetings 
were regularized in 2011 and now take place annu-
ally. When William Hague became foreign secretary, 
he immediately outlined the UK’s foreign policy 
priorities as directed at emerging countries, tradi-
tional allies, and the European Union. Only days 
before David Cameron gave his speech in January 
2013, committing a future Conservative govern-
ment to renegotiating UK–EU relations and then 
holding an in/out vote, Hague was in Sydney out-
lining areas of  enhanced cooperation between 
Britain and Australia as global partners, particularly 
in Asia.104
This development comes on top of  significant and 
ongoing defense intelligence cooperation between 
the “five eyes” of  the United States, the UK, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in a context 
in which the US alliance, via the ANZUS Treaty of  
1951, enjoys deep support in Australia. However, 
the treaty is a point of  strategic difference between 
Australia and New Zealand, because the United 
States suspended its security commitments in 1986 
in response to New Zealand’s non-nuclear policies.
Interestingly, Euroskepticism can be observed in 
Australia. It has been correctly pointed out that for 
the current right-wing government in Canberra, 
the European Union is a code word for bureau-
cracy, secularism, and especially environmental-
ism (all considered bad). When Australian Prime 
Minister Tony Abbott called for “more Jakarta, less 
Geneva”105 in Australian foreign policy, this appeal 
was not merely another signaling of  a shift in Aus-
tralian priorities but a comment on European polit-
ical values too. Indeed, were the British-born and 
Oxford-educated Abbott transplanted from Austra-
lian to British politics, his natural home would be 
the Euroskeptic right of  the Conservative Party.
Such views are not so much linked to the project 
of  a British exit from the EU but are related to the 
wider cultural politics of  the right. They are driven 
in part by a rehabilitation of  the British Empire as 
a force for good in the world, stemming not only 
from American neoconservatism, but from British 
Euroskepticism too. These ideas found their way 
into Australian politics via right-wing think-tanks 
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supportive of  the so-called Anglosphere.106 Such 
notions find receptive ears at important levels of  
Australian politics, and these ideas of  commonal-
ity are reflected back at Australia from the UK 
by figures such as Boris Johnson107 and Daniel 
Hannan.108
Were Britain to exit the EU, there might be some 
sense of  Schadenfreude on the right of  Australian 
politics. It might even be seen as an opportunity 
for the UK to return to a more “natural” political 
grouping of  English-speaking countries, a more 
universal destiny than parochial Europeanism, so to 
speak. Still, such views, however influentially sup-
ported, should not be overstated. The vast majority 
of  the Australian government would be disturbed 
at the thought of  a UK exit from the EU. This 
opinion is held with more conviction among those 
who regularly deal with the EU within the Depart-
ment of  Foreign Affairs and Trade. In submitting 
to the UK’s Balance of  Competences Review in 
2013, the Australian Foreign Minister stated that 
“Australia recognizes the UK’s strength and resil-
ience and looks forward to seeing it continue as a 
leading economy and an effective power. Strong, 
active membership of  the EU,” he added, “contrib-
utes to this.”109
So this is where Australia’s and New Zealand’s 
interests in Britain staying in the EU truly lie. The 
EU is of  course a key player in WTO negotiations, 
such as they currently are. It is also deeply involved 
in an array of  bilateral and “megaregional” trade 
negotiations, not least the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership. In the absence of  mul-
tilateral consensus, the extent to which countries 
commit to liberalization in these deals will have a 
great impact on Australia and New Zealand; both 
countries rely heavily on exports for economic sur-
vival. From an antipodean perspective, it is hard to 
see how the UK losing its voice in the EU could 
advance Australia’s and New Zealand’s interests.
The idea of  European integration as a means to 
end interstate conflict in Europe did not have the 
virtue of  being accompanied by the prospect of  
greater trade in this part of  the world. For Austra-
lia and New Zealand, UK accession to the EU was 
initially a net loss and occasioned an economic and 
strategic reorientation toward Asia and the Pacific. 
Opinion in Australia and New Zealand remains 
shaped by these foundational events, even if  
accommodation after CAP reform allowed for bet-
ter relations to develop. It is impossible to get away 
from the notion that Australia’s and New Zealand’s 
interests clearly lie in Asia more than in Europe. 
Ironically, by positioning itself  as a global as much 
as a European power, the United Kingdom looks 
attractive once again as a partner for Australia and 
New Zealand. Few in this part of  the world would 
want to see Britain leave the EU, but they might 
enjoy seeing it rattle the cage.
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The role of  Britain in the EU has been viewed very 
positively in Hungary, especially so before Hun-
gary’s accession to the EU. The United Kingdom, 
with its liberal approach to economic integration, 
strongly supported eastward enlargement, even 
if  this support was with a view to slowing down 
political deepening. But whatever the motivation, in 
the accession process Hungary, together with the 
other applicant countries, perceived the UK as a 
strategic ally. Within the EU, the UK and Hungary 
have very close ties. Britain is an important export 
market for Hungary: according to Eurostat data, 
France, Italy, the UK, and Romania each consume 
6 to 7 percent of  total Hungarian exports within 
the EU. Currently, around 4,700 British companies 
do business with Hungary – a figure that the UK 
trade and investment minister wishes to double by 
2018.110 Moreover, a great number of  mostly young 
and well-educated Hungarians (according to esti-
mates, over 100,000) have at some point worked in 
the UK, which was the first EU member state to 
open up its labor market to the eastern newcomers. 
While Hungarians have appeared to integrate well 
into British society and their economy, this devel-
opment has fueled worries about the implications 
for Hungary’s future with regard to demography 
and brain drain. 
At the EU level, there are issues on which Hun-
gary and Britain have very different views. In the 
Multiannual Financial Framework for 2014–2020, 
Hungary wanted to preserve the size of  the EU 
budget and thus levels of  cohesion and agricultural 
assistance, whereas Britain wanted to see them 
either frozen or reduced. Budapest also has a dif-
ferent approach to the future of  the EU, seeing a 
pick-and-choose approach as risky for the overall 
cohesiveness of  the EU. At the same time, the two 
countries have shared interests in some areas, such 
as the future role of  nuclear energy.
The UK as a Bridge between  
the Euro Zone and “the Rest”
All in all, Britain’s presence and influence in the EU 
is extremely important for Hungary as a non–euro 
zone country. Britain’s size means non–euro mem-
bers like Hungary can maintain influence over deci-
sions affecting the entire European Union, thereby 
preventing a marginalization of  non–euro zone 
countries in matters related to economic and mon-
etary union. This aim requires strong cooperation 
within the group of  the ten outsider countries, and 
the UK’s role in this group should be significant. 
In other words, the UK – on the basis of  its size 
and weight, and regardless of  its opt-outs – could 
significantly contribute to precluding an institution-
alized rift between the eighteen insiders and ten 
outsiders.
As regards the image of  Britain in the EU, Hungar-
ian experts and policymakers in foreign affairs see 
the country as a Euroskeptic member state but 
also as a heavyweight player, both in economic and 
foreign policy terms. It is widely perceived that 
within the EU, the UK can help counterbalance 
France and Germany. Its membership also makes 
the EU stronger and more influential on the global 
stage As regards the British Balance of  Com-
petences Review, Hungary would be in favor of  
improving the efficiency of  EU decision-making 
by rationalizing the scope of  EU-level regulations 
and by respecting the principle of  subsidiarity even 
more. But this process should adhere to the Lisbon 
Treaty and pertain to all member states equally. 
Revising the exercise of  competences by means 
of  treaty change might also be counterproductive, 
as it would entail complex negotiations and risky 
national ratifications.
As far as a potential UK exit from the EU is con-
cerned, this issue does not really appear in the 
public discourse, and no opinion polls have been 
Hungary
Krisztina Vida
Rather than see Britain build a greater wall of opt-outs or leave the European Union, Hungary would like 
to see Britain remain in the EU and further enhance its cooperation with other member states, especially 
those in central and eastern Europe .
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conducted on the topic in Hungary. But since the 
January 2013 speech by David Cameron, several 
newspapers and websites have been dealing with 
the British EU dilemma. Most articles on the topic 
emphasize that Cameron would personally prefer 
his country to stay in the EU, but in a more flex-
ible and viable EU. The articles also point to the 
various political pressures on the prime minister 
from different directions inside and outside his 
party. The promise of  an in/out referendum was 
also interpreted as a political tactic to secure greater 
support from British voters in the 2015 general 
election, given the significant number who would 
vote for leaving the EU (and given the fact that 
the Labour Party does not foresee such a referen-
dum unless a major treaty change at the EU level 
occurs). In the event of  the UK leaving the EU, 
the Franco-German tandem would be strengthened, 
and the relative weight of  all other member states 
would be enhanced. Others point to the unwanted 
reinforcement of  anti-EU forces in Hungary and 
across the European Union as a spillover effect of  
the British attitude.
For this reason, Hungary believes that criticism 
on EU matters coming from the United Kingdom 
must be heard and that Britain should not be iso-
lated in this debate. In fact, other countries have 
also raised criticisms (see, e.g., the Dutch review 
of  EU competences, or the recent confrontations 
between the Hungarian government and the Euro-
pean Commission over crisis management meth-
ods), and indeed many aspects of  EU decision-
making need improvement. But from Hungary’s 
perspective, these issues should be discussed and 
settled together, in a joint effort preserving the 
single institutional and treaty-based framework of  
the EU and not by moving toward individual solu-
tions and disintegration.
Overall, Hungary is interested in the UK’s con-
tinued full membership in the European Union, 
and would like to see its criticisms and proposals 
heeded and discussed at the EU level. At the same 
time, Hungary wishes to avoid any fragmentation 
of  the EU’s structures.
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Over the past few years, Sweden has emerged as 
one of  Britain’s closest partners in the EU. The 
two countries share several common positions 
across a number of  issue areas, such as free trade 
and the EU budget, and both are traditionally 
outward-oriented and hold liberal outlooks. This 
congruity is partly reflected by the strong commer-
cial ties between them. Britain is currently the fifth-
largest Swedish export market. Sweden is also the 
home to thousands of  British companies. When 
it comes to investments, Britain is the third-largest 
foreign investor in Sweden. The UK ranks as the 
fifth-largest destination of  Swedish foreign direct 
investment.
Britain and Sweden also view European politics 
through a similar lens. They are both geographically 
peripheral to the European continent and share 
a tradition of  regarding European politics from 
an outsider’s perspective. Moreover, they are both 
constitutional monarchies that were not part of  
the European project from the beginning – Britain 
joined in 1973, Sweden in 1994. Even after becom-
ing members, they have both opted to remain out-
side EU cooperation in certain areas, such as the 
euro zone.
Adding to traditional British–Swedish ties is the strong 
personal relationship between the countries’ two cur-
rent prime ministers, David Cameron and Fredrik 
Reinfeldt. In many ways it seems appropriate to 
speak of  a “special relationship” between these two 
European center-right leaders. Cameron and Rein-
feldt are known to frequently meet during EU and 
other international summits to exchange views. Their 
friendship predates the current Tory-led coalition 
government in London. Indeed, even before moving 
into 10 Downing Street, Cameron had a keen interest 
in Swedish politics. It was in Sweden that he sought 
inspiration for reform of  the Conservative Party, with 
a study visit in 2007 to learn from the experience of  
the conservative Swedish Moderate Party’s rebrand-
ing to appeal more strongly to middle-class voters. 
Furthermore, Sweden’s ability to maintain a generous 
and highly effective welfare state with sound pub-
lic finances was considered a model for Cameron’s 
general election campaign in 2010. Britain’s renewed 
interest in Sweden and the rest of  the Nordic region 
in general is reflected in the regional cooperation 
framework that the UK set up in 2010, the Nor-
dic Future Forum. This initiative can be seen as an 
attempt by the UK to develop more strategic ties with 
the Nordic-Baltic region, an area that Britain views as 
being home to like-minded outlooks about the future 
of  Europe.
During the past couple of  years, Britain and Sweden 
have been allies in their approaches to dealing with 
the euro crisis, the EU budget, and in promoting free 
trade. Both governments opted to stay out of  the 
euro zone’s new banking union. Sweden and the UK 
have also held similar positions on the Single Resolu-
tion Mechanism for overseeing failing lenders. On the 
recently proposed idea of  establishing a distinct EU 
financial transaction tax, Sweden’s Finance Minister 
Anders Borg worked closely with George Osborne 
to stop the proposal. In 2012 Sweden and the UK 
made headlines for their reluctance to sign the new 
EU budget. Sweden, alongside the UK, emerged as 
the biggest budget hawk in the EU, with both calling 
for cuts. Following the recent elections to the Euro-
pean Parliament, Sweden was one of  the handful of  
other countries that defended Cameron’s calls not to 
surrender the power to choose the next Commission 
president from the heads of  states to the members of  
the European Parliament.
Cracks in the Friendship
Despite the many obvious similarities between the 
UK and Sweden and the examples of  joint policy 
approaches in the EU, British–Swedish relations 
Sweden
Erik Brattberg
Sweden is one of Britain’s closest partners in the European Union . The two countries share many com-
mon positions on specific issue areas and a similar political outlook . It would therefore be highly unfortu-
nate from a Swedish point of view if the United Kingdom were to leave the EU . David Cameron’s intent 
to hold a referendum on Britain’s EU membership has therefore had a negative impact on the British–
Swedish relationship .
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have grown more sour of  late. To a large extent, this 
development has to do with Cameron’s commitment 
to a referendum on his country’s EU status, a deci-
sion that was lambasted by the Swedish EU minister. 
According to Swedish news reports, Cameron had 
called Reinfeldt before the announcement to inform 
him personally about the decision.111 Although Rein-
feldt said he was somewhat sympathetic to Cameron’s 
strategy to keep his increasingly anti-EU country in 
the EU, he did not hide the fact that Sweden would 
like to see the UK remain a constructive player within 
the EU.
It is therefore no surprise that London’s talk of  
wanting to renegotiate its status in the EU and 
put this new relationship to a referendum has 
been received with mixed feelings in Stockholm. 
For Sweden, sustaining the idea of  a multispeed 
Europe would be more difficult without the UK, 
something that could make Sweden more exposed 
if  it led to a “core Europe” capable of  making 
Sweden concede more power to Brussels. There 
are also Swedish concerns that if  taken too far, a 
multispeed Europe would dilute the effectiveness 
of  the EU altogether. Echoing this position, Swed-
ish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt remarked that while 
flexibility “is fine,” opening up a 28-speed Europe 
would mean that in the end there would be “just a 
mess.”
Furthermore, Britain and Sweden have pursued 
two distinctly different paths when it comes to 
managing their growing Euroskeptic and immi-
gration-skeptic publics. Cameron’s recent remarks 
about alleged “welfare tourism” of  citizens from 
other EU states and his efforts to curtail EU 
immigration to Britain hit a raw nerve in Sweden, 
which remains one of  the most liberal countries in 
Europe with regard to immigration. This position 
is illustrated, for instance, by the country’s relatively 
high intake of  Syrian refugees.
Swedish Views on a UK Exit
Sweden stands to lose tremendously should Britain 
ultimately decide to leave the EU. Stockholm would 
lose its most natural ally for a liberal and outward-
looking Europe. This situation would weaken 
Sweden’s position in the EU and its ability to influ-
ence the EU’s future orientation. Sweden would 
also be hurt economically. Britain is currently one 
of  Sweden’s largest exporting markets. If  Britain 
were to leave the Single Market, this could damage 
Sweden’s growth as new trade barriers would likely 
be put in place. Additionally, the disappearance of  
Britain’s contributions to the EU budget means 
that Sweden’s share would rise, as it is a major net 
contributor in the EU.
For a free-trade-oriented and export-dependent 
nation like Sweden, the prospect of  growing pro-
tectionism in the wider EU would be bad indeed. 
Sweden, together with the UK, has been among 
the most active supporters of  the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership that the EU is 
currently negotiating with the United States. If  
Britain were to leave the EU, a powerful voice 
advocating this transatlantic partnership would be 
lost. It would also weaken the EU’s foreign and 
security policy, as Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) missions would become more costly 
and lose significant military capabilities. For a non-
NATO country like Sweden, this change would 
have real strategic implications.
If  the British electorate ultimately decides to exit 
the EU, however, Sweden is unlikely to follow suit. 
The country has a firm EU orientation, although 
popular support for the EU has also declined in 
the past few years. In an April 2014 poll, 67 per-
cent of  those surveyed in both Sweden and the UK 
thought the EU “is moving in the wrong direction.” 
Unlike the UK, Sweden does not have a large anti-
EU movement such as the United Kingdom Inde-
pendence Party, despite the far-right Sweden Dem-
ocrats’ near 10 percent vote in the latest elections 
to the European Parliament. Even if  there were a 
change of  government in Stockholm following the 
upcoming national election in September 2014, the 
Social Democrats, who might get into government 
would not significantly alter Sweden’s overall policy 
toward the EU. One thing is certain though: with a 
UK outside the EU, Sweden would lose one of  its 
closest friends and allies for an outward-oriented 
and liberal EU.
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Internal economic and institutional instability in 
Italy – since 2012 the country has experienced 
four different governments and two parliamentary 
compositions – has limited Italian involvement in 
the debates on EU–UK relations. Existing debates 
have developed largely in response to Britain’s 
Euroskeptic positions. The Italian media often 
highlight that Euroskepticism is widespread in the 
UK and that it appears to be supported not only 
by radical and populist parties such as the United 
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), but also 
to different degrees by Labour and the Conserva-
tives. On the one hand, the Conservative Party’s 
aim to renegotiate the terms of  UK membership 
by means of  an in/out referendum is not seen as 
significantly different from Labour adopting simi-
lar anti-EU political lines in order to increase their 
electoral success in view of  the next national elec-
tions.112 On the other hand, it was noted in Italy 
that the UKIP, thanks to a strong anti-EU cam-
paign, has become the foremost British party in 
the European Parliament, now holding 24 seats, 11 
more than in 2009 (in comparison, Labour holds 
20 seats, Conservatives 19).113
In Italy it is generally believed the UK’s EU 
membership is necessary not only for boosting 
European economic growth and its system of  gov-
ernance, but also for counterbalancing what is per-
ceived to be German political hegemony over EU 
decision-making.114 The latter perception is wide-
spread among Italians. In 2013, 83 percent of  Ital-
ians believed that German dominance over Europe 
was far too strong and 70 percent feared an 
increasingly “Germanized” European Union would 
be detrimental for Italy.115 In this respect, former 
Prime Minister Mario Monti held several talks with 
David Cameron in 2012 to second the UK free-
market vision against excessive ordoliberal fiscal 
strictness and to persuade his counterpart of  the 
necessity of  increasing the EU budget as a way to 
enhance European governance.116 His attempts, 
however, were strongly dismissed.117 The UK’s 
refusal to sign the fiscal compact as well as denying 
an increase of  the EU budget were evidence of  a 
growing British willingness to disengage with the 
common institutions.118
Although some representatives of  the Italian 
government, like current Prime Minister Matteo 
Renzi, admire the UK’s “third way” of  dealing with 
the EU, it is generally assumed that ultimately there 
could not be a “greater Europe without the United 
Kingdom.”119
The Impact of EU–UK Relations on Italy
Even ignoring the Italian government’s official 
position, it is undeniable that British withdrawal 
from the EU would negatively affect the Italian 
economy and its balance of  trade.
First of  all, given that one of  the major reasons 
British citizens support anti-European parties is the 
perceived need to stop immigration from central 
and eastern European countries, a renegotiation 
of  the treaties could eventually lead to the UK 
also further limiting access for Italians to its labor 
market. Growing levels of  unemployment in Italy 
over the last couple of  years have resulted in the 
emigration of  many Italians looking for better job 
opportunities throughout the EU, including to the 
UK. In 2012, 119,000 Italians lived in Great Brit-
ain, while Italy hosted only 29,184 British citizens. 
Moreover, the number of  British citizens who 
moved to Italy fell by 2.7 percent in 2012 to 
1,548.120 Conversely, according to data provided by 
ISTAT,121 in 2012 7,404 Italians moved to the UK 
in search of  better job opportunities. Since Italians 
do not have to register with the Italian authorities 
when exercising their right of  free movement, real 
numbers are likely to be higher.
Italy
Eleonora Poli
British departure from the European Union would have an impact not only on Italy’s political stability, but 
also on its national balance of trade and unemployment rates . Full British involvement in the European 
project, however, would benefit the Single Market and its institutions, rebalancing what is considered to 
be excessive German interventionism in European decision-making processes .
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Britain’s leaving the EU could also result in the rein-
troduction of  trade barriers in the form of  custom 
duties. Once outside the European Union, the UK 
could certainly opt to negotiate a free-trade agreement 
with the EU to secure access to the Single Market. 
Yet this solution would more than likely require the 
UK to apply many of  the EU regulations it does 
now. For British Euroskeptics, this condition would 
be even more problematic than the current one, as 
the UK would have to respect EU rules while losing 
the power to intervene in the EU decision-making 
process. Hence, it is not very clear what a British exit 
from the EU would mean for economic relations.
Certainly the EU represents a large market for the 
UK. Nevertheless, in the first ten months of  2012, 
the UK exported goods and services to European 
countries at a value of  596 billion euros, whereas 
it imported a value of  628 billion euros, registering 
a negative balance of  32 billion euros.122 In other 
words, though the UK would surely be damaged by 
the reintroduction of  custom duties, other Euro-
pean countries’ economies might suffer more. This 
possibility is especially likely for Italy,123 where in 
2013 the number of  goods and services exported 
to the UK increased by 3.3 percent over the 
previous year, totaling 19.6 billion euros. Indeed, 
although the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath 
resulted in diminished exports to the UK (-29 per-
cent between 2007 and 2009), between 2009 and 
2013 Italian trade to Britain grew by 31 percent.124 
In contrast, from 2007 to 2013, UK exports of  
goods and services to Italy fell by 23.6 percent.
Furthermore, a British opt-out from the EU could 
affect Italian defense and security policy by under-
mining the effectiveness of  the European Com-
mon Security and Defence Policy. Accounting for 
22.4 percent of  defense expenditures and 11.8 per-
cent of  armed forces, the UK is one of  the most 
important European contributors in terms of  mili-
tary capability.125 Such a decision might also dam-
age Italian export of  aircraft, spacecraft, and related 
machinery to the UK, which in 2013 reached a 
value of  nearly six billion euros together with Fin-
meccanica’s business activities. Italy’s Finmeccanica, 
Europe’s third-largest player in the defense and 
security industry, has widely invested in the UK.
A Euroskeptic Domino Effect
Looking beyond the economic implications of  a 
possible UK exit from the EU, Europhile Italians 
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without the UK than an EU with a Euroskeptic 
and anti-federalist Britain. But the Euroskeptic 
British discourse might affect Italian politics, as it 
has already inspired some of  the positions main-
tained by Italian Euroskeptic parties such as Lega 
Nord and Movimento 5 Stelle. For instance, the 
British refusal to adopt the euro has been strongly 
endorsed by Lega’s members,126 along with the 
need for an independent monetary and fiscal policy. 
As for Movimento 5 Stelle, the party leader, Beppe 
Grillo, has shown great willingness to cooperate 
with the UKIP in the European Parliament. Indeed, 
both parties accuse the EU of  a lack of  democratic 
legitimacy,127 are skeptical of  the euro, and feel that 
Italy and Greece have been led by “puppet govern-
ments”128 put in place by Brussels and German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel.
Any successful attempt by the UK to renegotiate 
its relationship with the EU would create a political 
precedent that would provide Italian Euroskeptic 
parties the legitimacy to pursue similar objec-
tives. This outcome would perilously affect Italy’s 
already crippled political stability and its ability to 
contribute to the future development of  Euro-
pean institutions.129 This situation appears to be 
rather dramatic, especially in view of  the results 
of  the European parliamentary elections in which 
the aforementioned parties won a high number 
of  seats (five seats for Lega Nord and seventeen 
for Movimento 5 Stelle) by leveraging diminished 
Italian goodwill toward “more Europe.”130 Nowa-
days only 30 percent of  Italians trust the European 
institutions, and only 39 percent believe that the 
EU has protected its citizens – rather than pan-
dered to the financial markets – in the financial 
crisis.131
Although public opinion and Euroskeptic parties 
have endorsed British anti-EU arguments, a British 
departure from the European Union would have 
an impact not only on Italy’s political stability but 
also on its national balance of  trade and unemploy-
ment rates. Committed British involvement in the 
European common project, on the other hand, 
would surely benefit the effectiveness of  the Single 
Market and its institutions, and might well rebal-
ance what is considered excessive German inter-
ventionism in European decision-making processes.
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The debate about the UK’s future in the European 
Union must be viewed against the backdrop of  the 
severe economic crisis in Spain. This crisis has not 
only taken a toll on the lives of  Spaniards, with 
cuts in health care and education and ever-growing 
rates of  unemployment, but also resulted in a 
significant reduction of  Spain’s room for politi-
cal maneuvering in the EU. Even though Spain 
remains the fifth-largest EU member state, its 
inward-looking attitude has returned the country 
to the periphery of  Europe. Today, Spain is more a 
matter of  concern for the EU than an actor shap-
ing European policies.
Despite this situation, Spain has continued to 
nurture its links with other European partners, 
mainly the largest EU member states of  Germany, 
France, Italy, and Britain. In April 2013, after the 
first visit (albeit a fleeting one) of  a British prime 
minister in Madrid since 2006, Spanish Prime 
Minister Mariano Rajoy defined Spain and the UK 
as “[European] partners, [NATO] allies, and [bilat-
eral] friends.”132 In fact, this bilateral relationship is 
defined by such complexity.
Political contacts form a central part of  this com-
plex. Although in every governmental meeting 
British and Spanish leaders have praised the “stra-
tegic relationship,”133 it has nevertheless retained 
a low profile, except in the honeymoon years of  
José María Aznar and Tony Blair in the early 2000s. 
Benefiting from their personal friendship, Aznar 
and Blair jointly boosted the EU agenda on com-
petition and economic growth as well as justice 
and home affairs. They also both supported the 
US invasion of  Iraq, a position which put them 
at odds with other EU leaders. The following two 
heads of  state, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and 
Gordon Brown, returned to the usual low profile 
of  bilateral relations, with few common European 
interests or joint proposals.
The relationship between the UK and Spain is 
based intensely on population links and economic 
interdependence. Nearly fourteen million Brits visit 
Spain each year, with one million of  them having 
a second home along the Spanish coastline. The 
Spanish bank Santander is the UK’s third-largest 
financial organization, and the merger of  British 
Airways and Iberia has produced Europe’s third-
largest airline company.
There is also the everlasting dispute over Gibraltar’s 
sovereignty. Its tax-haven status, border control 
issues, and environmental conservation are a source 
of  permanent distrust between the two govern-
ments. The last episode of  this conflict made head-
lines in August 2013, when Spain introduced tight 
border controls on people crossing into Gibraltar 
as a reaction to the Gibraltar authorities’ decision 
to drop concrete blocks into the bay in order to 
create an artificial reef  to encourage sea life, but 
in fact restricted operations of  Spanish fishing 
boats.134 Even though both countries had always 
sought to avoid an EU dimension to this bilateral 
conflict, on this occasion David Cameron asked 
the European Commission to send a fact-finding 
mission to investigate the border checks imposed 
on the Spanish side. Rajoy also asked that the mis-
sion be widened to cover smuggling and money 
laundering in the territory. As a result, the long-
standing historical bilateral tension between Spain 
and the UK has to some extent been Europeanized, 
even if  the sovereignty question will remain under 
the UN umbrella.
Reactions to Cameron’s Speech
David Cameron’s proposal that a future Conserva-
tive government would renegotiate Britain’s rela-
tionship with the EU did not cause any substantive 
political discussion in Madrid, in spite of  carefully 
calibrated reactions by the government and a few 
Spain
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Spain and the United Kingdom have a complex relationship: economic ties are strong and important for 
crisis-ridden Spain, but in order to overcome its internal crisis, the Spanish government has clearly priori-
tized support of further euro zone integration . The referendum on Scottish independence is followed with 
great interest in Spain, as Scotland leaving the UK in the fall could give Catalonia a boost in its own inde-
pendence aspirations .
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spectacular headlines. The consequences that a 
British exit might have for the EU and Spain were 
overshadowed by a struggling Spanish economy, 
EU demands for harsh reforms, and the Scottish 
independence referendum.
The official governmental reaction showed a divi-
sion of  labor between the minister of  foreign 
affairs and the prime minister. On the one hand, 
Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel García 
Margallo took a tougher stance when he affirmed 
in a radio interview that withdrawing from the 
EU would be “awful news” for the UK because it 
would “become isolated in a world dominated by 
regional integration.”135 He also stressed that “the 
British [had] played a dangerous game by feed-
ing Euroskepticism and Cameron [felt] obliged 
to convene a referendum.” On the other hand, 
Prime Minister Rajoy took a more conciliatory and 
respectful tone. In all of  his public declarations, 
Rajoy stated that he really wished Britain would 
remain in the EU. But above all he underlined his 
support for Cameron’s stance to defend the “in” 
option in the would-be referendum. What is more, 
he appealed to the Conservative Party “to find a 
way of  continuing to be a key European partner, 
without the need for privileges and while maintain-
ing their obligations as a partner.”136
As far as Spanish public opinion is concerned, a 
poll conducted by the Madrid-based think-tank Real 
Instituto Elcano showed that a month after Cam-
eron’s speech a majority of  Spanish citizens felt a UK 
withdrawal from the EU would have negative conse-
quences for the UK (48 percent), for Spain (59 per-
cent), but mainly for the EU (66 percent).137 At the 
same time, Spaniards felt the British had contributed 
little to the EU. It was in the Spanish press that voices 
against the British challenge to the EU appeared 
most visibly. “British blackmail the EU,” “Cameron 
gives the EU an ultimatum,” “Cameron opens EU 
Pandora’s box,” and “Cameron shakes Europe” were 
some of  the headlines published by the Spanish press 
the day after Cameron’s speech.
Nonetheless, in Spain there has been much more 
interest in the Scottish independence referendum 
to be held on September 18, 2014, than in the still 
ambiguous referendum on Britain’s EU member-
ship, which may or may not be held by 2017. Spain 
is facing a similar challenge at the moment, with 
Catalonia possibly heading toward a referendum on 
independence (at the time of  writing, the Catalan 
regional government, with the support of  its parlia-
ment, announced that the referendum will be held 
on November 9, 2014). Therefore, the Foreign 
Minister’s statements mentioned above also had 
a domestic dimension. García Margallo, who has 
been one of  the louder voices of  the government 
against Catalan intentions to hold an independence 
referendum, has clearly argued that an independent 
Catalonia would be expelled from the EU and 
would remain outside the UN system.
Britain and Spain have responded differently to 
nationalist movements active in certain regions 
within their countries. While Britain has allowed 
Scotland to hold an independence vote, Spain has 
always rejected this possibility for Catalonia or the 
Basque Country, arguing that it was unconstitu-
tional as the Spanish Constitution clearly states that 
sovereignty lies with all Spanish citizens. But the 
outcome of  the Scottish referendum in Septem-
ber will certainly be followed with great interest in 
Spain.
What Britain’s Departure Would Mean for 
Spain and the Future of the EU
Spain and Britain have begun to represent two 
diverging visions about the future of  European 
integration and their roles within it. While both are 
located in the geographical western periphery of  
Europe, they have taken opposing views on their 
place in the EU. London has always defended its 
opt-outs and is now pushing for “less Europe.” 
Meanwhile, Madrid is fearful of  a two-speed 
Europe, as this option could mean that it would 
no longer be included in the central core of  the 
process of  European integration. Spanish politi-
cians have repeatedly pointed out that only “more 
Europe” can be the solution for the problems 
Spain faces. In a nutshell, Spain is a clear supporter 
of  further euro zone integration.
Despite these differences, the two countries share 
outstanding bilateral economic exchanges,138 with 
Britain being the second-biggest gross investor 
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in Spain and the fourth-largest recipient of  gross 
direct investment from Spain. They also have a 
common economic policy view based on the pro-
motion of  free trade, the dismantling of  monopo-
lies, and the deregulation of  markets, even though 
Spain will always defend its commitment to the 
euro zone.139 One can predict that if  any renegotia-
tion of  Britain’s EU membership meant restrictions 
to labor market access for Spanish workers, or any 
negative consequences for the Spanish economy, 
Madrid would react fiercely. At the moment, how-
ever, Spanish leaders have not seriously considered 
what an EU without Britain would imply. 
For Spaniards, the priority is to get out of  the eco-
nomic, financial, and banking crisis through the 
reduction of  unemployment, returning to a path 
of  economic growth. Certainly, Britain will never 
become an ally to Spain’s goal of  enhancing the 
political component of  the EU. Instead, Spain is 
quite aware that the UK is an indispensable part-
ner for economic issues as well as for enforcing 
the EU’s role in global issues such as economic 
governance and security. Spain will never defend 
a “Europe à la carte” strategy for itself, but admits 
that differentiated integration may allow enhanced 
integration for those countries that really want it.
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From Finland’s perspective, the UK is an important 
yet hesitant and difficult EU member state. As one 
of  the “big three,” its past and present importance 
in shaping European integration and EU decision-
making is widely recognized in Finland. As a cham-
pion of  free trade, the UK’s role in the creation 
of  the Single Market and the development of  the 
EU’s external trade policies are often highlighted, 
as well as its efforts in support of  eastern enlarge-
ment and the country’s importance to EU foreign 
and security policy. Among the general public, 
Britain’s long history of  parliamentary democracy, 
internationally well-known high and popular cul-
ture, and world-class universities are seen as a point 
of  reference for Finland and the whole of  Europe. 
Finns have also welcomed British interest in the 
“cool north,” from Nordic design to the Finnish 
welfare and education system.
An Important, Influential, Increasingly 
Difficult Member
Yet the UK is predominately viewed as a difficult 
EU member state, one that often creates obsta-
cles for advancing European integration in fields 
that have been deemed important for Finland. 
The outcome of  the 2010 UK general election 
heightened these concerns in both political circles 
and the Finnish media. Even the inclusion of  the 
pro-European Liberal Democratic Party in the 
coalition government, although initially expected 
to dampen Euroskeptic trends within the Con-
servative Party, did not prevent many in Finland 
from noting a Euroskeptic turn in the UK’s EU 
policy.
For Finland, the UK’s resistance to what it sees 
as “competence creep” – a supposed eagerness by 
the EU institutions to expand their competences 
beyond what is stipulated in the EU treaties – has 
hindered prospects for a streamlined and more 
effective EU in some areas such as external rela-
tions, an EU policy field in which Finland is greatly 
invested. The current government’s “referendum 
lock,” which triggers a national referendum in the 
event of  any further transfers of  national powers 
to the EU level, as well as the launch of  the Bal-
ance of  Competences Review, are seen as symp-
tomatic of  a problematic UK relationship with 
the EU. In light of  these developments, Helsinki 
has become increasingly frustrated with the UK’s 
eagerness to shape and often lower the possibility 
of  EU consensus on major reforms, even in areas 
where the UK has little intention of  participating 
in the deepened EU structures.
Despite also illustrating mutual goals, management 
of  the euro zone crisis has most clearly highlighted 
both the concerns and significant differences 
between the UK’s and Finland’s policies and posi-
tions vis-à-vis the EU. From Finland’s perspective 
the UK has constituted an additional hurdle to the 
management of  the euro zone crisis. The UK’s 
reluctance to participate in the stability mechanisms 
was seen as politically sensible and acceptable. The 
country is not a euro member, and it too has been 
facing significant economic challenges and an 
increasingly dissatisfied electorate. Yet London’s 
move to block some of  the much-needed reforms 
of  the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was 
not understood in Finland. The UK’s decision to 
veto proposed treaty changes branded the Fiscal 
Compact in 2011 was predominantly seen as a step 
driven by UK national interests. It was a step that 
further alienated the UK from the EU and Finland. 
At the same time, and largely due to the extraordi-
nary decisions taken to stabilize the single currency, 
the role of  the euro group and in particular the 
Finland
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The possibility of the United Kingdom seeking a renegotiated relationship with the European Union has 
received a lukewarm welcome in Finland . Finns see the UK as largely motivated by domestic politics 
rather than genuine European interest . Whereas Euroskeptic political forces in Finland have welcomed the 
British prime minister’s EU policy, the pro-European government has largely dismissed it as unrealistic and 
unhelpful . Increasing concern that the UK is drifting further away from or even leaving the EU is seen as 
an unwelcome development .
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two other remaining AAA credit-rated euro zone 
economies, Germany and the Netherlands, gained 
in importance for euro zone member Finland at 
the expense of  the UK.
The recent UK government review on the repatria-
tion of  EU powers has also received a mixed wel-
come in Finland. While both the Finnish government 
and the parliament’s grand committee overseeing EU 
affairs have highlighted the importance of  assessing 
the principles of  proportionality and subsidiarity as 
enshrined in the EU’s treaties, they have also shied 
away from the UK’s wish to assess EU competences 
in conjunction with envisaged treaty changes related 
to EMU reform. The UK’s suggestion that EMU 
reform would open up the possibility for the UK to 
seek a new settlement with the EU have therefore 
not gained support from the Finnish government. 
During his visit to Downing Street on the eve of  
David Cameron’s January 2013 Europe speech, then 
Finnish Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen reminded his 
colleague that Britain has benefited a great deal from 
an integrated Europe, and that “being a member of  
the EU, and especially in the Single Market, you can-
not kind of  pick the raisins out of  the bun.”140 Yet 
Katainen also reiterated his government’s view that 
the UK makes a crucial contribution to the EU’s Sin-
gle Market, free trade, and competitiveness. He argued 
that an “EU without Britain is pretty much the same 
as fish without chips. It’s not a meal anymore.”
The Finnish government’s position on treaty 
change seems to have shifted recently to a more 
hesitant position. It has highlighted that treaty 
change is not necessary to create many of  the 
envisaged EMU reforms as well as a better and 
fairer use of  EU competences. This position 
reflects domestic pressures related to the unpopu-
larity of  larger reforms, yet it is also shaped by 
many uncertainties embedded in a treaty reform 
process intensified by the UK’s aspirations to seek 
a still largely unspecified new settlement.
Euroskeptic Finnish–British Collaboration
Conversely, Prime Minister Cameron’s EU policies 
were welcomed by Euroskeptic political forces in 
Finland, which have recently seen growing levels 
of  support. The extremely unpopular political 
decisions taken to shore up the failing euro zone 
economies and stabilize the single currency have 
resulted in seismic changes in the Finnish political 
landscape. The emergence and landslide victory of  
the populist and Euroskeptic Finns Party (previ-
ously the True Finns Party) in the 2011 Finnish 
parliamentary elections sent shockwaves through-
out the pro-European ruling political parties. As 
a result, the well-cemented national consensus on 
Finnish EU policy broke down, and many have 
observed a hardening and more assertive tone 
in Finland’s EU policy. The current government, 
which excludes the Finns Party, has for instance 
demanded collateral for the second Greek loan 
package and blocked Bulgarian and Romanian 
entry into Schengen. The overall outlook of  the 
country, however, has remained pro-European. 
Both the EU and euro membership enjoy wide 
support among Finns, and the government has 
highlighted continuity in engaging constructively 
with the EU.
Because the Finns Party is the only major political 
party in Finland embracing Cameron’s EU policy, 
the ties between the Finns Party and the British 
Conservatives have strengthened. The leader of  
the Finns Party has over the past few years high-
lighted his links with the UK’s Conservative Party, 
at whose party conferences he has been a frequent 
visitor. He has argued that he also wants to see a 
better EU deal for Finland, one that would exclude 
established joint liabilities. Furthermore, he wants a 
referendum on Finland’s relationship with the EU. 
Yet he has noted that he cannot push through this 
decision without the support of  the other major 
political parties. Moreover, he has distanced his 
party from more radical arguments suggesting that 
Finland should leave the euro zone or even the EU 
altogether.
It is noteworthy that Prime Minister Cameron’s 
2013 speech explicitly mentions the Finnish parlia-
ment in Helsinki as one of  the many in Europe in 
which the future of  Europe is increasingly debated. 
Importantly, the links between the Conservative 
and Finns parties were further consolidated after 
the European Parliament elections in May 2014, as 
the Finns Party became a member of  the UK-led 
European Conservatives and Reformist group in 
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the European Parliament. These developments 
have not yet provoked sharp reactions from the 
ranks of  the center-right National Coalition Party, 
the customary Finnish partner of  the UK Con-
servative Party. The National Coalition has firmly 
aligned itself  with the European People’s Party 
(EPP), the largest EP group, whose gatherings have 
attracted broader public attention in Finland, in 
part because German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s 
CDU is also an EPP member, and her policies have 
been seen as central to the management of  the 
euro zone crisis.
Joint Economic Concerns and  
Shared EU Goals
The continuing economic challenges facing the EU 
and Finland, however, have highlighted some impor-
tant shared objectives between the UK and Finnish 
governments. As one of  the remaining euro members 
with an AAA credit rating, Finland has had to carry 
the full economic burden associated with the euro 
zone crisis. Finland has provided loans and accepted 
significant liabilities related to the various rescue-loan 
packages and established stability mechanisms for the 
euro zone. Moreover, the global financial crisis hit the 
Finnish export-oriented economy hard. In 2009 the 
country saw the most drastic reduction of  its GDP 
in peace time. Even though the economy again dis-
played modest growth in 2010, the sluggish economic 
growth of  the euro zone and the EU has been seen 
as a contributor to current hardships in the Finnish 
economy. This coincides with significant structural 
challenges in the Finnish economy, such as the dimi-
nution of  the country’s extensive information technol-
ogy sector.
Against this background, the UK’s aspirations to 
improve the EU’s competitiveness, further develop 
the Single Market, and exercise restraint in EU 
spending have been seen as crucial objectives, 
shared by the UK and Finland. Thus, the UK’s 
continuing participation in the EU has been high-
lighted by the government and the parliament’s 
grand committee as the most favorable prospect. 
Moreover, the possibility of  the UK drifting away 
from the EU or losing its influence and power at 
the decision-making table has been seen as a pos-
sible negative development for Helsinki.
Current Finnish assessments on the state of  the 
European Union, however, suggest that recent 
years of  crisis have led to an increasingly differen-
tiated EU. While some of  the key political dividing 
lines cut across the euro zone, the relationship of  
the euro area with the rest of  the EU has gained 
importance in Finnish EU policy. The govern-
ment has been instructed by the parliament to 
pay special attention to the fact that other Nordic 
members Denmark and Sweden are outside the 
euro area. Moreover, the possibility of  a UK exit is 
seen as an increasingly serious danger which would 
have direct and indirect consequences for Finland. 
The country would lose an important northern ally 
in setting up the EU’s economic policy guidelines. 
This would happen even if  the UK did somehow 
manage to remain a member of  the Single Market 
by some yet unspecified special arrangement. The 
Ukrainian crisis has also highlighted the impor-
tance of  the EU and its foreign policy for Finland, 
within which the UK contribution is regarded as 
important despite its “hang-ups.” The UK’s with-
drawal could also damage the credibility of  the 
EU in the field of  security and defense, which is a 
pivotal field of  EU cooperation for Finland, as the 
country is not a NATO member.
Against this background, there is somewhat more 
understanding in Helsinki for the UK’s EU con-
cerns. In addition to economic imperatives, Finland 
shares worries, voiced also in some other non–euro 
member states, about the heightened political divid-
ing line based on euro membership.
Finland would like to see the UK make a strong 
and constructive contribution to the EU as 
opposed to disruptive policies. Given shared opin-
ions, Finland could potentially turn out to be a 
useful friend for the UK in the EU. Helsinki might, 
however, be disappearing from the UK’s radar. 
Prime Minister Cameron’s trip to neighboring Swe-
den to meet political leaders from Sweden, Ger-
many, and the Netherlands to discuss the thorny 
question of  the EU’s key priorities and the next 
president of  the European Commission did not go 
unnoticed on the other side of  the Baltic’s Gulf  of  
Bothnia.141
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There is a cynical element that has linked Greece 
to Britain since the outbreak of  the debt crisis 
in Europe. This link is the potential exit of  both 
countries from either the euro zone or the Euro-
pean Union. Analysts and journalists have exten-
sively used the terms Grexit and Brexit in discuss-
ing the scenarios. The Grexit dominated the media 
agenda from 2010 to 2012, while a Brexit has been 
on the agenda from the beginning of  2013 onward. 
The causes that might lead Greece and Britain to 
abandon either the euro zone or the European 
Union are substantially different. The former might 
be pushed by some EU members to leave, while 
the latter is able to decide its fate alone. Moreover, 
Athens is obliged to meet the required fiscal targets 
and implement the necessary reforms in order to 
remain part of  the common currency family,142 
whereas London is attempting to negotiate a new, 
UK-only deal with Europe.143
A Grexit is currently considered an affair of  the 
past in Europe. The Greek Ministry of  Finance, 
for instance, issued a statement in June 2014 under-
lining that “the question of  Greece’s participation 
in the euro zone has been definitely and irreversibly 
answered.”144 Nevertheless, the relevant trauma and 
phobias of  the 2010–2012 period are still appar-
ent in the country. Greece’s approach vis-à-vis the 
potential exit of  Britain from the European Union 
has been shaped accordingly. In particular, Greece 
is highly concerned about Britain leaving the EU, 
because such a development could revive the 
Grexit nightmare, opening the bag of  Aeolus with 
the resulting political winds blowing the EU toward 
the removal of  additional states from the euro 
zone or the European Union.
Although Athens’ view is clear, it has taken no 
official position on Prime Minister Cameron’s Janu-
ary 2013 speech. The Greek government’s main 
priority has been to put its own economic house 
in order without commenting on the initiatives of  
other leaders or interfering in the internal politi-
cal debates of  other countries. In parallel with this, 
general interest on the subject in Greece is low. 
With the exception of  a few scholars such as Lou-
kas Tsoukalis, the future of  the European Union 
and the questionable position of  Britain in it have 
not sparked domestic debate.
Greece’s Inward-Looking Attitude
Greek political elites tend to frame discussions 
on Europe from a narrow ethnocentric perspec-
tive. Their attention is largely – if  not exclusively – 
turned toward the efficiency of  the current bailout 
policy and the possible reorientation of  Brussels’ 
economic approach of  austerity toward Southern 
Europe. Within this framework, they neglect other 
issues and dimensions. The pre-election campaign 
of  the 2014 European Parliament elections in 
Greece, for instance, did not include specific ref-
erences to the future of  the European Union, its 
transformation, or the potential creation of  a two-
speed system, with or without Britain. Instead, the 
main debates were whether the EP election result 
might be interpreted as a signal of  stability or an 
alarm for the survival of  the coalition government.
Nonetheless, Greek politicians tend to say they 
want “more Europe.” They see, in other words, 
further European integration as a panacea not only 
in dealing with the ongoing economic crisis but 
also in shielding the country’s national and geopo-
litical interests. In this regard, Britain’s exit might 
theoretically accelerate developments toward the 
enhancement of  European governance, as London 
has been traditionally hesitant in granting national 
sovereignty to Brussels and accepting supranation-
alism. However, a British withdrawal would have 
tangible negative consequences for the EU and 




A country struggling to find its way out of an unprecedented economic, political, and social crisis naturally 
seeks to avoid additional trouble at the European level . Britain potentially withdrawing from the European 
Union not only might put a Grexit back on the political agenda, but also would constitute a setback for 
Greek–British political and economic cooperation .
DGAPanalyse 16 | September 2014
92
Historical Ties
In spite of  studies suggesting that the British 
economy might benefit and also escape from 
bureaucratic burdens, a withdrawal of  the country 
from the EU could not but cause uncertainty as to 
the new role and position of  Britain in cooperation 
with European bodies.145 There is no precedent for 
such an evolution, and therefore estimations and 
predictions are highly debatable. Greece enjoys 
good political and economic relations with Brit-
ain and seeks to preserve this smooth coopera-
tion. The issue of  the return of  the Parthenon 
marbles plays a negative role in relations, but is not 
sufficient to heavily influence the overall spirit of  
mutual trust, which has been evident between the 
two countries since World War I.146 Even histori-
cally, the opposition of  the British government to 
the unification of  Greece and Cyprus in the Cold 
War period was the only significant thorn in the 
bilateral relations. British Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson, for instance, did actively support Greek 
accession to the then European Economic Com-
munity in 1975. After Greece became a member 
in 1981, European affairs have been of  high inter-
est in bilateral meetings, as had been the case with 
NATO issues.
In recent years, Greek–British cooperation yielded 
positive results in the fight against terrorism. In 
response to the assassination of  British military 
attaché Stephen Saunders in the year 2000 by the 
terrorist organization 17 November (17N) in Ath-
ens, both countries successfully worked together to 
combat 17N.
Economic Ties
Furthermore, the importance of  Britain for the 
Greek economy cannot be ignored. Britain is 
the seventh most-important trading partner for 
Greece.147 Additionally, Greek exports to Britain 
exceeded £650 million in 2011 and 2012. Cop-
per, milk, pharmaceuticals, aluminum, fruit, and 
fresh fish are among the largest groups of  export 
products. Moreover, a UK exit from the EU might 
create obstacles to British citizens visiting Greece. 
In 2012 and 2013, tourists from Britain were the 
second-largest national group of  European visitors 
to Greece, with only Germany sending more visi-
tors. To be precise, 1,920,794 British tourists visited 
the country in 2012, and 1,846,333 in 2013.148
Furthermore, approximately 40,000 Greeks reside 
permanently in Britain while many Greek students 
opt for the UK for their university education. 
These students pay lower tuition fees because of  
their EU status. According to the latest available 
data, Greece was the country of  origin of  11,630 
students in the academic year 2010/11 and of  
11,790 students in 2011/12. Spain and Italy – coun-
tries with much larger populations compared to 
Greece – sent a much lower number of  students 
to Britain in both academic years. It is no coinci-
dence that various chairs of  Greek and Byzantine 
studies have been established in prestigious British 
institutions. Last but not least, the Greek shipping 
presence remains significant in the economic life 
of  Britain.149 Despite the recent trend toward mov-
ing shipping offices to Piraeus, there are currently 
some 75 to 80 Greek shipping offices in London. 
All in all, Greece would only have to lose if  Britain 
decided to leave the European Union.
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While the debates in Britain about its possible 
withdrawal from the European Union are heating 
up, many Japanese have yet to make sense of  why 
an increasing number of  Britons are giving serious 
thought to leaving the EU. Meanwhile, Japanese 
companies investing in the UK are beginning to 
voice concerns about the possibility of  Britain’s 
leaving, fearing such a decision would have adverse 
consequences for their UK investments. Given that 
in economic, political, and security terms, Japan has 
long seen the UK as its primary partner in Europe 
and a gateway to the EU, the possibility of  Britain’s 
exit from the European Union poses a serious 
challenge to Japan’s relationship with the EU as a 
whole.
Britain as Japan’s Primary Partner in Europe
It is hardly a new phenomenon that Japan regards 
the UK as its primary partner in Europe. Tokyo 
saw London as its top partner in Europe before 
Britain’s accession to the European Economic 
Community in 1973, with the modern relationship 
stretching back to the Anglo–Japanese alliance of  
1902. This history might indicate that Britain’s EU 
membership is not necessarily a precondition for 
the Anglo–Japanese relationship. Nevertheless, in 
the postwar period, Japan’s motivations in reaching 
out to the UK have always been inextricably linked 
to Japan’s relations with Europe as a whole. Since 
the 1960s, Tokyo has consistently expected London 
to act as a force to encourage the outward-looking 
nature of  the Common Market. Britain’s free-trade 
and business-friendly credentials have always been 
something that Japan relies upon in its relations 
with Europe’s Single Market.
It is well known in Japan that the UK has always 
been a reluctant partner in European integra-
tion, and that the country chose not to join the 
European single currency (indeed, there are many 
books and articles on Britain’s relations with the 
EU in Japanese).150 Some Japanese even express 
sympathy toward Britain’s uneasy relations with the 
European continent in light of  Japan’s own posi-
tion. Both the UK and Japan are island nations 
and maritime powers. Although some expectations 
that Britain would join the euro and fears of  nega-
tive consequences from Britain’s opt-out from the 
single currency were often expressed in the 1990s 
and early 2000s, London today remains one of  the 
most important international financial markets, and 
exports from Britain to the euro zone do not seem 
to be hindered by currency fluctuation or transac-
tion costs. In short, Japanese stakeholders have 
come to terms with Britain’s unique position within 
the EU over the past decades.
Britain as a Gateway to the EU Market
However, the increasing seriousness of  Britain’s 
domestic EU debate presents a fundamentally dif-
ferent challenge for Japan. Concerns revolve first 
and foremost around the implications for trade and 
investment that Britain’s exit from the EU would 
have. More than 1,300 Japanese companies have 
invested in the UK, creating an estimated 130,000 
jobs. The UK has the largest concentration of  
Japanese investments in Europe. It is difficult to 
tell to what extent this investment is directly depen-
dent on Britain’s membership in the EU, but what 
is undeniable is that many Japanese companies use 
Britain as a gateway to the EU market. The most 
notable examples include Toyota and Nissan, which 
export cars to various EU countries without need-
ing to pay tariffs or adjusting to local standards and 
regulations.
It is therefore hardly surprising that those compa-
nies have already voiced concerns and indicated 
that they would need to reconsider their investment 
plans in the future, should the UK leave the EU 
and its Single Market. Compared to investment in 
the financial sector, car manufacturing is believed 
Japan
Michito Tsuruoka
In Japan, there is a growing perception that Britain is losing its traditionally pragmatic attitude toward the 
European Union – and that this development is hardly helpful for Britain itself, not only for public diploma-
cy, but also for doing business, regardless of the country’s ultimate decision on its EU membership .
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to be the most vulnerable sector in view of  an 
exit.151 Short of  actually leaving the EU, mere 
uncertainty about the future of  Britain’s relation-
ship with the EU, exemplified by the promise of  
holding an in/out referendum, seems enough to 
make Japanese investors nervous.
A paper submitted in July 2013 by the Japanese 
government to the UK government’s review of  
the balance of  competences between the UK and 
the EU voices some important concerns about 
the possible adverse impacts of  Britain’s leaving 
the EU.152 While Tokyo makes clear that it has no 
intention to intervene in Britain’s domestic political 
debate about the EU, the paper does not hide its 
wish to see the UK remain within the European 
Union, stating that it “expects that the UK will 
maintain a strong voice and continue to play a 
major role in the EU.” Also, although the paper is 
not intended as a warning, it argues that Japanese 
companies have invested in the UK “as part of  the 
Single Market of  the EU” and to use the country 
“as a gateway to the European market,” and goes 
on to argue that it “expects the UK to maintain 
this favorable role.” That this Japanese government 
paper attracted media attention in Britain demon-
strates that the possible investment implications are 
serious and sensitive.
At the same time, the UK’s role as a champion of  
free trade in the EU, where some countries are 
inclined to more protectionist ideas, is still seen 
to be a significant strength for UK–Japanese rela-
tions. David Cameron is reported to have played a 
major role in building an EU consensus on starting 
FTA negotiations with Japan in 2011. Tokyo has 
often relied on London to channel its positions to 
the EU as a whole. The value of  the UK in this 
regard will be missed should the country leave the 
EU. Japan’s trade and economic relations with the 
EU and the UK after its exit would depend on 
the sort of  relationship that the EU and Britain 
end up concluding – a European Economic Area 
(EEA) membership, customs union, FTA and so 
forth. An FTA and Strategic Partnership Agree-
ment currently being negotiated between Japan 
and the EU will only apply to EU member states. 
Japan would therefore need to conclude a separate 
agreement (assuming WTO rules are not deemed 
enough) with the UK after it has left the EU. While 
concluding such a new arrangement should not be 
difficult in substance, it could take a long time sim-
ply due to administrative and procedural burdens, 
which might have negative economic consequences 
for both countries.
Britain as a Reliable Voice in  
European Foreign Policy
For Japan, the implications of  a possible Brit-
ish departure from the EU go beyond trade and 
investment. The aforementioned government paper 
states that it “appreciates the role that the UK has 
played in the activities of  the EU in various fields 
such as politics, the economy and security.” Indeed, 
the UK is a strong advocate for the EU’s engage-
ment in the world, and has more than once played 
a critical role in the development of  European for-
eign policy and EU defense.
As a country that has a history of  engagement, 
regional expertise, and commercial and other 
national interests in Asia, Britain has often been 
the leading voice in the development of  the EU’s 
Asia policy. London – including Britons working in 
various EU institutions – is believed to have played 
a crucial role, for example, in the start of  the EU–
Japan strategic dialogue on the East Asian security 
environment in 2005 and the drafting of  policy 
guidelines for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy in East Asia in 2006–2007153 and 2012.154
If  it were to leave the EU, Britain would not lose 
its interests in Asia. On the contrary, it is often 
argued that Britain needs to leave the EU to better 
engage with emerging powers like China and India. 
However, leaving the EU would mean that Britain’s 
role in shaping the direction of  European foreign 
policy would be lost; the prospect of  dealing with 
an “EU without Britain” is not something that 
Japan is eager to see.
Meanwhile, recent years have seen Britain and 
Japan strengthen their bilateral security and defense 
partnership.155 This includes strategic dialogues at 
various levels and intelligence and defense equip-
ment cooperation. The idea of  conducting joint 
military exercises and negotiating an Acquisition 
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and Cross-Servicing Agreement was endorsed on 
the occasion of  Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit 
to London in May 2014.156 Security and defense 
cooperation of  this sort – the areas where the EU 
has little or no role – is not directly dependent on 
Britain’s status as an EU member. For example, the 
value of  Britain as a partner in intelligence coop-
eration is highly unlikely to be affected, as London’s 
intelligence activities operate almost entirely inde-
pendent of  the EU.
Nevertheless, Japan’s efforts to ensure synergies 
between its cooperation with the EU as a whole 
and its cooperation with individual European coun-
tries, like the UK, France, and Germany, would be 
complicated. As long as Britain remains in the EU, 
its bilateral cooperation with Japan can contribute 
to the EU–Japan relationship and vice versa. How-
ever, if  the UK were to leave the EU – not least 
if  afterward the UK–EU relationship would turn 
out to be rocky – UK–Japan cooperation might 
need a new set of  justifications vis-à-vis Brussels. 
Tokyo would face a difficult challenge in prevent-
ing Anglo-Japanese cooperation from undermining 
the EU–Japan relationship. Tokyo would not want 
to find itself  in a situation where it is required to 
choose between London and Brussels.
Britain: No Longer a Rational and  
Pragmatic Player?
Another important aspect is how Britain is per-
ceived in its debate on the EU. Many Japanese 
observers are aware that Prime Minister David 
Cameron’s promise of  an in/out referendum can 
be understood only as a domestic political move. 
They believe, or want to believe, that the current 
phase of  tense debates on this issue will pass as 
the political climate changes, therefore dismissing 
the seriousness of  the current debates. After all, 
Cameron did not make his promise of  an in/out 
referendum acting as prime minister, but rather as 
the Conservative Party leader; it will happen only 
if  the Conservatives win the next election in 2015. 
However, the mere fact that Britain’s membership 
in the EU is being questioned causes uncertainty 
about the direction of  the country.
At the same time, some Japanese observers are 
beginning to question the rationality and pragma-
tism of  the British and wondering where Britain is 
headed given the current state of  the debate about 
Europe in the UK, where fundamentalist and 
inflammatory rhetoric against Brussels has been 
on the rise. For example, the argument that the UK 
could better compete with emerging economies like 
China and India and secure better trade deals with 
those countries by acting alone rather than as part 
of  the EU is hard to believe for Japanese observers. 
Some people cannot help but sense an element of  
British arrogance in such an argument.
Of  course, not all elements of  the debate are 
unconstructive. For sure, there are some legitimate 
grounds why British business sees EU regulations 
as increasingly burdensome and it is one of  the 
major reasons why the British business community 
is becoming more Eurosceptic. London’s calls for a 
thorough reform of  the way the EU works seems 
legitimate and Tokyo shares some of  London’s 
concerns. However, a growing perception in Japan 
that Britain is becoming more fundamentalist and 
losing its traditionally pragmatic attitude towards 
the EU are hardly helpful for Britain itself, not only 
for public diplomacy, but also for doing business 
with Britain – regardless of  the nation’s ultimate 
decision on its EU membership.
The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not repre-
sent those of  the National Institute for Defense Studies, the 
Ministry of  Defense, or the Government of  Japan.
DGAPanalyse 16 | September 2014
96
DGAPanalyse 16 | September 2014
97
A colony of  Britain for almost a century and a 
half  (1819–1959), Singapore grew to become the 
“Gibraltar of  the East” and one of  one of  the fore-
most entrepôt hubs in the British Empire by the 
eve of  World War II. After Singapore gained inter-
nal self-government in 1959 (it subsequently joined 
the Federation of  Malaysia in 1963–1965 before 
becoming a separate, independent state), Singapore 
grew to become one of  the shining success stories 
of  rising Asia, and one of  the richest states in the 
world, with a per capita GDP higher than many of  
the older EU member states.
Thousands of  Singaporean students pursue edu-
cational degrees in the UK, making Singaporeans 
(despite the country’s small population of  five 
million) one of  the largest contingents of  foreign 
students in the country. Singapore is the EU’s fifth-
largest external investor, and the second-largest 
Asian investor (after Japan but ahead of  China). 
Over three-quarters of  Singapore investments in 
the European Union go to the UK alone. The bulk 
of  this is in the real estate, transport, and tour-
ism sectors. Singapore’s Temasek Holdings, one 
of  the most important sovereign wealth funds in 
the world, opened its European office in London 
in March 2014. The Queen has made three state 
visits to independent Singapore (in 1972, 1989, and 
2006).
Defense
The only formal defense agreement that Singa-
pore has signed with a European country is the 
Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA, 1972), 
which commits the UK, Australia, and New Zea-
land to consult in the event of  a military threat or 
attack on Singapore and Malaysia. In practice, the 
FPDA promotes defense exchanges and joint exer-
cises, but is not an actual defense treaty containing 
an automatic mutual defense clause like NATO’s 
Article 5. The Singaporean defense attaché and 
Defence Technology Office in Europe (which 
used to be based in London) is now in Paris. This 
is because Singapore has expanded its defense 
cooperation activities with continental European 
partners. There has been an Advanced Jet Training 
detachment in Cazaux (in the southwest of  France) 
since 1998. Important military procurements and 
joint defense technology development have been 
pursued with the defense establishments of  France 
and Sweden, among other EU states.
Trade
One of  the most trade-dependent and pro-free-
trade countries in the world, Singapore has pursued 
a dual track of  negotiating multilateral trade agree-
ments and bilateral preferential trade arrangements 
for its economic survival and prosperity. Its first 
free-trade agreement was concluded under ASEAN 
(the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, or AFTA) in 
1993. Singapore now has eighteen free-trade agree-
ments in force, and is actively seeking new ones, 
including with the European Union.
As a potential economic hub for European access 
into Southeast Asia’s emerging markets, Singapore 
has been targeted by the European Commission 
as a key trade partner. However, a UK exit could 
alter the political character and overall economic 
policies of  the European Union. A British exit 
is viewed in Singapore as a prospect that may 
undermine the liberal free-trade character of  the 
EU, and which would negatively affect not only 
the UK’s standing, but also the aggregate power 
of  the EU in international economics, politics, 
and security. Within the framework of  the Treaty 
of  Lisbon’s principle of  qualified-majority voting, 
the exit of  one of  the EU’s “big three” mem-
ber states would represent a recalibration of  the 
power dynamics, where the remaining larger 
member states have increasing decision-making 
power. The UK is viewed as the leader in advo-
Singapore
Reuben Wong
Britain is one of Singapore’s closest partners in Europe . This closeness is evident on many fronts: histori-
cal, political, economic, and cultural, as well as educational and familial . But Singapore’s relations with the 
United Kingdom are also pragmatic and not unduly affected by the role that Britain plays or does not play 
in the European Union .
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cating free trade. Hence, a British exit or reduced 
British influence in the EU might present chal-
lenges to the EU’s commitment to free trade.
In 2012, EU–Singapore FTA (EUSFTA) negotia-
tions were concluded. However, because of  delays 
the EUSFTA has yet to be ratified by the Euro-
pean Parliament, which will now be done under the 
new Parliament elected in the May 2014 elections. 
Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong called 
for the support of  the European Parliament and 
all 28 EU member countries for the EUSFTA at 
the opening of  Temasek Holdings’ Europe Office 
in London in March 2014. He also underlined the 
significance of  the EUSFTA in allowing Asian 
companies to “use London as a base to venture 
into Europe.” There is uncertainty over whether a 
UK exit might necessitate a renegotiation of  trade 
agreements between Singapore and the UK, and 
whether new agreements to protect investments 
would need to be made. Currently, the EU is Sin-
gapore’s biggest export destination, ahead of  China 
and the United States, and Singapore is the EU’s 
largest trading partner in Southeast Asia. Analysis 
by Europa estimates that EUSFTA will benefit the 
EU’s real GDP with a growth of  around 550 mil-
lion euros over a ten-year period, while the Singa-
porean economy will experience a 2.7 billion euros 
growth over the same period.
Moreover, Europe sees Singapore as the gateway 
to ASEAN, a dynamic and growing market of  650 
million people. While a significant portion of  EUS-
FTA is hinged on the role of  the UK (including its 
negotiated provision for increased access for Euro-
pean financial services to Singapore – and this con-
stitutes Britain’s primary industry), trade and eco-
nomic liberalization remain imperative for Europe 
2020’s vision of  “a more competitive economy 
with higher employment.” To complement and 
reinforce the EUSFTA, negotiations for the EU-
Singapore Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(ESPCA) were concluded in May 2013 to develop 
broad-based cooperation in security, energy, mari-
time transport, air services, science and technology, 
and to facilitate mobility of  students and scholars 
within the Erasmus Mundus program. Singapore’s 
negotiations with the EU on an investment agree-
ment, which would be added to the EUSFTA as an 
“investment chapter,” is expected to be completed 
by this summer. A failure to ratify the EUSFTA 
might damage the credibility of  the EU as a seri-
ous international actor with stable interests. As the 
EU’s first free-trade agreement in Southeast Asia 
(and only its second in Asia), the EUSFTA is seen 
as a model for the EU’s ongoing and future FTAs 
with Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Vietnam.
Singapore’s interests in the EU remain primarily 
economic. Whereas ties are predominantly bilateral 
vis-à-vis European member states, reflected for 
example in the Singapore-France Joint Declaration 
on Strategic Partnership, and “The Way Ahead” 
between Singapore and Germany, the EUSFTA 
would become the first multilateral economic 
framework for Singapore and Europe (aside from 
ASEM which has been criticized as a mere “talk 
shop”). A British withdrawal from the EU has the 
potential to impact on the EU’s political character; 
Singapore and other Asian countries would there-
fore watch closely to see if  the EU remains open 
to free trade should the UK cease to be a player in 
EU decision-making.
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David Cameron considers Dutch Prime Minister 
Mark Rutte one of  his main allies in Europe. This 
is not surprising since the two leaders share a simi-
lar approach to European Union issues. The two 
center-right politicians support free trade, promote 
austerity to remedy the economic crisis, and seek 
a “leaner and meaner” EU. Their domestic politi-
cal environments are comparable too. Both lead a 
coalition government with a pro-EU junior partner 
but have to align this aspect with a growing chal-
lenge to their leadership from Euroskeptics, within 
as well as outside their parties. These commonali-
ties are a sound basis for cooperation, and, regard-
less of  the current leadership, the Netherlands 
traditionally has been politically close to the United 
Kingdom.
The Hague championed British EU membership 
in the 1970s and still considers it central to the 
effective promotion of  Dutch interests inside the 
European Union – whether it is an open, liberal 
European economy and a deeper Single Market, 
or a more ambitious European foreign policy 
with an Atlanticist touch. Economically, relations 
between the two countries are very close. The UK 
is the most popular destination for Dutch invest-
ment, and the Netherlands is the second-largest 
investor in Britain (after the United States). The 
Netherlands is the UK’s third-largest trading part-
ner (after the United States and Germany). In 2013, 
Dutch imports from Britain totaled £34 billion, 
and exports to the UK were worth £36 billion. 
Moreover, the UK values the Netherlands as a like-
minded country that sits at the heart of  the euro 
zone. Downing Street uses its relations with the 
Dutch to pursue common objectives, among oth-
ers, to help shape favorable outcomes in euro zone 
decision-making. (For example, the Netherlands 
helped the UK oppose a European financial trans-
actions tax.)
A “Brexit” would be troubling for the Netherlands: 
the Dutch are wary that it would rearrange the 
political balance inside the EU in favor of  southern 
countries that support greater state intervention 
in the Single Market. Moreover, the Netherlands 
has traditionally sought a triangular balance of  
power in which France, the UK, and Germany 
keep each other in check. Were the UK to leave, 
the Netherlands would need to recalibrate its 
diplomacy toward Paris and Berlin – something it 
is less comfortable with. In security policy, in the 
past two decades the Netherlands has avoided the 
need to choose between NATO and the develop-
ment of  the EU’s Common Security and Defence 
Policy. Britain leaving the European Union, how-
ever, would force the issue on the Dutch. For this 
reason, political elites and policymakers are hostile 
to the idea of  the UK leaving the EU, making the 
Netherlands a natural ally for Cameron’s pursuit of  
EU reform.
The Hague winced, however, when Cameron 
announced his intention – should he win the next 
UK general election – to renegotiate the terms of  
British EU membership, pursue treaty change, and 
hold an in/out referendum by 2017. Not only does 
the Netherlands have experience with the unpre-
dictability of  referendums (we need only recall the 
Dutch “no” vote for the European constitutional 
treaty in 2004), but politicians are concerned about 
the impact of  Cameron’s agenda on Dutch politics; 
it has already spurred calls for a Dutch referen-
dum, and talk of  a Brexit has energized a domestic 
debate about a “Nexit.”
Over the past decade, Euroskeptic opinion has 
increased in the Netherlands. Its most obvious, 
current exponent is the Freedom Party (PVV) led 
by Geert Wilders. Much like Nigel Farage and his 
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), 
Wilders has become an important political force, 
The Netherlands
Rem Korteweg
The Netherlands wants the United Kingdom in the European Union, and the government of Mark Rutte 
will work with London to push a reform agenda – but not at any price . If David Cameron hopes to attract 
the support of the allies he needs, then he must be a team player and show greater awareness of the EU 
debates in like-minded countries . Regrettably, a British sense of “narcissistic victimization” toward the EU 
risks alienating even its natural ally in The Hague .
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changing the terms of  the Dutch EU debate. He 
has tapped into popular discontent about the EU, 
raising concerns about immigration, euro zone 
bailouts, welfare fraud, and the EU budget. Many 
Dutch voters feel that their political elites did not 
take the “no” vote in the constitutional referen-
dum seriously and have instead promoted further 
EU integration. The majority of  Dutch citizens 
say that the EU is neither on the right track nor 
that Dutch national interests are being adequately 
protected within the EU. Cameron’s Bloomberg 
speech in January 2013 gave voice to this senti-
ment. Following the speech, in an effort to pre-
empt Wilders, even mainstream opposition parties 
such as the Christian Democrats suggested EU 
competences should flow back to member states. 
On February 10, 2013, a public opinion poll found 
that nearly three-quarters of  Dutch respondents 
believed that too many national competences had 
been transferred to Brussels.157 In January 2014, 
another survey found that two-thirds of  Dutch 
respondents would want a referendum if  new com-
petences are assigned to the EU.158 It even sparked 
a grassroots initiative that lobbied, unsuccessfully, 
for a referendum on Dutch EU membership.
Reform, Not Referendum
A change to the EU treaties would trigger such a 
referendum in the Netherlands – for instance, if  
EU leaders decided to codify new euro zone gov-
ernance structures or certain British opt-outs fol-
lowing a renegotiation process. Even though public 
opinion polls suggest that in a referendum the 
Netherlands would in fact narrowly vote for stay-
ing in the European Union, the government does 
not want to find out. Instead, The Hague favors 
reforms that do not require treaty change.
Rutte agrees with many of  Cameron’s principles. 
He too wants a more competitive Europe and 
a more modest European Commission. He too 
wants a stronger role for national parliaments and 
that issues be tackled at the “national level where 
possible, European where necessary.” Like Cam-
eron, Rutte wants to reduce EU red tape and to 
confront welfare fraud.
But although the substance is similar, the style is 
different. Cameron has tried to manage British 
Euroskeptic sentiment by announcing a referen-
dum; Rutte has taken a softer line. In an effort to 
stem the rising tide of  domestic Euroskeptics, his 
government has focused on subsidiarity – a con-
cept enshrined in the EU treaties that says the EU 
should only legislate if  it leads to better results than 
legislating at the national level – and stricter policy 
priorities for the new Commission. A subsidiar-
ity agenda was launched in 2013, identifying 54 
points where the Netherlands does not want the 
EU to be involved. The Hague also said that “the 
time of  an ‘ever closer union’ in every possible 
policy area is behind us.” The rhetoric chimes with 
Downing Street’s, but the Dutch agenda does not 
imply a repatriation of  powers, and it promises less 
far-reaching change than many Tory backbench-
ers would like. Moreover, the Netherlands seeks 
a political “gentlemen’s agreement” involving the 
European Parliament, the European Commission, 
and the member states to focus the Commission’s 
agenda in the coming years.
In Brussels, Cameron uses the threat of  leaving as 
a negotiating instrument, while Rutte seeks reforms 
through political deals and a better application of  
the existing treaties. This divergent style threatens 
to cause a rift between the two governments. For 
instance, in June 2014, Cameron was disappointed 
that the Netherlands did not publicly back the 
UK’s campaign to stop Jean-Claude Juncker from 
becoming Commission president. The Juncker 
debate laid bare the limits of  The Hague’s sup-
port for London. Rutte might have agreed that the 
Luxembourger is not the best person for the job, 
but Cameron’s uncompromising attitude made it 
difficult for Rutte to support him. In EU politics, 
the Netherlands understands the need to reach 
compromises behind closed doors and disapproves 
of  public brinkmanship. Besides, Cameron’s very 
public dismissal of  Juncker – and his implicit threat 
that Juncker’s appointment would bring a UK exit 
closer – hit another nerve. As a general principle, 
the Netherlands favors a strong EU and a bal-
ance of  power among the larger states precisely so 
that one large member state cannot force its posi-
tion onto others. The UK’s tactics over Juncker’s 
appointment questioned this principle. As a smaller 
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country with an economic stake in the EU’s politi-
cal success, the Netherlands has an interest in being 
a team player.
This leads to the root of  Dutch concern about 
the “British question.” In spite of  close bilateral 
relations, in private, senior Dutch policymakers 
share their exasperation about what they perceive 
as British “narcissistic victimization” regarding the 
EU. By this they mean the self-absorbed quality of  
the EU debate within Britain, which fails to appre-
ciate that many of  Britain’s concerns are shared 
by numerous member states – as if  “Brussels” is 
uniquely unpopular in the UK, and Britain uniquely 
suffers from EU policies. It has created greater 
British antagonism toward the EU, a transactional 
mind-set, and it reduces Britain’s willingness to 
compromise. Dutch policymakers are concerned 
that this will produce British alienation rather than 
British allies. The Netherlands wants the UK in the 
EU, and it will work with the UK to push a reform 
agenda, but not at any price. If  Cameron hopes to 
attract the support of  the allies he needs, then he 
must show greater awareness about the EU debates 
in like-minded countries and adjust his tactics 
accordingly.
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Unsurprisingly, the debate in Brazil about the pos-
sibility of  Britain leaving the European Union has 
played a minor role in the political and media land-
scape. European integration as a whole still poses 
numerous questions for Brazilian political circles 
and for the foreign ministry itself, which to this day 
maintains separate divisions for eastern and west-
ern Europe and has yet to create a unified division 
for EU member states as a whole. This in itself  
reflects the perplexity – for the Brazilian foreign 
policy bureaucracy and for the government itself  
– of  dealing with the EU as a whole, while simul-
taneously maintaining various levels of  bilateral 
engagement with its 28 member states on issues 
ranging from development to trade, innovation, 
collective security and beyond. With this in mind, 
Brazilian views on a UK exit from the EU should 
be viewed in light of  the general perception of  
the EU in Brazil as well as the country’s complex 
relations with individual EU member states. This 
brings to the fore ideas about power, sovereignty, 
and autonomy that constitute the pillars of  Bra-
zil’s own approach to regionalism and guide – to a 
greater or lesser extent – its foreign relations.
These concepts have been the basis of  Brazil’s 
own relations with the UK, which under the three 
consecutive governments of  the Workers Party 
(PT) – two led by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and 
one by Dilma Rousseff  – have been strengthened 
both in terms of  volume and investment. From 
2003 to 2013, Brazilian exports to the UK grew by 
almost 120 percent, making the UK Brazil’s elev-
enth-largest trading partner. Significantly, among 
the other EU member states, only Germany is 
higher on the list of  Brazil’s major trading partners. 
Relations with the UK have also been strength-
ened on the level of  political discourse. This has 
included the signature of  a Strategic Partnership 
and a number of  initiatives in such areas as educa-
tion, science and technology, and development. 
Britain is viewed as a traditional power as well as a 
normative power; it holds material resources (eco-
nomic, technological, in terms of  innovation) as 
well as a particular worldview and active global role 
that give it a wide reach, not least due to its perma-
nent seat on the UN Security Council.
A Fresh Focus
The current British government’s decision to focus 
on Brazil as an important emerging power and 
potential partner therefore brought a warm recep-
tion in Brazil. This strategy – promoted by former 
Foreign Secretary William Hague – was viewed as 
a manifestation of  the British government’s prag-
matic foreign policy vision, which aims to increase 
the country’s ability to penetrate new and emerging 
markets. In some media and political circles this 
emphasis on commercial, pragmatic and economic 
diplomacy, which led the Foreign and Common-
wealth Office to engage more with Brazil, is linked 
to British skepticism about the EU and European 
integration. The argument put forth is that the 
more consideration the UK gives to the possibility 
of  leaving, the more effort it will invest in build-
ing stronger commercial and other ties with mar-
kets outside the EU. This needs to be taken into 
account when we consider the significant percent-
age of  UK trade and investment flows with the rest 
of  the EU. From a Brazilian perspective, this would 
need to be partially substituted by other regions 
were Britain to exit the EU.
In the same spirit, the fact that the UK has redi-
rected its attention to Latin America after over fifty 
years of  relative indifference can be linked to the 
need for diversification of  UK foreign policy. It is 
part of  an attempt to move a bit further from the 
narrow and heavy emphasis on the EU and, in a 
similar way, to reorganize relations with the United 
States following the debacle in Iraq.
Brazil
Elena Lazarou
Brazil has received greater attention from Britain of late, with the two countries increasing trade and 
concluding bilateral partnerships and initiatives . Yet Brazil’s strategy toward the European Union and its 
individual member states remains uncoordinated . A Britain apart would be subject to more criticism on a 
political level – currently tempered by its EU membership – but would be free to cement free trade rela-
tions with Brazil on its own terms, providing these complementary economies with immediate benefits .
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The recognition of  emerging powers, including 
Brazil, as the “rising stars” of  a new global order 
is sometimes treated in Brazil with a degree of  tri-
umphalism. The coincidence of  this phenomenon 
with the onset of  a prolonged economic and socio-
political crisis in the EU, the cradle of  regional 
integration, has led to a subtle but definitely pres-
ent discussion in Brazilian academic and political 
circles regarding the benefits and desired nature of  
regionalism. Deep integration, supranationalism, 
and the delegation of  sovereignty – once rhetori-
cally hailed as the model for any type of  proposed 
regional cooperation in Latin and South America 
– have increasingly been questioned, as the advan-
tages of  European integration become less visible, 
and as Euroskepticism rises across Europe. In this 
respect, the proposal for a referendum on the UK’s 
EU membership, which might result in a public 
rejection of  the advantages of  European integra-
tion, has been used by skeptics of  “too much 
regionalism” in Brazil as a reason for caution and 
justification for the support of  strictly intergovern-
mental regional cooperation, where national lead-
ers and legislatives maintain their sovereignty. This 
has added to the problems faced by Mercosur (the 
regional customs union made up of  Brazil, Argen-
tina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Bolivia), 
which some hoped might develop like the EU.
“The West and the Rest”
In spite of  these views, Brazil maintains a view of  
the world dominated by the division between “the 
Global North and the Global South” and “the 
West and the Rest” – between established powers 
and the developing world. In this mental map, Brit-
ain undoubtedly belongs to Europe and is naturally 
part of  the European space. It is also undoubtedly 
the European country with the closest relations 
with the United States – whose relations with 
Brazil have recently been scarred by the trauma 
of  espionage, with the UK seen as an accomplice 
of  the United States. The UK is also perceived 
– co rrectly – as a country with a strong colonial 
past, the memory of  which survives through the 
Commonwealth. As part of  the EU, however, 
Britain sheds some of  these negative character-
istics, instead becoming a more like-minded and 
trustworthy partner for Brazil. If  the UK were to 
withdraw from the EU, Britain and Brazil would 
undoubtedly diverge on issues of  collective security 
and intervention, and possibly in the area of  global 
financial governance. While the UK regularly sup-
ports sanctions and other forms of  intervention 
in the UN Security Council, Brazil – when present 
in a nonpermanent member capacity – tends to 
abstain. UNSC Resolution 1973 of  March 2011, 
relating to the intervention in Libya, is a case in 
point. With regard to multilateral trade arrange-
ments, such divergence became obvious when the 
UK supported the Mexican rather than the Brazil-
ian candidate for WTO director, claiming that they 
shared closer views of  trade liberalization. Should 
Britain decide to go it alone, London would be 
likely to raise a louder voice in international affairs 
on such issues, promoting views and policies that 
might be inconsistent with Brazilian objectives.
A slight exception to this relates to interregional 
commercial negotiations. Despite a decade of  
negotiations, there is no sign that a free-trade 
agreement between Mercosur and the EU will be 
reached anytime soon, not least due to the inability 
to forge consensus within both blocs. Were the 
UK to exit the EU, and therefore free itself  from 
the constraints of  the EU’s common commercial 
policy, it would be able to conclude a free-trade 
agreement with Brazil more rapidly, and this gives 
Brazil something to feel hopeful about. The com-
plementarity of  the Brazilian and British economies 
would guarantee that such an agreement would be 
mutually profitable, helping boost Brazilian exports 
of  raw and semi-manufactured products to the UK 
as well as its industry by importing capital goods 
and factors of  production.
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Discussions of  the future of  Britain’s relations with 
the EU too often focus on debates and speculation 
about what a “Brexit” might mean for Britain. But 
the future of  UK–EU relations is not only of  con-
cern to the UK. British positions on the euro zone, 
reform of  the EU, and, should it ever happen, a 
Brexit could have significant implications for the 
rest of  the EU and countries beyond it.
This volume gathers twenty-six views from sixteen 
member states, nine non-EU countries, and a view 
from the EU’s institutions in Brussels. By doing so, 
it brings together a range of  national viewpoints 
on the direction of  the UK’s relations with the EU, 
what this direction means for the countries con-
cerned, and what it could mean for the future of  
the EU. The contributions also give an insight into 
how the current EU debate in Britain is perceived 
in other countries, where it has already left its 
mark. Regardless of  whether Britain will ever leave 
the EU, this project shows that the way in which 
Britain’s current EU debate is being perceived also 
shapes how the country’s place in the EU will be 
seen in the years to come.
Five overall themes emerge from the contributions.
First, developments in the UK have not passed unno-
ticed. But there are varying levels of  understanding 
as to what is driving UK behavior and a great deal of  
uncertainty about what its impact could be for the EU 
and the other countries covered. The possibility of  
Britain leaving the EU is one that has been raised in 
many countries, but is often made in passing, largely 
with reference to what it would mean for trade, eco-
nomics, and security. There is next to no sign that any 
country is actively planning for it, but many states 
are aware that this may become necessary because 
of  developments in the UK’s domestic debate. This 
matters more for some states than others. For Ireland, 
a UK exit from the EU would be a “doomsday sce-
nario.” For some countries, such as Slovenia, it would 
matter largely in terms of  its political ramifications 
for the rest of  the EU. And for some states that have 
traditionally been close to the UK, such as Sweden, 
Poland, and the Netherlands, the UK’s behavior may 
be pushing them slowly into positions where, despite 
not planning for a European Union without Britain, 
this prospect might become easier to adapt to owing 
to their fraying links with the UK.
As editors we noticed that several of  the first drafts 
submitted referred to David Cameron’s January 
2013 Europe speech as if  he had been speaking 
for the British government (rather than as the 
leader of  the Conservative Party, making a com-
mitment to seeking a renegotiation and referendum, 
should his party win the general election in May 
2015). At the same time, as Roderick Parkes notes 
in the chapter on Poland, there is an awareness 
that while Cameron might have been speaking first 
and foremost as the leader of  the Conservatives, 
his position nevertheless reflects that Britain has a 
fundamental problem with the EU that it has been 
unwilling to deal with for a long time. This assess-
ment is also found among other member states 
and reflects longer-running feelings about the UK, 
namely, that this turn is something that has been 
waiting to happen for many years, and that has 
helped to reinforce a perception, found in several 
contributions, that the UK is headed for a referen-
dum and exit no matter what happens.
Second, awareness of  the UK’s position and the 
possibility of  its exit is largely framed by wider 
concerns facing the EU, especially the euro zone.
For many states, the UK and relations with it are 
important, and the EU would be a lesser place 
without the UK. Ultimately, however, the UK is 
secondary to these countries’ relations with the 
EU. This applies not only to states within the EU 
but also to some outside it, i.e. Australia and New 
Zealand, Singapore, Japan, and China. For many 
states, the UK’s relationship with the EU, whether 
as a renegotiated relationship or after leaving it, 
will matter in terms of  what it means for the EU 
and the wider geopolitical situation in Europe. As 
Emmanuel Sigalas makes clear in writing on the 
perspective from Austria, the implications would 
not simply be economic but also political. The 
UK’s leaving would take the EU into uncharted 
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territory, with potentially formidable challenges 
for the future of  supranational institutions and 
European integration in general. Fabian Zuleeg’s 
view from Brussels underlines this point. How the 
EU would change is therefore just as important a 
question as how the UK might change if  it were 
to leave, and how individual bilateral relations with 
the UK might change. Countries such as the Neth-
erlands, Sweden, and Italy favor the counterbalance 
to Germany and France that the UK has provided; 
the UK’s exit could fundamentally change the EU’s 
internal balance of  power. The UK should not 
take this as a sign that it can put itself  in a posi-
tion where others have to choose between the UK 
and the EU. All states wish to retain strong links 
to the UK, and to work with it to secure both their 
national interests and, for those within the EU, the 
common interests of  the EU. But this will be done 
while remaining committed first and foremost to 
the EU. Even for a state such as Norway, located 
outside the European Union, the lodestar of  Euro-
pean politic is the EU, and this would determine 
relations with the UK.
This does not mean the reform agenda pushed 
by the UK does not appeal to some states. The 
problem for the UK is that the real pressure for 
reform has been, and will remain, within the euro 
zone. This has turned the UK into a bystander – or 
even an additional hurdle, as Juha Jokela notes in 
the chapter on Finland – to what is considered 
the more vital issue. For a country such as Greece, 
which has been fully absorbed by its own malaise 
over the past years, there are fears that a Brexit 
might put the prospect of  a “Grexit” back on the 
agenda. For many states, the focus has been on 
making the core of  the euro zone work again, and 
this will shape how they view relations with the 
outer-tiers. States outside the euro zone, such as 
Poland, Denmark (the other opt-out country apart 
from the UK), Romania, and Bulgaria, might fear 
being trapped in an outer-tier of  a Union that 
becomes more complex and fragmented. A country 
like Romania might fear getting caught in the slip-
stream of  British decisions. This is why countries 
within the euro zone, among the pre-ins, and even 
Denmark with its opt-out, have focused on Ger-
many and France for leadership and have tried to 
secure a place close to euro zone decision-making. 
Reform agendas might well happen to overlap 
with London’s, but with the euro zone continuing 
to move ahead, these agendas might increasingly 
diverge.
Third, as noted above, there is some support for 
the UK’s positions on EU reform. For example, 
there is a good amount of  sympathy for the British 
desire to see steps taken to encourage economic 
dynamism, better regulation, and a sound division 
of  labor between the EU level and member states’ 
level. However, conceptual clarity and language are 
crucial. States such as the Netherlands and Ger-
many seek a better enforcement of  the principle of  
subsidiarity, not repatriation. Subsidiarity, then, can 
go both ways: more and less Europe. A multispeed 
EU is considered a possibility, but not – as the UK 
might hope – in a pick-and-choose fashion. As 
Alexander Stubb points out in his foreword, this is 
not what flexible integration is or should be about. 
Germany, for example, recognizes that even if  the 
UK were to leave, it would need to work with it, 
but would be hesitant about doing so in any way 
that would weaken the EU’s institutions. This is 
what frames Berlin’s concerns about where Britain 
might be headed. France finds it unacceptable that 
some countries want to reap the benefits of  EU 
integration while discarding the constraints. For 
other states, the UK’s ideas might seem tempting, 
but only in the short term and for economic gains. 
There is an underlying view that the proposals are 
not sustainable in the longer run and may lead to a 
fragmentation of  the European Union, a prospect 
that for a number of  countries, such as Slovenia or 
Hungary, comes with powerful imagery and nega-
tive connotations. As Christian Nünlist emphasizes 
in his chapter, Switzerland might have secured 
some form of  cherry-picking and à la carte access 
to the Single Market, but with limits; also, there is 
ever less appetite in Brussels for “third ways” like 
Switzerland’s.
Some in the EU are also hostile to the UK’s 
demands, in particular the way in which Britain is 
going about seeking change. Only the chapters on 
Slovenia and Spain mention the idea that the UK, 
or Cameron, may be trying to blackmail the EU. 
However, underlying many of  the contributions 
is a feeling that the UK is trying to use the threat 
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of  withdrawal as leverage to achieve a renegoti-
ated relationship. The unwillingness by many in the 
EU to discuss the idea of  Britain’s leaving and its 
consequences for the EU, stems in part from a fear 
that this would play to Cameron’s tactics.
Fourth, there are clear concerns, both in EU mem-
ber states and third countries, about the economic 
and, to a lesser degree, security consequences of  
a British exit from the EU. Economic calculations 
are the most easily discerned thinking in all coun-
tries surveyed. It is Britain’s economic approach 
– especially its free-market, liberal outlook – that 
would be the most noticeable loss for the EU. Eco-
nomic dynamism is considered a vital issue, as EU 
members are still feeling the effects of  the recent 
financial crisis. Countries within the EU, Italy for 
instance, fear a British withdrawal could have a 
negative impact on their trade balance and unem-
ployment rates. For states such as Canada, China, 
Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore, a 
British withdrawal could disrupt both trade deals 
and their ongoing relations with the EU. Brazil’s 
perspective is, for the time being, more about 
expectations, for instance regarding a boost to 
bilateral economic relations, but it might get disap-
pointed if  Britain and the EU got stuck in long and 
complicated withdrawal negotiations. At the same 
time, there are limits to how far Britain’s economic 
contribution can take it. Some countries, such as 
Romania, note a growing “mercantilist” attitude in 
British thinking. The UK leaving could therefore 
make it very difficult for them to maintain their 
current economic relations with the UK. Spain 
does not simply look to the UK for economic 
growth, but is instead placing its hopes on further 
economic and monetary union. As Henrik Larsen 
notes in the chapter on Denmark, Britain’s eco-
nomic connection to some states such as Denmark, 
traditionally close to the UK, has been in decline 
for some time. The Irish Republic worries about 
British efforts to undercut it and the rest of  the 
EU. Ireland is perhaps the best example of  the lim-
its to the economic relationship. Despite its large 
economic relationship with the UK, in addition to 
common social, cultural and familial ties, Ireland 
is clear about the EU remaining its priority, rather 
than the UK. Some states, including Ireland, will 
seek to exploit economically Britain’s marginaliza-
tion, using it to strengthen their appeal to investors 
from around the world. As all of  the views from 
outside the EU make clear, this is likely to be recip-
rocated by such states who will look for new eco-
nomic links and partners within the EU.
The UK’s role in the EU’s foreign, security, and 
defense policies is not so easily replaced. Whether 
it is the United States or France, there is a clear 
realization that the EU and Europe’s place in the 
world would lose from a British withdrawal. With-
out Britain, France would face Germany’s “culture 
of  restraint” on external affairs, which could find 
support from other member states. For the United 
States, an EU without Britain would further com-
plicate transatlantic relations by stunting its long-
sought for improvements to the European arm of  
NATO, as well as a reduction in Europe’s depen-
dence on the United States and efforts to make 
Europe take on a more global role. For other EU 
states, losing the UK would be detrimental to the 
EU’s geopolitical thinking. Without the UK, Euro-
pean defense would be unlikely ever to achieve its 
full potential. Outside powers may also seek to play 
on divisions, with China already choosing between 
bilateral and multilateral relations when necessary, 
something the United States has also been accused 
of  in the past. Finally, as James Kilcourse reminds 
us in the chapter on Ireland, the UK’s leaving the 
EU may have negative security implications for the 
situation in Northern Ireland, affecting European 
security closer to home.
Fifth, while these economic and security concerns 
serve to remind countries of  the UK’s role in the 
EU, they do not necessarily generate sympathy for 
the UK. Instead, the outcome is exasperation at 
the UK’s inability to offer leadership, especially in 
those states that have often looked to the UK. This 
band of  British “orphans,” as Roderick Parkes puts 
it, have had to look to other parts of  the EU, Ger-
many in particular, for leadership and influence on 
decisions. The UK’s change from a pragmatic part-
ner to one that seems more ideologically driven is 
noted even by states outside the EU such as Japan 
and Singapore, and also by Germany, a country 
usually seen as having an ideological attachment 
to European integration but which has recently 
adopted a more pragmatic approach to integration.
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The result is a Britain increasingly associated with 
“negative leadership,” one that is even starting to 
undermine the EU’s fundamental values. The UK’s 
debate on limiting immigration is seen as a direct 
attack on the fundamental right of  free movement 
of  people and labor in the Single Market. This has 
been noted throughout the EU, but most painfully 
within states in central and eastern Europe that 
were once close supporters of  the UK, such as 
Poland and Romania. Meanwhile, countries such 
as Austria, the Netherlands, Finland, and Italy fear 
the influence of  British Euroskeptics on their own 
domestic debate and are frustrated with London 
for not successfully confronting the issue at home. 
As the chapters on Germany and Poland note, the 
UK is increasingly seen as a spoiler in the EU. One 
outcome of  this, as touched on earlier, is that the 
UK’s behavior may have led to a situation where 
some states are adapting to the prospect of  its leav-
ing the EU without wishing for it. The UK is seen 
as a state to be worked around as much as one to 
work with.
In facing such a situation, the UK’s options in the 
EU appear quite limited at this point in time. While 
the European Parliament elections in May 2014 
registered dissatisfaction with the EU in countries 
other than Britain, according to the views gath-
ered in this volume, other EU governments are 
not likely to align with the UK; many of  them 
perceive the UK’s long-term EU agenda as opaque 
or unpredictable. While some of  the UK’s criti-
cisms of  the EU and proposals for its reform are 
seen as legitimate, what is not seen as legitimate 
is advancing this as a purely national interest and 
using the threat of  leaving as leverage; whether the 
UK likes it or not, this is how many in the rest of  
the EU interpret UK maneuvering. London will 
have to work harder and engage in more effective 
coalition-building if  it wants to succeed in shaping 
to its own preferences the ongoing debates about 
EU reform.
It is not just the UK that has limited options. 
Britain’s position and the idea of  it leaving the 
European Union is also of  concern to the rest of  
the EU. As many of  the contributions point out, 
a Brexit would be an unprecedented event, with 
unclear and potentially transformative implications 
for the whole of  Europe. For both the EU and the 
UK, it will be difficult to avoid a further deteriora-
tion of  relations. The upcoming national election 
campaign in Britain will not make things easier for 
the rest of  the EU. Overall, compared to previ-
ous episodes of  UK-EU difficulties, the European 
Union today is much larger and in parts much 
deeper. It therefore lacks the intimacy of  a smaller 
organization. Some member states have little if  any 
attachment to the UK. Furthermore, unlike in the 
past, it is no longer so easy for the rest of  the EU 
to wait for either a change of  government in the 
UK or for discussions to find a compromise. The 
British government’s own behavior of  getting close 
to Germany while neglecting, and in some areas 
abusing, relations with former close partners in 
central and eastern Europe and Scandinavia means 
Britain has found itself  on the sidelines of  EU 
politics. Both the UK and rest of  the EU need to 
appreciate that this sideline could easily turn into 
the outside, either by Britain leaving, or by the EU 
leaving the UK behind by integrating in ways that 
exclude it.
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